Table of Contents

• Facing the Issue, Ashleigh Merritt, NASA/UT/FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project
• CRM Training in Health Care, David M. Gaba, M.D., Department of Anesthesia, Stanford University School of Medicine
• Followership and Leadership in the Cockpit: Part II, Dr. Maureen A. Pettitt, Mr. Joseph H. Dunlap, Western Michigan University
• Conflict Management for Aviation Professionals
  Part II, Jim Blanchard, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
• ATA Data Management Meeting, Todd Curry, USAir
• CRM Industry Workshop Review, Tom Leahy, USAir Express/CCAir

by: Ashleigh Merritt
NASA/UT/FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project
a.merritt@mail.utexas.edu

To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet - T. S. Eliot (Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock)

In this article, I talk about face and the role that it plays in so many aviation situations -- captain-first officer interactions, the cockpit-cabin interface, LOFT debriefings, and multi-national crews, to name a few. I am going to present some recent theorizing on the concept of face, and then I hope, by my examples, to convince you of its presence and application in the aviation environment. Although its origin is attributed to China, the concept of face is now recognized as a universal phenomenon. As T. S. Eliot writes, we all have a public countenance that we present to the world. Face is the public self image we wish to claim for ourselves (Goffman, 1967) - the way we would like others to think of us. Everyone wants to avoid embarrassment, maintain self-respect, and project a positive self-image in social interactions.

Because we all have face-needs (to protect, support, or enhance our public self-image), every interaction has the potential to threaten our face, the face of the other party, or both. And so, face can be a delicate interplay, a negotiation between two parties for the respect to which they both believe they are entitled. Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that the degree to which face can be threatened in a given interaction is a function of three elements - the social distance between participants, the level of imposition, and the power distance derived from differences in status. Sounds academic? Let's consider these three elements within the cockpit.

First, the social distance between participants: It is easier to fly with someone you know rather than a stranger. Having worked together in the past, or being friends outside work, or simply being members of the same cultural group (e.g., the same airline prior to a merger), the atmosphere in the cockpit is more relaxed and there is less concern about saying the wrong thing r causing offense. It is easier to tell a friend they have the social closeness acts to diminish the embarrassment and loss of face ("I know you're a competent person even if you make a mistake this time").

Second, the level of imposition: Regardless of the relationship and status of the people involved, it is to point out a small error than a large mistake for a small favor rather than a large asking someone to take over for five s asking them to rearrange their entire . The smaller the imposition, the less s for a refusal or a begrudging acceptance, and the smaller the threat of embarrassment or resentment to both parties.

Power distance is the third factor contributing to face-threat in any interaction. Power distance can be considered the status difference between two parties reflected in the ability of one party to control the other's behavior. It is harder for the subordinate looking up to challenge the superior than it is for the superior looking down to criticize the subordinate. And as that distance increases, so too does the face-threat. Imagine that the CEO of your airline is a pilot, and then imagine the CEO flying in the left seat how awkward it would be to correct even his smallest errors, or how outrageous it would be to broach even the smallest request, e.g., asking if he would change his meal order so that you could have the fish. Remember what it was like to be the fresh and inexperienced new person on the job - how difficult it was to voice any concerns. There is the fear that one will appear foolish in front of a more experienced or senior officer, resulting in a loss of face or positive self-image. As the old saying attests "It is better to keep one's mouth shut and be thought a fool, than to open it and remove all doubt".

The world over, as one's status over another increases, one has more legitimacy to ignore the other's face-needs. The CEO, the check airman, the FAA inspector, and the captain can all be less concerned with the impact of their comments on junior personnel, while the flight attendant, cadet, first officer, and pilot undergoing the check-ride are all more careful in how they interact with the person of senior status. Of course seniors can choose to be nice guys in which case they will consider "the face-needs" of others, but it is not incumbent upon them to do so. The most popular bosses or superiors are often those who deliberately downplay the status differential between themselves and their subordinates, and actively consider the face-needs (self-respect) of their subordinates.

It is the perception of the difference in power that affects one's interaction style, and this perception is often influenced by one's own sense of competency. Hence, more experienced first officers are more confident of their abilities and less concerned with making a gaff in front of the captain. Greater competence acts to diminish the sense of power distance, as the phrase "knowledge is power" suggests. A common source of conflict in the cockpit can be the differential perceptions of power. A captain may consider the power difference between himself and the first officer to be larger than what the first officer perceives, hence the captain may expect greater deference to his authority than the first officer might be willing to demonstrate. Conversely, the overly confident new first officer may believe himself to be more competent than the captain observes, and may attempt to interact with the captain as a peer. In both cases, one or both parties believes the other is not granting them the level of respect they deserve (a public challenge to one's face).

If I might interject a note about national culture here: Power distance is strongly influenced by national culture. In the individualistic Anglo cultures such as the USA, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, a perception of egalitarianism promotes smaller distance and freer interactions between seniors and juniors. In more hierarchically structured societies (e.g., Confucian cultures in Asia and Latin cultures in Europe and South America), the distance between seniors and juniors is greater and differences are highly respected (Merritt, 1994; Merritt & Helmreich, in press). In these cultures the crew acknowledges the greater power distance by giving greater face to the captain. There is greater deference and formality, more agreement, and considerably less challenge in these cockpits.

Given this information, it is not hard to imagine. the recipe for frustration that is the multicultural crew. Each participant brings to the interaction his or her own culturally influenced perception of the difference in power between themselves and the other. The Anglo captain doesn't understand why his Latin first officer doesn't speak up, while the Latin first officer silently awaits his commands and directions; meanwhile the friendly and informal Anglo first officer thinks his Asian captain is trying to claim a level of respect far greater than what he deserves, while the Asian captain is offended that his first officer fails to show the appropriate deference to the captain's authority. Now add to these interactions the difficulty of communicating in other than your first language. How often have we used the "Nod-n-Grin" response"? A little embarrassed that we missed the intent of the statement the first time, and rather than pursue something which we may still not understand (more embarrassments, we simply nod and feign understanding as a way to save face. Such misunderstandings and non-clarifications can lead to dangerous silences in the cockpit.

The same logic that allows us to understand intra-cockpit conflict also allows us to understand the cockpit-cabin interface. The Dryden accident all made us aware of the important role of the flight attendant in crew communications and flight safety (Helmreich, 1992). A Fokker F-28, delayed on the ground by extra passengers and fueling, failed to undergo the necessary de-icing procedures and crashed soon after lift-off. On reviewing the accident, many pilots have expressed surprise that the flight attendants on duty did not convey passenger and/or their own concerns to the cockpit2. Pilots may be surprised to learn that many flight attendants do not believe it is their place to question the senior crew, just as many flight attendants may be surprised to learn that the cockpit is expecting to hear from the cabin crewmembers. Let me highlight this point with some data taken from a recent survey of personnel in a large commercial carrier.

Using the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ) (Helmreich, Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich, & Wiener, 1993) for both pilots and flight attendants, we found that the pilots believed more strongly than the flight attendants that the captain should encourage questions from the crew, and they were also more likely to speak up if they perceived a problem. On the other hand, the cabin crewmembers did not think they should question the captain, they were less likely to question senior crewmembers' decisions, and they believed subordinates were sometimes afraid to disagree.

When asked what style of leadership they preferred, three-quarters of the pilots said they preferred a leader who consulted with them before making decisions. By comparison, only one third of flight attendants said they preferred a consultative leader, while 50% said they preferred a directive (or in some cases autocratic) leader who made decisions promptly but explained them to the crew before moving forward. These results have been echoed in every cockpit-cabin survey that .he NASA/UT group has conducted.

To what can we attribute these differential preferences for command and communication? First and foremost, there is the power distance. The pilots, though not directly the flight attendants' bosses, are nonetheless perceived to be of a higher status within the company, hence the power distance between cockpit and cabin is generally perceived to be higher than between captain and co-pilot. Second there is greater social distance or unease between cockpit and cabin. The social awkwardness is often compounded by gender and age differences (both of which can actually influence power distance also), occupational separation within the company, and a physical barrier (the cockpit door). Flight attendants are not completely comfortable with the pilots, and vice versa, hence interactions tend to be stilted. Third, there is an enormous difference in competencies with regard to knowledge of the aircraft. Simply as a function of their job, pilots have a much more sophisticated understanding of avionics and basic aircraft maintenance than do flight attendants.

Any one of these elements (power distance, social unease, difference in competencies) is enough to explain flight attendant reticence in the typical cockpit-cabin interaction. When we combine all three elements, it becomes painfully clear that to approach the captain about a possible aircraft malfunction is a very face-threatening activity for the cabin crew. The risk of making a fool of oneself (or being yelled at) is much higher if one speaks than if one stays silent. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that flight attendants are less assertive, more afraid to disagree, and less likely to challenge senior crewmember decisions. Knowing that there are others on the plane equally or better qualified to diagnose safety problems, the junior cabin crewmember can rely on this diffusion of responsibility to give them greater solace and sanction for their silence.

Our research indicates there is yet another reason for the flight attendants' reluctance to voice their concerns. From other items added to the FMAQ, we learned that each group perceived the other group as having a poor understanding of their job. For example, 70% of pilots believed they had a good understanding of the flight attendant's role, while 70% of flight attendants believed the opposite -- that pilots did not have a good understanding of what FA's did. Although the cultural stereotype of the "ditzy flight attendant" is thankfully fading, many flight attendants still feel that pilots undervalue their contribution to the flight -- this in itself is a perceived face-threat or insult to the public self-image of the cabin personnel. We are all less likely to engage in open communication with people who do not respect us or our work. We don't want to help them or . interact with them, and we may even services, hoping to provoke a failure. The first officer who is commanded by an authoritarian nothing silently seethes and hopes the a mistake; the cabin crew slighted by the will withold all offers of food and beverages requested. Pilots and flight attendants are barriers to teamwork. Eighty-five per it and cabin personnel in the recent that flight safety can be compromised by poor cockpit-cabin relationships, and more than of the respondents agreed on the need cockpit-cabin communication and LOFT debriefings provide another classic example of n in face-threatening situations. At issue is the pilots' image of themselves as competent professionals, an image that can not be tarnished if positive learning is to occur. A LOFT be particularly tricky when you have a r who is junior to the pilots undergoing the facilitator has the greater immediate power training setting, yet senior captains may deference is in order to honor their face. Does this sound familiar? If not handled well, LOFT can be a very face-threatening activity, resulting in zero or negative learning. The best learning will occur in a non-threatening environment, i.e., a friendly environment where social and power distance are minimized and the flight scenarios represent a realistic level of imposition upon the flight crew's abilities (i.e., no impossible scenarios designed to humiliate even the best crews).

As these aviation examples demonstrate, almost every interaction has face-threatening potential. To return to the theory: There are strategies that we develop to minimize face-threat, the most common being a modification of our communication style. The greater the social or power distance, and/or the greater the imposition, the more indirect the communication strategy which will be employed. The most indirect strategy for dealing with a face-threatening situation is silence. There are times when the fear of making a fool of oneself or the discomfort of confronting others renders us silent. Hints, suggestions, and clues are other indirect strategies. The indirectness gives each party a way out of the situation if need be, by allowing the hearer to choose whether they will acknowledge or ignore the request. Inquiries can also act as indirect communication. At the other end of the communication continuum are the direct bald statements. Let me provide a very simple example of the differences in strategy. Imagine you are in an office with another person, you are cold, and you want the door closed. In ascending order of directness, you could shiver noticeably but say nothing; comment on how cold it is today; ask the other person if they feel cold; ask if they would mind if you shut the door; say that unless they object you're going to shut the door; or you could just get up and shut the door. Again, imagine the difference in your approach if the person was your new boss whom you hadn't yet gotten to know (greater power and social distance), or if closing the door also meant the other person had to change seats as a consequence (greater imposition).

I'd like to pose the controversial question "Is there a place for indirect communication in aviation?" After much thought I now believe there is. Please allow me to defend my answer. A simple example first: Consider how the effective LOFT facilitator chooses indirect communication in the debrief as a way to get the crew talking about their efforts, rather than baldly and directly pointing out crew errors. Even the instructor's silence can sometimes prompt further crew-critique. The same technique can be utilized by captains on the line to debrief and train the crew. The invitation to participate ("what do you think, Bill?") is a gentler way to encourage open communication than a bald directive ("speak up if you have a problem").

I believe we are all agreed that open communication enhances flight safety and flight training. The important distinction to be made here is that open communication is not synonymous with direct communication. Open communication implies full information-sharing in a positive and mutually reinforcing environment. Direct communication implies a lack of concern with how one's comments will be received - surely this is antithetical to the team concept. While I would never advocate (suggest, or even hint at) the use of indirect communication strategies for aviation crews, what I do advocate is greater understanding of the threat experienced by junior personnel in their interactions with senior staff.

CRM training has traditionally focused on advocacy and assertion skills, particularly for the first officer, and more recently the flight attendant. However I believe the training has ignored the undue burden that such direct communication places upon junior or inexperienced personnel. The training is forcing an unnatural style upon the junior officers, and direct communication which is forced can be too blunt, too abrasive. How often do we hear complaints from captains these days about overly assertive first officers? Captains are reacting to the perceived face-threat -- they believe the first officers are claiming too much face for themselves without giving appropriate face to the captain's authority.

Indirect communication is a natural response to face-threatening situations, hence it will always occur in aviation, especially at the rank and occupational interfaces. A linguistics study conducted at NASA-Ames in the 80's used transcripts from accidents as well as simulator sessions to study indirect communication in the cockpit (Linde, 1988). The study found that, while there was less indirect communication under abnormal flight conditions, it did altogether. That is, even in dire conditions, the first officer was still unable to be rect. As an example, recall the Delta Airlines L-1011 which crashed after encountering a severe microburst on approach to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport in 1985 (NTSB, 1986). The recorder shows that the first officer was only able to voice his concern to the captain with indirect phrases such as "lots of lightning out there". found that crews classified as high in safety performance actually had higher rates of indirect n than poor performance crews. The author considered the indirect communication to act as a kind of social oil which prevented animosity and promoted better teamwork.

I think we need to acknowledge that indirect communication will always be present in aviation, and that it is not automatically a bad thing. Indirect communication can facilitate teamwork, it can promote non-defensiveness in training and debrief situations, and in high face-threat situations it may be the only form of communication that less experienced or lower status crewmembers can articulate. From a training perspective then, the need for junior personnel to be assertive should be balanced by the need for all personnel to be conversant with indirect communication, to understand the reasons for its use, and the circumstances under which it is likely to appear. Personnel can be trained to listen for indirect communication, interpret the meaning behind the words, and react appropriately to the message. Joint cockpit-cabin training could benefit from discussions of indirect communication, just as captain upgrade training could address the benefits of indirect communication for teambuilding.

Let me end by saying that I am not advocating the use of indirect strategies for emergency or time-pressure situations. Such situations demand precise and direct communication. However in order to promote the most effective communication in an emergency, some earlier effort has to have been spent establishing an environment conducive to open communication. As crewmembers become more comfortable and competent in a situation, their communication strategies will become more naturally open and direct. It is up to the higher status officers to promote that openness by encouraging and being receptive to the earlier, more indirect attempts at communication.

1 I am indebted to Bryan Sexton, one of our NASA/UT/FAA Crew Research Project members studying social interaction in Switzerland, for this term. Bryan reports the Nod & Grin response is a common technique for saving face, especially in multi-cultural interactions. Struggling as a bilingual himself, Bryan tells me this response is very easy to master.

2 To be balanced, I should add that a pilot from another airline was traveling on the flight, and he also failed to directly convey his icing concerns to the cockpit. As a professional courtesy to his peers, the pilot did not interfere beyond an initial observation to the cabin crew. What is "professional courtesy"? It is mutual face enhancement -- by honoring the professional status of the other, one indirectly honors one's own status.

References

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Garden City, NY: Anchor.

Helmreich, R. L. (1992). Human Factors aspects of the Air Ontario crash at Dryden, Ontario: Analysis and recommendations. In V. P. Moshansky (Commissioner), Commission of inquiry into the Air Ontario Accident at Dryden, Ontario: Final report. Technical appendices. (pp. 319-348). Toronto, Ontario: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada.

Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A., Sherman, P., Gregorich, S., & Wiener, E. (1993). The Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire. NASA/UT/FAA Technical Report 93-4.

Linde, C. (1988). The quantitative study of communicative success: Politeness and accidents in aviation discourse. Lang. Soc. 17, 375-399.

Merritt, A. C. (1994). Cross-cultural issues in CRM training. In Proceedings of the Sixth ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Regional Seminar and Workshop (pp. 236-243). Amsterdam, the Netherlands, May 17-19,1994.

Merritt, A. C. & Helmreich, R. L. (In press) Human factors on the flightdeck.- The influence of national culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

National Transportation Safety Board (1986). Aircraft Accident Report.- Delta Air Lines, Inc., Lockheed L-1011-385-1, N726DA, Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, August 2, 1985 (NTSB/AAR-86/05). Washington, DC: Author.

by: David M. Gaba, M.D.
Department of Anesthesia, Stanford University School of Medicine
Anesthesiology Service, VA Palo Alto Health Care System

Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) have gained wide acceptance in commercial aviation, leading to enhanced safety and efficiency of air crew and system operations. I believe that professional air crew trainers may be interested to know that many of the concepts and techniques of CRM and LOFT have been adapted for the training of medical personnel.

Unlike in aviation, initial medical or nursing training, specialty training, and on the job training of health care professionals is not regulated very strictly and is highly variable. The bulk of training in health care focuses on medical (physiologic) and technical knowledge and skills. Until recently, nearly all such training was conducted in lectures or seminars or with real patients.

Over the last ten years, realistic patient simulators have become available which can be used in a variety of medical situations. These simulators, which involve patient mannequins and actual clinical equipment are similar in spirit, if not quite in fidelity, to full motion flight simulators. Readers may be interested to know that a well known manufacturer of flight simulators, CAE Link (now CAE Electronics), began producing patient simulators in 1992, based in part on simulation technology developed in my laboratory. The CAE Patient Simulator is now commercially available.

For the last nine years, my group has conducted research on human performance by anesthesiologists. This led us to believe that the same behavioral CRM issues recognized as important in aviation were equally important in anesthesiology (i.e. leadership, communication, use of all available resources, distribution of workload, etc.). Based on careful study of the scientific literature and NASA publications on CRM, we created a curriculum on CRM like issues for anesthesiologists, calling it Anesthesia Crisis Resource Management (ACRM). We summarized our knowledge of anesthesiologist cognition and the principles of crisis management for anesthesiology in the textbook Crisis Management in Anesthesiology. This is the first publication of its kind in any medical field. It also contains the first comprehensive "emergency procedures manual" through which anesthesiologists can prepare in advance or use in real time to recognize and manage critical events occurring during or after anesthesia. Beginning in 1990, we created a simulator-based training course in ACRM for anesthesiologists. This is modeled closely after CRM courses in aviation and consists of a didactic/exercise component, a set of simulator sessions (resembling LOFT scenarios in some respects) and a facilitator led detailed debriefing using videotapes of the simulation session. The simulation scenarios are highly realistic (nurses and surgeons are included) and challenge both medical and technical skill as well as the key skills of resource management". The debriefing sessions concentrate mostly on the generic ACRM issues rather than the case specific technical issues. As in aviation, we conduct ACRM instructor training and are also performing research, evaluating various aspects of ACRM training.

After our original development of these curricula and courses at Stanford University and the VA Palo Alto Health Care System, we have transferred these techniques to other teaching centers in North America. Dedicated centers conducting detailed ACRM like training are operating at Palo Alto, California (VA Palo Alto HCS/Stanford Simulation Center for Crisis Management Training in Health Care), Boston (the Harvard affiliated Boston Anesthesia Simulation Center), Toronto (Canadian Simulation Center for Human Performance and Crisis Management Training), and Pittsburgh (University of Pittsburgh Human Simulation Center). Other Centers are likely to follow.

Similar types of CRM like training are also being conducted in Europe (Brussels, Copenhagen, Basel). In fact, the Basel group has incorporated high-fidelity simulated surgical procedures so that surgeons and operating room nurses can join in combined team training rather than only as part of the simulation team. Combined team training is also underway at the Canadian Center. Similar curricula in CRM are being developed at several Centers for emergency room personnel and for intensive care unit teams.

As in aviation, it will take considerable time to assess the impact of CRM training in health care. However, the concept is spreading rapidly and there is already anecdotal evidence to suggest that anesthesiologists have benefited from the ACRM course. Those of us in health care say "thank you" to the professional air crew trainers who pioneered the CRM training approach

References

Gaba D.M., Howard S.K., & Fish K.J.(1994). Crisis Management in Anesthesiology. New York, Churchill Livingstone.

Howard S.K., Gaba D.M., Fish K.J., Yang G.S., & Samquist F.H.(1992). Anesthesia crisis resource management training: teaching anesthesiologists to handle critical incidents. Aviation Space Environmental Medicine 63: 763770.

by: Dr. Maureen A. Pettitt
Mr. Joseph H. Dunlap
Western Michigan University

In a CRM Advocate article earlier this year (July, 1995), we argued that leadership is an activity that necessarily involves both leaders and followers as they interact to accomplish goals and, further, that followership and leadership are equally critical to safe, efficient crew performance. We also noted that leadership and followership are concepts subject to wide interpretation, often defined by a rather ambiguous mix of traits, styles, and skills.

Our interest in the issues surrounding followership and leadership led to a research project funded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to identify trainable leadership and followership skills and to develop guidelines for training these skills. As part of this project, we recently hosted a meeting of subject matter experts (SMEs) to discuss cockpit-specific followership and leadership skills. The group's expertise was varied and included first officers and captains at major airlines, a captain from a national airline, and a former vice-president of operations for a major carrier. All had experience in developing and implementing flight crew training programs.

This meeting resulted in some interesting findings. First, the group concluded that a certain amount of followership and leadership skills is needed to effect a safe, efficient flight. If one of the crew members is weak in a technical or interactional skill area, another member will fill the "skill void". Each of the subject matter experts could give several examples of such compensating behavior. If, however, the other crew members do not compensate for this void--due to limitations in skills, role definition, or time available--an unsafe situation may result.

Another important outcome of our meeting was a preliminary list of what we refer to as "interacting skills" common to both followership and leadership. We have since tried to categorize or order the concepts discussed. As anyone familiar with this process can attest, this can be a frustrating effort. To begin with, there are some not-easily-resolved terminology issues. How does one differentiate between knowledge, skills, tasks, traits, strategies, behaviors, dimensions or styles? All have been used, somewhat interchangeably, in leadership literature.

For example, McLean and Weitzel (1991) identify six leadership skills: communications, situational discretion (recognizing which of three practical roles to play as leader), motivation, risk management, problem solving and relationship renewal. Lock(1991)identifies core traits (i.e., integrity, self-confidence, originality, flexibility, and adaptation) as well as interpersonal and management skills necessary for successful leadership. According to Manski (1987), the two secrets of effective leadership are the ability to create a vision of the future and the ability to inspire people to make the vision a reality. We could continue in this vein for many pages, but you get the idea--the interpretations are numerous.

While we did not wish to reinvent the wheel, we did aspire to develop a leadership/followership model that was practical and realistic in terms of the airline operating environment. We have adopted an "open-system" perspective to develop a working model which includes the cockpit (the system of interest) and environmental factors outside the cockpit that the crew has little or no control over such as weather, regulations and procedures, and the corporate culture. Within the cockpit, however, a climate and structure are established--generally early on and primarily by the Captain--who is influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the regulatory/procedural environment, the physical environment, and the corporate culture.

The ultimate goal of setting a climate and establishing a structure is to ensure effective crew performance. To this end, one or more of the crew members carry out structuring tasks (i.e., planning, delegating, coordinating and monitoring) and climate-setting tasks (i.e., motivating, clarifying roles, coaching) using technical, cognitive and communication skills to accomplish these tasks. The anticipated outcome is more effective problem solving, decision making, workload management, and/or conflict resolution.

Who does what, however, is another issue. At the individual level the leader and the follower(s) are defined by the hierarchical position held, but the leader/follower roles will vary as a result of the role assumed by the individual. For example, the Captain may assume follower tasks when he/she is the pilot not flying. In addition, each member of the crew brings to the cockpit knowledge, skills, and attributes which can be applied to their role as follower or leader. We are, at this point, most interested in the skills which enable good leadership and/or good followership.

For the purposes of our research, we have used Rominszowski's (1984) definition of skills. Rominszowski suggests that a skill can be actions (intellectual or physical) or reactions (to ideas, things, or people) which a person performs in a competent way in order to achieve a goal. A skill, he continues, is practiced by using certain items of knowledge stored in the mind and can be developed--or improved--with experience or practice (p. 241). A task, on the other hand, is a coherent set of activities (steps, operations or behavior elements) that leads to a measurable end result (p. 83).

During our discussion, we noted several "interacting skills" in addition to the technical, cognitive and communication skills described above to establish the climate and structure. The six interacting skills we subsequently identified met certain criteria. First, they were observable and could be evaluated. Second, individuals could improve these skills through training. Third, these interacting skills were common to both effective followership and leadership and were applied as necessary to ensure task accomplishment, A description of each skill and behavior representative of the skill is described below:

1. Initiative -- begins an action, without external direction, to overcome a perceived deficiency.
2. Influence -- obtains commitment from others to ideas or actions using effective interpersonal skills, styles and methods.
3. Adaptability -- adjusts to changing environments, ambiguity, and abnormal situations.
4. Receptiveness -- encourages, pays attention to, and conveys understanding of another's ideas, comments or questions.
5. Modeling -- exhibits behavior consistent with the company's highest technical and ethical standards 6. Envisioning -- creates and articulates a picture of the future or a desired state.

We believe that these interacting skills are especially critical in airline operations because of the constantly changing composition of airline crews and the shifting cockpit roles due to the rotation of pilot flying/pilot not flying. Further, we are convinced that these interacting skills are used in situations, as necessary, to compensate for technical, cognitive, and/or interpersonal skills required--but not present--for structure and climate-setting tasks.

We would be interested in your comments or anecdotal evidence regarding the application of leadership/ followership skills in airline operations. Please provide information in writing to us by mail: Western Michigan University, School of Aviation Sciences, Kalamazoo, MI 49008.

References

Locke, E. A. (1991). The Essence of Leadership: The Four Keys to Leading Successfully. New York: Lexington Books.

Manski, F. A. (1987). Secrets of Effective Leadership. Memphis, TN: Leadership Education and Development, Inc.

McClean, J. W., & Weitzel, W. (1991). Leadership: Magic, Myth, or Method? New York: American Management Association.

Rominszowski, A. J. (1984). Designing Instructional Systems. New York: Nichols Publishing.

by: Jim Blanchard
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

Conflict management is a familiar topic in resource management programs. Most programs recognize that the need for conflict management training arises from everyday human interaction. This brief article continues the series started in the last issue of CRM Advocate. The series is intended to supplement an understanding of conflict management techniques in aviation operations, and point out that the most important step in conflict management for airline employees occurs long before the flight leaves the ramp. Objective: Conflict management training is a fundamental exercise in skill-based management courses, it is measurable when correctly implemented in a curriculum, and it makes better leaders of those who have leadership "thrust upon them". Part II of the series addresses detecting conflict and classifying conflict into four "bins" that each have a known effectiveness. Training strategy: Teach the crews to detect and further understand "What type of conflict is taking place?" and "How to identify the resolution strategy needed to manage the conflict?" Training centers that teach conflict management strategies will often use a similar technique. The instructional process: (1) teach the fundamentals of the four management strategies, (2) teach the methods of detecting these strategies, and (3) teach individuals how to manage the impact of the strategy on the team's performance.

In Part I of this series, I set the stage for understanding conflict in aviation operations by stating that ... effective communication sets the stage for minimizing conflict in the operational environment In that statement is the word minimizing, which I intentionally used as opposed to reduce" or "eliminate". Some conflict is good. It helps everyone stay "in the loop," and reduces the likelihood of one person dominating the operation to the point that all others no longer feel like a part of the team. Conflict leads - the development of policy and procedure, and points out .areas where improvement is needed. Unfortunately, the human factors community has yet to define a set of -aviation-specific knowledge regarding conflict management that is based on reliable research about pilots and other professionals in the aviation operation. To discuss conflict management as a mature "body of knowledge" is easy until it comes to answering the question of "How does the pilot know when enough conflict is present and how do you actively manage the ;situation while piloting the aircraft?" I propose a simple refinement to the knowledge most pilots already have about conflict management. Today we say "conflict" and in the future we should say "conflict management strategy is..." since it is the management strategy that is observable and trainable... and this is the source of the actual conflict that arises between individuals. More often it is the approach or tact of the individuals that is causing conflict with the others involved.

In conflict management training it is often necessary to tell the participants that the conflict management strategy your partner is using is what is really upsetting you, and the way F manage that is to propose, through action or suggestion, that you both try another strategy. This is a foundation of principled negotiation, takes little time to do, and keeps the conversation going. Often changing management strategies shifts the focus of the conversation from the conflict back to the problem at hand. Remembering that flying the aircraft is the job at hand, not having a sensitivity session at FL330. Specifically, as I offered in Part I of this series, performing the duties of the position and respect for those duties by others sets the environment. The role of the professional aviator often makes it imprudent, and dangerous, to have a conversation in less than a focused, direct tone. Failure of the participants (flight crew, ground crew and management) to support this basic premises creates an environment that fosters conflict. It is important to recall from prior training that conflict may not be readily evident, nor severe or prolonged, just a nuisance.

Shifting Strategies

Observing a situation makes conflict more evident than participating. Aircraft don't have systems that observe and prompt pilots to manage inter-personal conflict. Not sure if we want or need them either. So ... detecting it, as discussed in Part 1, is part anticipation and part effective communication. Statements for participants like, "I'm not sure I understand" or "what do you mean" can be either a sincere request (indirectly) for more information or clarity, or a signal that the person is taking a hostile position in the conversation. It seems necessary to address both possibilities together since the likelihood of knowing which is true while continuing to pay attention to the task at-hand of piloting is hardly worth the effort, and may compromise safety. Shifting strategies at this point is the best option, since it offers a new approach and sometimes a new insight by the listener. It shows willingness to try to communicate, and typically reduces personality barriers by sending a message of "I am trying to communicate with you." The longer you wait to make the shift, the longer it takes to "re-plow" the old ground. Delaying wastes time and confuses the intent of the original message in the argument or conflict itself.

A Classification Scheme for Conflict Management Strategies

There are numerous schemes published for defining conflict management strategies. Unfortunately, most do not lend themselves to the decision making environment of civil aviation, and none are designed to be used in a training environment such as Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). Over the past eight years, I have refined the strategies into four types (on two different spectra). Figure 1 shows a simple graphic of the relationship between the two spectra and their anchors.

The first anchor is confrontation, described as actively working with all involved to solve the problem. Second, on the other end of the spectrum, is avoidance. This is described as clearly avoiding any actions that would further address the problem at hand. On the other spectrum are the anchors forcing and withdrawal. Forcing is the technique of demanding participation and dictating solutions to problems, often without the requisite knowledge or teamwork. Withdrawal is the removal of oneself from the actions of resolving the problem. This essentially means becoming a non-participant by any means possible. A characteristic of the spectrum anchored by confrontation and avoidance is that the parties have to work hard at maintaining either strategy. To actively manage (confront) the problem at-hand requires both aviation skill and attention to the inter-personal relationships. The same is true for the avoidance strategy. Trying to put things off in an environment where more information is available every second and the people involved don't want to put things off is a very taxing management strategy.

On the other spectra, anchored by forcing and withdrawal, is the disappointment and failure of the teams studied in this set of anchors. Research has shown that these strategies lead to bad decisions and timid crews, which ultimately result in an overall decrease in performance. A note of caution ... don't confuse forcing with command authority (the requirement for directives) when normal operating procedures (including trained emergencies) are expected and in-favor.

Identifying Types of Conflict Management Strategies

I have always found it nearly impossible to identify the management style when acting as the manager or employee. The same is true for the hundreds of crews that I talked to about "how to tell when the PIC/SIC is not managing the situation well." This is part of the reason for the use of video and trained observers. A few tips on things to watch for when examining yourself or others in the debrief. The captain suggests an alternative when a situation does not require one (ambiguous leadership when the crew expects a directive could be a sign of avoidance--pursue the reason for the solicitation for an alternative), the first officer asks for clarification on a directive where the procedures have been trained (withdrawal from the process of flying the aircraft has already taken place, or more skill-based training is needed), time is available and the captain makes an utterance that clearly indicates that no more time will be spent on the problem (forcing the decision could mean the captain has not shared additional information or is not willing to tolerate discussion of alternatives), and the first officer and flight engineer have been assigned to work a problem while the captain pilots the aircraft, only to intervene as necessary--directing actions as anticipated by the crew--after using available time. Confronting a problem is usually preferred since pilots are trained and selected for the innate ability to resolve unforeseen problems and maintain procedural compliance. However, the trained observer will note that less than 60 percent of the confrontation managerial styles remain confrontational ... most deteriorating into less than satisfactory strategies within two minutes.

Reasons for the Deterioration

A number of reasons for these strategy decays exist. First, the crew itself has been highly screened and trained to not let problems go unresolved... it is difficult to sit there and talk about it for any length of time (one of the major components and forces behind the immediacy factor is this motivation to make an early, sometimes too early, decision). That motivation must be managed. Second, the need for more information often causes what was a good confrontational start to deteriorate into a set of fact-finding missions that often lead to disaster. In a study of past controlled flight into terrain accidents, it can be inferred that most had been preceded by conversation of impending doom prior to the accident event itself Often the crew has some subtle stimuli that trigger the trained sense of 66 something's not right" and the pursuit of facts takes longer than the time available. It can be said that the moment of absolute certainty will never arise, so making a decision under uncertainty is normal operational policy. Leadership is directly responsible to see that the confrontation approach reduces that uncertainty to acceptable level. Third is a sociological basis for the teamwork and the crew interactions. Everyone on the team has a common objective, to fly safe and efficiently. When a team has a common objective it works well together when things are going as they should. It is known that when things are not going well, the team attempts to divide into individuals who bolster their own proposed solution as "the best one for the team's common problem." Leadership skills again are paramount to managing this process and retain a team structure. Leaders--Captains--need to allow a certain amount of team alternatives to emerge when the situation and time permits, so that the individual has the knowledge that their alternative has been considered. This allows the individual to overcome the feeling that they are not involved in the resolution. More importantly, it builds the team's ability to remain in-tact through trying situations -hat will follow. This learning of how the team works under pressure is attributed to the team members trusting the leadership and knowing that when the leader can take the time to seek alternatives, they will be considered. The result is a team that truly feels part of a result, not a 'shunned" member of a process. More importantly, sound conflict management leads to increased stability in team performance. A fourth factor in conflict management deterioration is that in aviation operations, the time factor can create artificial and real stress that affects the way we communicate with each other (immediacy factor).

Paradox of Conflict Management

The management skills it takes to manage conflict in the 95 percent of the operations are the barriers to successful outcomes in the 5 percent of the operation where uncertainty and immediacy exist.

In the next article, this paradox will be examined from the training and measurement perspective.

by: Todd Curry
USAir

On September 26, 1995, the ATA AQP Data Management Focus Group met at the American Airlines Flight Academy. This particular focus group meets quarterly, at a minimum, to discuss pertinent industry issues regarding training validation and the associated implications and practical solutions for carriers operating under an AQP. Represented at the most recent meeting were: FAA AFS-230, Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, Boeing, Continental, Delta Airlines, Northwest, Mitre Corporation, TWA, United Airlines, UPS and USAir.

The primary issue presently being addressed by the group is the production of an AQP specific data management guide to be used as a reference by all carriers who are currently operating under or who are considering operating under an AQP. It is proposed that the guide contents include the following areas: appropriate data to be collected, how to collect data, suitable data collection points, data collection methodology, statistical analysis, data integrity and reliability, database structures, internal and FAA reporting issues, and examples of some carrier specific formats. It is anticipated that topics related to the indoctrination, qualification and continuing qualification for crew members, instructors and evaluators will be addressed.

Whereas each carrier and AFS-230 will have its own objectives relative to data management, the focus group is concentrating its efforts on sharing expertise that will assist carriers in their global efforts to manage the quality of training programs by validating training assumptions; assessing effectiveness of instructor and evaluator performance; monitoring crew member, instructor, and evaluator proficiency levels by establishing expected values and projected variance over time; validating alternative training technologies, and promoting common standards of data sharing.

It is expected that the guide will be available to the airline industry at the annual ATA AQP meeting in May 1996.

Northwest will host the next Data Management Focus Group meeting November 15-16 in Minneapolis. Please contact O.J. Treadway of American Airlines at 817.67.5193 for details.

by: Tom Leahy
USAir Express/CCAir

The 5th annual Industry Workshop for CRM was held September 12 and 13 in Seattle. The meeting was sponsored jointly by Alaska Airlines; Boeing and Horizon Airlines. The conference began with welcoming remarks from the sponsors reinforcing the need and value of CRM programs and their need to change as cultural changes dictate.

Ted Mallory reviewed the history and themes of the previous conferences and set the theme for this years meetings as a forum to establish programs and create new initiatives in CRM/Human Factors training.

Throughout the conference, numerous presentations were made to the group in the form of briefings and demonstrations. These briefings included research updates; reports on training programs; resources available to the industry and product demonstrations.

Bob Helmreich and Bill Taggart gave a detailed presentation on where CRM is today and some of the challenges that we, as an industry, will have to overcome to ensure the future of successful human factors training.

Barb Kanki and Judith Orasanu presented information pertaining to ongoing studies in the field of CRM integration into procedures as well as research efforts on Crew Decision Making. New research projects include such areas as Free Flight and Cross-Cultural Communication.

Vince Mancuso (DAL) gave a detailed presentation on Delta Airline's integration of CRM into its Training Curriculum. The presentation included a model for new ISD review being more of an overall process when dealing with CRM issues.

Hop Potter of the FAA briefed the group on initiatives by -he FAA pertaining to CRM. He reviewed several new FAR changes and described how they will affect CRM raining.

George Sweeney described the integration of Human Factors training throughout the curriculum at NWA. This was followed by Chuck Brewer presenting an update on CRM training and initiatives at the Regional Airlines.

The first day of the conference was concluded with presentations on Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement and an update on Military Human Factors training.

The second day of the conference began with a demonstration of CD ROM training programs and the impact they can make as a training tool. This session was presented by Vince Mancuso of Delta and Taylor Braley of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

Ben Berman of the NTSB gave an overview of resources available from the NTSB and described how crew members monitoring and challenging one another has been found to be a problem in a large percentage of the major accidents.

The material contained in The CRM Advocate back issues is the property of the contributing editors. No duplication of any kind is authorized without the express written permission of the editor. All rights reserved. For training and information purposes only. The intent of the editors is shared information, through controlled distribution to the benefit of the safety of flight.

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