TRAINING FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY
Captain John Bent
Flying Training Manager (Policy)
Cathay Pacific Airways
INTRODUCTION
New technology. Until October 1994, Cathay Pacific Airways (CPA) in Hong Kong operated airliners manufactured in North America. Therefore the arrival of the first Airbus type in October 1994, was a significant departure from tradition. The A330 was the first twin to be operated by CPA since "Betsy" the C47, CPA's first airliner in 1946, now in the Hong Kong Science Museum. Modern twins, ETOPs, and fly-by-wire operations were all new to the airline.
Perceptions. This paper sets out to balance the extremes of perception within the man-machine debate, as a direct result of the recent experience of introducing new technology to CPA. It has been condensed to a third of the size of the original paper for presentation at the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at Columbus Ohio, in May 1997. As a means of providing feedback from the experience of new technology, a prototype of this paper was written in March 1996. At that time, 18 months into the launch of the A340 and A330, it had become apparent that many perceptions regarding high technology passenger aircraft, established in the minds of the media and the public, were unfounded. It was considered important, both within and outside the airline, that these perceptions were balanced with verdicts derived from actual experience.
The challenge. To this date (April 1997), CPA has introduced into service four A340-200, six A340-300, eleven A330 - 200, and four B777-200 aircraft in thirty months (the A340-200 aircraft have now been returned to lessors). During 1996, the launch of new aircraft types proceeded against a background for the whole airline of 517 cockpit crew transition training events, fueled by new routes and the need to establish a new airline; Cathay Freighters. For an airline with a total of only 1,300 cockpit crew, this was therefore a huge task. During 1998 and beyond, more new B777-300, A340-300, and A330 aircraft will be introduced to CPA.
At the start of the A340/A330 introduction, one new airframe was introduced, and sixteen new A340/A330 pilots trained, every month. Now, after thirty months, 430 pilots in CPA are qualified on A340, A330, or B777 aircraft. 200 of these are now flying both Airbus types routinely on a mixed fleet flying (MFF) roster. CPA is the first airline in the world to have a significant line pilot group flying both twin and quad airliners together commercially. Over 2,000 landings have been completed on A330 and A340 types in base training.
Lessons Learnt. Lessons are always learnt with any new aircraft introduction to service. This paper outlines many of these from a strongly practical and current perspective. A common thread through the introductory process has been an identified need for continued cooperation between designers and pilots, more responsive and appropriate rule making from regulators, and the paramount importance of appropriate training for new technology. The practical experience from CPA negates many modern industry "myths" regarding new technology jet transports. However, most of the CPA experience relating to the introduction of hi-tech aircraft, endorses that of other airlines which have been recently exposed to similar experience. This paper sets out some of these lessons in order to stimulate further debate, with the aim of encouraging improved industry practices on the broadest front possible.
Automation. To set the scene, here is an extract from an article by John Wiley, which quotes former NTSB member John Lauber, as saying: Comments from a number of periodicals, papers, journals, and other documents show that:--- cockpit automation increases, decreases, and redistributes workload. It enhances situational awareness, takes pilots out of the loop, increases head-down time, frees the pilot to scan more often, reduces training requirements, increases training requirements, makes a pilot's job easier, increases fatigue, changes the role of the pilot, has not changed the role, makes things less expensive, more expensive, is highly reliable, minimises human error, leads to error, changes the nature of human error, tunes out small errors, raises likelihood of gross errors, is desired by pilots, is not trusted, leads to boredom, frees pilot from the mundane, and finally increases air safety and has an adverse affect on safety -----. Lauber seemed to have pinpointed the confused perceptions regarding the relationship between automation and pilots! So after the theory, let's have a look at some recent practical experience:
UNDERSTANDING WHAT'S NEW
Research. An organisation which takes on significant new technology without research does so at its peril. In the case of CPA, resources were focused on the practical experience already accumulating worldwide. There are now over seven thousand pilots flying Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft internationally. With such a large number, it was possible to establish a feel for the training objectives necessary for the effective introduction of these types.
Experience. As an early operator of the B747-400, CPA was able to transfer some operational experience of Flight Management Systems (FMS), glass cockpits, and the impact of software changes to the new aircraft. Maximum use was made of this. However, from the outset, it was recognised that design concepts employed by Airbus Industrie were significantly different from Boeing, and two management pilots, Fry and Bent, spent almost two years in pre-launch research. These two pilots, whose most recent experience had been on the Lockheed L1011 Tristar (10 and 14 years respectively), attended an A340 familiarisation course at the Airbus Miami simulator, and flew a number of test aircraft. However, the most useful experience was gained by completing a full A320 transition course in Toulouse, and then flying with Dragonair as Line Captains for a period of six months. During this period approximately 100 sectors were flown by each pilot, mainly into China. Accident data, training and mixed fleet flying issues, were researched with other airlines, regulatory authorities, and safety organisations, and a process was started to try to de-mystify Airbus technology. The objective was to establish facts, and from these it soon became obvious that some extreme perceptions had to be corrected if effective training on type was to be assured. Forums were run for company pilots, in which notable experts in related fields provided knowledge and experience anchored in fact rather than sensationalist media hype.
Design philosophy. Between aircraft manufacturers, there are bound to be different design approaches. This paper concentrates on those of Airbus Industry fly-by-wire design, due to the experience of the author on these types. There are no known pilots yet who have been subjected to equal levels of experience on Boeing and Airbus fly-by-wire types. Therefore, until this happens, it is not possible to be objective regarding different design approaches from a strongly practical perspective. Historically in commercial aviation, differing design philosophies were usually successful in practice, without one being "better" or "worse" than the other. One manufacturer's hype against the design philosophies of the other has usually served the industry poorly, leading to mis-informed public and industry opinion. Our customers, the travelling public, have developed inaccurate perceptions from media hype of recent years. There are obvious areas where design commonality can be sought by all manufacturers, with the common objective of safety, and these areas should provide a positive focus for the industry.
Designing for the past or the future? Designing an aircraft with the objective of the highest levels of efficiency can mean that differences in operational techniques are inevitable. To design the private car of today so that it handles like a model T Ford or a Morris Oxford could be considered to be inappropriate and ridiculous. New operational techniques had to be learnt in the past, when straight wings became swept, and jets replaced piston engines. In all of these cases, sometimes traumatic adjustments had to be made.
Designing to be different. Accepting that the driver for improved design today must be efficiency, man-machine interfaces must, to some extent, change with the introduction of new technology. However, in the pilot-flight deck interface, there are still many examples of the "design-to-be-different" culture from manufacturers, which holds back progress in commonality and safety. The commercial importance for manufacturers to be able to offer "difference" in the competition for customers is fully understood in the areas of efficiency and passenger comfort, but the need to be "different" in flight deck design is questionable. Nowadays, aircraft procurement decisions are made on the basis of airframe efficiency, not flight deck design. It is therefore increasingly likely that cross-manufacturer flight deck commonality would generate improved levels of flight safety without impairing commercial or marketing constraints.
Pilots in design teams. In recent years, manufacturers have indeed involved pilots in design, but "which pilots?" Flight crew are conservative by nature, a healthy trait in normal flight operations, but the employment of senior pilots to recommend future design solutions is likely to result in more of the same. Manufacturers should be careful to select experienced pilots who can abandon "mind sets", and visualise the best solutions in new arenas with open minds. These pilots may not always be younger, but should certainly be pilots who are experienced enough to understand the practical issues, with a blend of the qualities necessary to contribute effectively to design teams.
Understanding the changes. Looking at the broader scheme of things, new design objectives, such as automation for efficiency, drive new concepts of operation for pilots. The contemporary aircraft designer has deliberately severed a number of traditional man-machine connections in areas where computers can manage systems more efficiently than people. The first of these was the FMS (Flight Management System), which forced the pilot to "work through a keyboard". The increased "space" that this automation gives the crew to manage the operation is now well known and welcomed. Pilots have been "unloaded" to allow them to monitor the "big picture" more effectively. The intent has been to reduce human error in systems management, and although there have been some negative outcomes of these developments, effective training has generally been able to neutralise these effects, and support the intended gains.
There are numerous safety-enhancing design features on the new "fly-by-wire" generation of airliners, from both manufacturers involved. The following paragraphs chart some positive aspects of Airbus design (of which the author is familiar), without intending to fuel "inter-manufacturer rivalry", but to dispel some persistent myths.
Sidestick control and envelope protections - "designer-severed interfaces"? An example of a what could be described as a designer-severed interface can be found in the "normal lawote functions of Airbus A319/A320/A321/A330/A340 flight control system. This was designed for simplification of control, to improve efficiency, and to protect the airframe. (This philosophy is hardly new in earlier military aircraft design. Neither, when applied to other systems on airliners. Remember that the first anti-skid systems stopped the brakes operating against the order of the pilot. Who would like to return to the days of skidding on wet runways? Remember the early jet engines without acceleration control units. Who would like to return to the " flame-out on thrust application" of days gone by? Must we be allowed to overstress or stall our aircraft?).
In "normal law" on the Airbus fly-by-wire types the pilot cannot stall, overstress, overbank, or overspeed the aircraft. Is this, as industry commentators have said, such a bad thing for pilots? The pilot flying an "envelope-protected" aircraft can suddenly apply maximum control at any speed, calling upon the lightning response of computers to fly his machine precisely around the edge of the flight envelope. The pilot can instantly place the aircraft in the optimum and most efficient avoidance maneuver possible. His or her chances of avoiding collision with terrain or other aircraft are far higher than is possible through human manipulative skill alone. The pilot still chooses to act, applies control input; and IS in control. He or she simply utilises the most precise tool available - the computer. A simple collision avoidance maneuver in the Airbus simulator, flown by a non-type qualified pilot, or even a non-pilot, convincingly demonstrates the skill level required: NIL!
Designing for avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and Collision. To design for manual recovery from extreme situations, allowing overstressing of the aircraft, is an interesting argument. However, in practice, such manual control inputs would be likely to cause the aircraft to cycle in and out of the flight envelope limits - a most inefficient exercise which can only reduce the efficiency of all lifting surfaces to a sub-optimal level for recovery. Consistent precision flying "near the edge", rarely practiced by line pilots, is quite beyond the capabilities of most, especially when trying to respond rapidly from low levels of arousal at the end of a long flight. Recent research into CFIT has shown that fly-by-wire envelope protected airliners demonstrate average distance and height recovery factors 1,000ft and 50ft less than conventional non-protected aircraft, representing 5 seconds of recovery time. It is likely that in some CFIT accidents, terrain may have been avoided, if the aircraft involved had fly-by-wire envelope protections (data from the Flight Safety Foundation).
Feedback in autothrust - a "designer-severed interface"? As a result of the reliable mechanically linked autothrust systems of the last generation of airliners, pilots have become used to getting a sense of performance trend through throttle/thrust lever movement (in autothrust). For many pilots, this has become, almost indiscernibly, primary performance feedback. "Moving lever" autothrust systems have therefore encouraged pilots to look at the throttles/thrust levers for feedback, rather than the airspeed indicator and trend arrows. This imperceptible, but progressively learnt, behavior has lead to some strong pilot paradigms on this subject. The designers of the A319,320,321,330,340 airliners have eliminated the need to sense performance from throttle/thrust lever movement. Pilots on these types must now look directly, without distraction, at the most accurate source of feedback; aircraft performance. (We should be reminded that in one of the most critical events where feedback is essential to a pilot, engine failure just above V1, a conventional thrust lever tells a pilot that the engine is still running!).
Do we need thrust levers? Maybe, some time in the future, when Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems can tolerate failure to the same level of redundancy as fly-by-wire flight controls (as much as 5 levels rather than two), it may not be necessary to fit thrust levers at all; a switch will do! Meanwhile, existing autothrust systems which provide feedback (moving thrust levers) have, by virtue of potential failure of the required electro-mechanical feedback servos, higher fallibility than the direct digital information displaying thrust and performance on the flight instruments. In the autothrust mode, there have been no accidents where "non-moving" thrust levers played a contributory part, but there have been a number of fatal accidents in which jammed or misinterpreted thrust lever movement was a factor.
Pilot Feedback. At CPA, a pilot is currently flying A330 and A340 aircraft, who has flown B737-300, A320, 747-400, A330, and A340 aircraft, in that order. There is insufficient space here to include his paper on the subject, but to quote an extract: All the selectors for thrust control (Airbus) are incorporated within the thrust levers in the form of thrust lever angle transducers and detent switches. Positioning the thrust levers between the IDLE and CLIMB detent allows the autothrust system to control the thrust. Moving the thrust levers beyond this range allows the pilot to demand the thrust he requires: FLEX/MAX CONT or TOGA. This is of course, an instinctive movement for every pilot. In the case of the missed approach there are no TOGA switches to press. He merely applies full forward thrust. This is a manual thrust selection. At the level-off altitude, moving the thrust levers back to the CLIMB detent re-establishes autothrust for speed. The fact that the thrust levers do not move has been criticised, (usually by pilots who have not been endorsed on type), but is far outweighed by the advantages. Besides, driven thrust levers tend to encourage thrust lever monitoring, rather than airspeed monitoring. With non-driven thrust levers the pilot is not distracted into monitoring the thrust levers, and quickly learns to monitor the airspeed as he would with manual thrust.
Mind sets must be changed (paradigms must be shifted). An early entry to the aviation paradigm line book, from a senior military officer in the twenties: -"Monoplanes will never take over from biplanes; less that two wings will not be acceptable to us." It is often difficult to understand and accept new concepts in design, especially without practical experience of the concept in action. One example of the influence of "mind sets" could be found in a recent draft report entitled "design-induced accidents", developed by an international aviation organisation. An early draft of this paper included two critical references to the Airbus Sidestick and Fixed Thrust Lever design, later withdrawn. Due to media speculation, and common misperceptions, it is likely that "mental models" are already firmly formed against sidesticks and fixed thrust levers, in the minds of new trainees to Airbus fly-by-wire types. Such mind sets severely limit the most effective training programme, and must be corrected with facts prior to the course. CPA provides a file of "pre-course reading" one month before all A340/A330 transition courses, and is now augmenting this package with a video featuring a design-test pilot explaining Airbus design philosophy.
LESSONS AND SOLUTIONS
Preparation prevents poor performance. In the past, many accidents which were related to the introduction of new-concept aircraft may not have occurred if this first lesson had been thoroughly applied. Assumptions were made that traditional training was well proven, and would do the job. Traditional training programmes were applied to new-concept aircraft, and pilots often only understood the operational impact of the differences after a risky period of practical discovery on the new type. Such an experimental process is a risky luxury for public transport operations.
A new man-machine relationship. It is most important for transitioning pilots to understand the fundamental conceptual changes. The traditional decision-making loop from stored mental systems knowledge - to pilot action, is now replaced by a code of conduct between man and machine. The designed protocols for ECAM/EFIS interaction are dominant features to understand, and these new behavioral codes for new generation pilots must be understood far more thoroughly than the internal workings of the systems which these protocols are designed to manage. The key to the effective handling of complex systems failures is to have an overall understanding of system architecture, dominated by a thorough understanding of the designed management disciplines required to handle the abnormality effectively. The latter part of this equation has a great deal more to do with task sharing, communication, and the effective use of resources, by two pilot crews (CRM), than technical expertise.
CRM. It is essential that the industry fully understands the greatly increased need for enhanced CRM skills in the two-pilot-hi-tech cockpit, especially in terms of communications and task sharing (including the man-machine interface). Efforts by CPA to promote this awareness, include CRM and Automation policy statements, and improved procedures. "Hot mikes" are now required below Flight Level 150 on the Airbus and B777 fleets, and all pilot duties, except a rejected take off, have been split 50/50 PF/PNF, in order to maintain the most simple and clear separation of tasks and duties. The latter policy also promotes command awareness from the initial qualification as First Officer; now being seen as a positive factor in Airbus Command Training.
Technical knowledge. If during training, pilots insist on a depth of technical knowledge which is traditional for conventional types, they will require training programmes extending to multiples of current transition course lengths. If pilots perceive that they still need to know the systems in traditional detail, they run the risks generated by changes to software (altering system function), and saturation during the management of complex abnormalities. Results from surveys indicate that some pilots feel that the operation of a high technology aircraft reduces systems knowledge. This is in fact true, but on the more advanced aircraft it is the designers intent! It must be stressed that the "high tech pilot" must now have a firm grasp of design concepts and protocols rather than detail which cannot be influenced.
The technical examination. The application of traditional training programmes to new technology aircraft may be inappropriate. The training programme which is driven by the technical examination at the end, can place the focus of learning in the wrong place. Even if the conceptual message is learnt, the existence of a traditional "type technical examination", dominated by temperatures, pressures, and systems detail, can be a threat and distraction to the trainee, who knows that a type rating depends on the examination. This can strongly distract the trainee from the acquisition of the real operational messages which must be learnt on high technology aircraft. This is not to minimise the need for technical knowledge, but to apply it appropriately to the new technology aircraft now arriving in the industry.
Simulation. The importance of effective simulation to the introduction of a new type cannot be overstated. The success of the CPA introduction has been strongly founded in this fact. The importance of significant exposure to simulation is rated highly in CPA in terms of maintaining skills and standards. For recurrent training, CPA plans 21-26 hours of simulator per pilot per year. Triple camera video facilitated LOFT is currently being introduced, and a library of "video" clips depicting correct procedures in abnormal situations will soon be developed. Zero Flight Time Training (ZFT), is already well established on the B747-400, and now the Airbus fleet.
Ground Training. A new style of pilot training was introduced at CPA for the Airbus introduction, similar in concept to the Lufthansa "Integrated" Training for the A340. Cathay developed the theme further into a non-compartmentalised process, now called "seamless training", using a regular mix of CBT/tutorials/Flight Training Device/Full Flight Simulator. The primary training objective is operational learning. The traditional barriers between technical and simulator training have been reduced. Technical and Simulator Instructors are now more obviously part of a single team, and the intention is to provide regular route familiarisation flights to enhance operational knowledge. The standard "type technical" examination for the A340/A330 is being replaced by in-house "phased exams". This aligns the course material with the programme objective of operational training. Seamless training is still under development, and should be further enhanced in the near future.
SUMMARY
Rule making for new technology. It is usual, in the non-US regulatory world, that the airline first feels the full effect of new technology, and then transmits the news to the regulators. While the aviation industry progresses rapidly into the world of the "byte", the regulatory framework in many countries is still driven by traditional practice. The industry is in urgent need of regulations which are more appropriate to the operation of modern airliners. It is time for all regulatory authorities to develop a systematic approach to new technology, and responsive rule making. Research into the implications to man-machine interfaces and operating practices must be a part of this. The US Advanced Qualification process is, in the opinion of the author, an appropriate step on this path.
Appropriate training. Adaptation to new technology has been a challenge since the first machines were invented. Through trial and error, we have always accommodated our machines eventually. If we wish to avoid this trial and error period, there is only one sound solution: appropriate training. It is not enough to just apply traditional training programmes to significantly new technology. The operational impact of new technology is always measurable in human factors terms. Glass / FMS equipped flights decks are powerful tools for efficient flight, but can also become powerful traps if they are given dominant priority over plain common sense (airmanship). Considerable responsibility for identifying training needs must lie with the manufacturer at the design stage.
Preparation and Teamwork: - Lessons from CRM. This paper has looked at recent experiences from the introduction of new technology aircraft in commercial aviation. A developing theme of this experience is that good results are only achieved through preparation and effective teamwork. Teamwork must be improved between regulators, designers, manufacturers, airline managements, engineers, flight crew, air traffic control authorities, and other critical team members in the industry. If improvements do not occur, and the presently "static" accident rate prevails in a period of continued growth, the industry is likely to see a progressive increase in accident fatalities in coming years. Informed observers have suggested that this potential accident rate could reach the loss of one widebody aircraft per week by the year 2010. Preventative measures taken in the late nineties may be able to minimise this horrific possibility.
The lessons of modern Crew Resource Management Programmes tell us that it is the man more than the machine that needs attention. These lessons apply more widely now to all member of the aviation team. The term CRM may evolve into ORM/CRM (Organisational or Corporate Resource Management), or similar expressions. "Bottom-line-focussed", totally cost-driven airlines, always need to remember that "an accident is the ultimate inefficiency". Key decision makers, and responsible persons in the industry, need to tenaciously root out irrational mind-sets where they exist, and see themselves as members of a team of architects who will build even more safety into the future of this remarkable industry.
Copyright © 1996-2005 by Neil C. Krey unless otherwise indicated.
Non-commercial reproduction rights granted if the following notice is included:
"Source: Neil Krey's CRM Developers Forum, http://www.crm-devel.org"