Table of Contents

• Followership and Leadership in the Cockpit, Dr. Maureen A. Pettitt, Mr. Joseph H. Dunlap, Western Michigan University
• Lack of CRM Could Happen to You, Lieutenant Tyson Hummel, U.S. Air Force
• Grass Roots CRM Training - for Part 141 School, Wayne S. Cook, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• International Aviation Human Factors Center, Captain Tom Houle, USAir/ALPA
• Abstract: A Survey and Analysis of LOFT Debriefing Techniques, R. Key Dismukes, NASA Ames Research Center, Lori K. McDonnell, San Jose State University, Steven E. Gregorich, University of California, San Francisco
• CRM Workshop, St. Louis, MO. Tom Leahy, CCAir/USAir Express
• Whose in Charge, Anyway?, Norm Komich, USAir Shuttle
• Flight Crew Human Factors Workshop, Jim Blanchard, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University & MITRE
• Do Raters Agree?, Randolph Law & Paul Sherman, NASA/Univ. of Texas/FAA/Aerospace Crew Research

by: Dr. Maureen A. Pettitt
Mr. Joseph H. Dunlap
Western Michigan University

Leadership been traditionally viewed as a linear, one-way (i.e., downward) action with the primary aim of task accomplishment. It would be safe to say that this perspective has dominated the cockpit for most of the history of the airline industry. However, the role of the cockpit crew is changing and, consequently, the skills required of flight crew members are changing also. In today's environment, task accomplishment requires not just technical competency, but an array of interpersonal skills.

The captain is responsible for safety management, management of the crew and cockpit resources, and, at many airlines, he or she is viewed as the first-line supervisor of a profit center. As a result, the captain could be regarded as a leader whose role is to gain the cooperation of others in order to accomplish tasks.

In this article we will discuss some perspectives on leadership, on followership, and on the dynamics of leadership and followership. We will argue that leadership is an activity which involves both leaders and followers as they interact to accomplish goals and that followership skills are as important as leadership skills to the safe and efficient performance of airline cockpit crews. Finally, we will discuss how these conclusions impact the selection and assessment of pilots.

Leadership Perspectives and the Cockpit

The essence of leadership has been debated for many years. You probably remember as we do the arguments for both sides of this question: Are leaders born or are they made? Disheartened by the futility of this argument, some theorists suggested that leadership was not dependent on genes or training but on situational variables. More recently, there has been much discussion about transactional leadership and transformational leadership. The primary focus of the transactional leader is the administration of rewards and punishment based on the subordinate's performance. Transformational leaders -- a more enlightened and charismatic group of individuals -- interact with subordinates to cause organizational change.

Despite years of leadership theory-building and studies, widely-published research over the past 35 years regarding job satisfaction and job-related stress strongly supports the notion that between 60% and 75% of the managers in corporate America are not effective managers (Hogan, Raskin & Fazzini 1990). It is not too far fetched to suppose that this could be as true in the cockpit as it is in industry. While one could claim that the previous military experience of the airline pilot population might diminish the impact of this statistic, it could also be argued that a) the emphasis on technical competence during the selection process and b) the seniority system in the airline industry both increase the likelihood that a poor manager will become a captain.

Clark and Clark (1992) summarized some generally-accepted propositions on leadership. They concluded that the quality of leadership has significant effects on a) profitability of cost centers, b) performance of work units, c) quality of work output, d) reduction of stress, e) worker satisfaction and morale, reduced absenteeism, and g) reduced accidents. Experience suggests that these tenants hold true for cockpit leadership as well as leadership in organizations.

Further, Clark and Clark argue that research shows that leader behaviors can be trained, that trained leaders perform better than untrained leaders, and that the effects of training persist. Interestingly, they also point out that most individuals in leadership positions behave in a manner too authoritarian for the circumstances. They contend that behavioral changes are unlikely to occur without intervention.

In all, the Clarks discuss sixteen findings from leadership research. Their summary indicates that much attention has been given to leader personality traits, the dimensions of leadership, and the development of leadership. Considerably less attention, however, has been given to the concept of followership. While research has been conducted on the compatibility of leader and followers (e.g., Avolio and Howell 1992), studies related to the attributes of successful followers are meager and even less is to be found regarding followership skills.

This lack of research studies on followership is due, in part, to the conventional (i.e., hierarchical) assumptions that leadership is more important than followership, that good followership is simply doing what one is told to do, and that effective task accomplishment is the result of good leadership period.

Perspectives on Followership

Borrowing from the military leadership model, followership might be defined as "willing and wholehearted cooperation" in the accomplishment of tasks accompanied by respect for authority and subordination of personal preferences. In this paradigm, followership is a set of skills within good leadership and includes such behaviors as:

a) working effectively as a team member, b) accepting all assigned tasks willingly, c) maintaining a positive attitude, especially when the situation is confused and changing, d) offering suggestions as appropriate, but without usurping authority, e) supporting the chain of command, especially under stress, f) voicing differences of opinion, but executing with vigor the decision, g) demonstrating loyalty to the unit and its leaders, and h) placing the task and unit interests above personal interests.

We are not suggesting that this notion of followership should be adopted in other organizations or in the cockpit. However, some analogies can be drawn between these followership behaviors and other attributes described in the literature. For example, Ludin and Lancaster (1 990) suggest that successful followership is a result of identifying values and being true to them (integrity), having the knowledge and commitment that enables individuals to see how their piece contributes to the larger effort (owning the territory), the ability to deal with change and ambiguity (versatility), and taking responsibility for their own careers, their own actions, and their own development (self-employment).

Yet another perspective is that effective followers share these essential qualities (Kelley 1988):

1. They manage, themselves well
2. They are committed to the organization and to a purpose, principle, or person outside themselves.
3. They build their competence and focus their efforts for maximum impact.
4. They are courageous, honest, and credible.

In summary, these perspectives suggest that followership involves the subordination of personal interests, the social capacity to work well with others, and the commitment and competence required to accomplish of group goals. While this reveals much about the behaviors of an effective follower, it sheds little light on the skills underlying those behaviors.

Leader/Follower Dynamics

Hogan, Curphy and Hogan (1994) state that "leadership involves persuading other people to set aside for a period of time their individual concerns to pursue a common goal that is important for the responsibilities and welfare of a group" (p. 493). This suggests a more interrelational model than the literature cited above and we would argue that leaders and followers are best seen in their interrelated roles.

Consider, for example, these propositions from Heller and Van Til's (1982) summary of articles in a special issue on leadership and followership. "The leader must lead, and do it well to retain leadership; the follower must follow, and do it well to retain followership." On the other hand, they propose that "where all seek to lead, or all seek to follow, there can be no leadership or followership." The benefit when both are present is that "good leadership enhances followers, just as good followership enhances leaders." The darker side of this two-way process has been described as the difference between the leader's power and the "counterpower" of subordinates (Yuki 1981). In this model, potential influence derived from characteristics of the leader is called personal power. The subordinate's "counterpower" is derived from control over information and special skills or expertise.

We would substitute the notions of power and "counterpower" with influence, and suggest that influence contributes equally, albeit differently, to both effective leadership and effective followership. Through the articulation of ideas, the leader influences downward and laterally to build consensus and accomplish goals. The follower must possess the ability to be tactfully assertive in articulating ideas, an essential skill of upward influence.

It is unlikely that leaders or followers can successfully influence others unless they are technically competent and versed in both interpersonal and task related skills such as active listening, communication, problem analysis and conflict management.

If the sagacity of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values and motivations, then the genius of followership lies in exercising the appropriate amount of independent initiative, versatility, and social capacity to support the values and motivations of the organization and its leaders.

Pilot Selection and Assessment Issues

Historically, the military has been a significant source of commercial airline pilots. In general, these individuals have the requisite technical competence along with many hours of flight experience. Further, many of these individuals were subjected to some leader selection process or participated in a leadership development program at some point in their military career.

For their part, the airlines continue to emphasize the individual's technical competence and give less attention to evaluating an individual's leadership attributes or skills during selection. This approach stands in stark contrast to the increasing emphasis on effective leadership and crew coordination. The airlines have invested money and other resources to develop, implement and evaluate CRM programs, yet they have apparently invested little to evaluate the same attributes and skills in pilot candidates.

As the supply of military pilots diminishes a valid question is: How do we screen for leadership and followership skills? How can we train for and evaluate these skills?

Editor's note: As an industry we must face these questions and challenges head-on, military or not, shortage or not.

It is also interesting that the performance markers being developed for crew evaluation deal primarily with leadership. In the typical Line/LOS evaluation checklist, for example, leadership/followership dimensions are evaluated as follows:

1. Captain coordinates flightdeck activities to establish proper balance between command authority and crew member participation, and acts decisively when the situation requires.
2. When appropriate, crew members take the initiative and time to share operational knowledge and experience.

In this model, followership is to some degree dependent upon the captain and, consequently, downplayed in importance. To some extent, this perspective holds true for pilot training as well as performance evaluation. It may be, as Kelley (1 988) suggests, that the airline industry -- like other organizations -- assumes that leadership has to be taught, but everyone knows how to follow. This may explain why the industry has given little attention to the skills and traits of effective followers.

Conclusions

This discussion exemplifies the difficulties surrounding the identification, training and assessment of leadership and followership skills. The literature describes these concepts in terms of characteristics and behaviors rather than skills. These difficulties aside, however, we would argue that new pilot hires should be assessed, trained, and evaluated in terms of leadership and followership skills. The two are inextricably linked; you cannot have one without the other. There is an old saying that respect is love in plain clothes. We believe followership is leadership in plain clothes, and that the training and assessment of followership skills is essential to effective overall crew performance.

When an airline hires a pilot, they expect that individual will eventually become a captain for the airline. Nevertheless, a pilot will spend the first part of his or her career -- ten years or more -- as a follower rather than a leader. It would be appropriate to assess both leadership and followership potential prior to hiring.

If we conclude that leadership and followership are interrelated roles, then perhaps we need to train for the skills that are central to those roles. We need to acknowledge that there are both similarities and differences between the skills related to these roles, and define them in a manner that allows for appropriate training and evaluation.

by: Lieutenant Tyson Hummel
U.S. Air Force

It has been documented that human error is the number one cause of aircraft accidents. In fact, human performance is responsible for roughly 80% of all aviation accidents, and many safety professionals consider that a conservative number. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is one way that the aviation community is attempting to deal with our shortcoming as humans. The generic definition of CRM would be the proper utilization of all resources to affect the safety of flight. Basically, what that boils down to is using everything you have to make sure you are doing the right thing when it comes to maintaining flight safety. Unfortunately, as pilots, we often hear generic buzzwords like better communication, leadership, delegation, etc. while many times the specific analysis of accidents never reaches the pilots. This is due to the fact that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports contain objective facts about accidents; not specific analysis.

CRM will be more embraced by the flying community if it can be traced to specific events and acts which would have made a difference. We will attempt to trace such breakdowns in CRM by using an aircraft accident and the action taken as an example.

There are seven general classes of human error:

1. Error induced by design
2. Errors from ignorance or lack of training
3. Errors from inactions/actions which are deliberate
4. Physiology
5. Psychology
6. Environment
7. Crew Resource Error.

Crew Resource Error (CRE) is just one example of human error and we will concentrate on human behavior on the flight deck. CRE is the failure on the part of the flight crew to properly utilize all available resources affecting the safety of flight. Accidents will usually involve multiple cockpit resource errors that build upon one another until the occurrence of the accident.

There are seven (7) generally accepted facts which make up CRE:

1. Failure to exercise leadership - leadership orientations of flight crews are usually classified as over command (domineering), under command, or withdraw command (not commanding at all).

2. Failure to delegate - flight captains sometimes try to carry too much of the work load and not allow or task other crew to carry out important tasks.

3. Failure to prioritize - the flight crew forgets to prioritize tasks, prioritized incorrectly, or forgets to fly the aircraft. (it is a widely accepted principle that a crew's three tasks are to (a) aviate (b) navigate (e) communicate - in that order).

4. Failure to monitor and cross-check - since monitoring is often considered boring to the human machine it is often ignored. Cross checking verifies the information on another instrument and offers validation.

5. Failure to utilize available information - many times flight crews will fail to utilize available information right in front of them or that is easily obtainable.

6. Failure to communicate - occurs when parties who are exchanging information on a regular basis do not do so. CRM teaches bottom-up flow of information, and the lack of vital information being relayed and validated by the command authority is a failure to communicate.

7. Failure to follow established procedures - occurs when pilots/aircrew deviate from the normal procedure.

American International Airways (AIA) flight 808 is an example of the flight crew failing to properly utilize all available resources. The DC-8-61 cargo flight was an uncontrolled flight into terrain (CFIT) approximately 1/4 mile from the approach end of runway 1 0. The Captain lost control of the airplane while approaching the Leeward Point Airfield at the U.S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during VFR conditions. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post accident fire. The three flight crew members survived with serious injuries. Since our concentration is on CRE, the behavioral actions and interactions on the flight deck will be analyzed by looking at excerpts from the exchange of conversation from the Cockpit Voice Recorder.

1642:53 The CVR recorded the Captain stating to the other crewmembers, "otta make that one zero approach just for the heck of it to see how it is; why don't we do that, let's tell 'em we'll take [runway] one zero; if we miss we'll just come back around and land on two eight."

The Captain did not initiate nor did the other crewmembers request a briefing of the procedures to be followed in the event of a missed approach. In addition, the crew never discussed what would constitute a missed approach nor when such an approach would be initiated. Although the approach would have been extremely difficult, it was still 'possible' for the DC-8 to accomplish it. Considering the difficulty of the approach and lack of familiarity with airfield, the crew displayed poor leadership and communication by not discussing the approach, it's difficulties (the crew did not discuss the airplane's weight or prevailing winds), and missed approach.

1646:07 (after the First Officer made initial contact with the Guantanamo tower controller... several seconds later the controller responded), "runway one zero, wind two zero, zero at seven, altimeter two niner seven, report Point Alpha." The First Officer acknowledged and requested "clarification" of the location of Point Alpha. The controller provided the crew with the information and followed this transmission several seconds later with, "eight zero eight, Would you like runway two eight." The First Officer responded, "we're gonna try ten first..."

The winds favored runway 28 which would have been the logical runway to use. Runway 28 would have provided a straightforward no-nonsense approach.

The Captain began the approach sequence, flaps were set at 15 degrees and approach checklist items were performed and the aircraft began to slow for the approach.

1652:03 The tower controller transmitted, "Connie eight oh eight, Cuban airspace begins three quarter of a mile west of the runway. You are required to remain within this, within the airspace designated by a strobe The First Officer responded, "Roger, we'll look for the strobe light.." Several seconds later the First Officer again remarked to the Captain, "I'd give myself plenty of time to get straight ... maintain a little water off because you're gonna have to turn... I think you're gettin in close before you start your turn." The Captain responded, "yeah, I got it, I got it ...going to have to really honk it, let's get the gear down."

The above mentioned strobe light was inoperative. The DOD did not have a procedure in place at Guantanamo Bay to ensure that all air traffic controllers were made aware of the inoperative strobe light and to ensure that the controllers communicated that operational status to the flightcrews. As a consequence the Captain attempted to locate an inoperative strobe light that they did not know was inoperative. Additionally, the First Officer did communicate his initial concern about the approach.

by: Wayne S. Cook
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Prescott, AZ

A joint Flight/Aeronautical Science CRM Committee has been formed at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, AZ campus. This committee will investigate how best to incorporate CRM principles into its flight training curriculum, beginning with private pilot training (ASEL) and related academic courses. Flight Technology, Aeronautical Science, and Humanities/Social Science departments are all represented in an effort to create a pervasive CRM atmosphere for ERAU students. The need for ERAU to adopt the basic concepts of CRM having been recognized, an overview presentation of committee work was given in October 1994 to the Aeronautical Science Industrial Advisory Counsel - a group of liaison persons between ERAU and the aviation industry, including numerous air carriers,

Mr. Wayne Cook, Committee Chair, Mr. Pete Halle, Aeronautical Science Department Chair, and a delegation from the ERAU campus at Daytona Beach, FL visited the NASA Human Factors research facilities at the University of Texas (NASA/UT) in August 1994. A day and a half of talks were conducted with Dr. Robert Helmreich, Director of the NASA/UT/FAA Aerospace Crew Performance Project, and NASA/UT researchers Mr. Bill Taggart, Captain Sharon Jones, and Mr. John Wilhelm. Much insight was gained concerning how to proceed with incorporating CRM principles into a large Part 141 flight school. Both the Daytona Beach, FL and the Prescott, AZ campuses of ERAU have actively searched for methodologies to narrow the experience gap between their graduates and entry-level positions for a major carrier. It is hoped that the pervasive utilization of CRM principles at ERAU will contribute toward filling this gap.

Dr. Helmreich provided several suggestions including a survey of staff and students to define the organizational culture and an audit of flight instruction through observations of activities and student evaluations. The ground work for such activities is currently being laid.

Since the August meeting with the researchers at NASA/UT, the Committee has reviewed much of the current CRM Literature focusing primarily on Dr. Helmreich's book Cockpit Resource Management (Academic Press, 1993). With this information, and their own aeronautical backgrounds, the Committee members began to address the strategic issues involved with incorporating CRM principles into private pilot flight training. Several interesting considerations surfaced. These are each briefly discussed below:

1. Use student observation activities for teaching CRM but not as the central focus. It was agreed that mandatory student observation activities done from the rear seat of training aircraft would not work. Reasons included (1) present syllabi do not include observer units as such; (2) mandating observer activities has proven futile in the past,- (3) the strategic problem of filling a mandatory observer activity, when a given student is absent, is untenable; and (4) back-to-back dual instructional flights provide a significant, and possibly sufficient, amount of exposure to observer activities/duties.

The problem of utilizing a student observer during a dual instructional flight who could not be utilized on a checkride, solo activity, or solo cross-country activity has been discussed at length. Despite this obvious problem, it was recognized that some benefit could be derived on a dual instructional flight from utilizing a third person in the rear seat, if and when he/she is present. The frequency of utilization of this person must be addressed. Generally, it was agreed that the use of this person was most appropriate during more advanced flight instruction, particularly in multiengine aircraft such as the Beechcraft Duchess.

2. A new three to five day CRM seminar or two to four week CRM course. This seminar or course was initially suggested by a committee member, and retired airline captain, who has volunteered his services as a consultant to ERAU at Prescott. After considerable discussion, the idea was generally agreed upon by all members of the Committee; however, there were some reservations about making it mandatory for all flight students. Several questions have been raised: Would it be accepted? Should students be asked to attend a three to five day seminar during evening hours or before the official beginning of the Fall or Spring semester? Should the seminar be conducted on an eight-hour (or more) per day basis, similar to those conducted by major carriers? Would a two to four week course be a better format than a seminar?

Although these questions were not definitively answered, it was agreed that such a seminar or course would serve the purpose of providing a significant and substantial experience and knowledge foundation for subsequent classroom, ground school, and flight training. It was also suggested that "recurrent CRM training" for students as well as instructors must be addressed, possibly by incorporating it into designated flight and non-flight courses or by additional CRM courses or seminars.

The Committee believes that concepts such as teamwork, situational awareness, problem definition, inquiry, advocacy, decision making, critique, feedback, and conflict resolution could be introduced at this early state in an effort to influence students to accept these concepts. Together with the recognition that the captain, or leader in any group, is responsible for setting the atmosphere for the work to be done, students may employ these concepts as "Gospel" for productive work to be done, not only in the cockpit but in their college life at ERA U an beyond. If ERAU can instill this mindset in its students early in their college careers, and back it up with faculty, staff, and administrators that also employ and exhibit these concepts, its students will truly by "shining stars" in a world that by and large has rejected the use of these resource management principles.

3. Stress the use of resources. The Flight Technology Department's Safety Officer suggested that students be taught to recognize the need to use all the resources at their disposal, e.g., ATC, Flight Service Station personnel, dispatch, Flight Watch, etc. Although this is a straight forward statement, how and when such resources are utilized is a subject deserving much attention by ERA U instructors. Some students, even after studying about such resources, still fail to utilize some of these in flight. Certainly, the Committee will be giving this subject considerable attention.

4. Find a way to get students to make decisions. Decision making is recognized as a major problem. Student dependence upon the instructor, ATC, or occasionally even a checkpilot to make a decision may be considered alarming. However, it must be realized that when a student does this he/she is attempting to make maximum use of the available resources. Flight instructors must not inhibit this student response, rather, they should simply temper it with the realization that on a checkride querying the checkpilot is not allowed. Within the extraordinarily safe environment of an ERA U dual instruction flight, students should be assertive enough to try new techniques and procedures in flight or at least query the instructor about them during the preflight or postflight briefing. Unfortunately, this happens too infrequently. Much more learning would take place if students exercised such prerogatives more frequently. Certainly, stressing the importance of "inquiry" early in a student's college career would address this problem significantly.

5. Challenge/reply -No; Flow Checks - Yes; Read/do - Yes. Incorporating a "challenge/reply" methodology was considered inappropriate at the private pilot level. Additionally, it would present a real problem with stage checks and checkrides. However, the use of "flow checks" was considered appropriate at the student pilot level. For example, portions of the run-up checklist could be done in a flow check and then backed up by the checklist. Similarly, the pre-descent, before landing, and after landing checklists could be conducted in this manner. ERA U is using such methodologies at present, but their use is limited to more advanced courses. However, especially for initial training purposes, checklists such as engine start, shutdown, and portions of the run-up checklists were considered most appropriate with the "time honored" read/do methodology.

6. Use self-evaluation batteries/tests. An instrument to identify students' hazardous thought patterns and their ability to be a "team player" would be beneficial, but how this information would be used is still being discussed. One interesting point was whether this information should be used to pair students. Proponents stated that both "opposites" and "similar" scoring students could be paired, then results could be compared. Opponents, stated that a random selection of student pairs is necessary because students with like academic schedules must be paired anyway,- therefore, any strategy for pairing these students could prove futile.

7. Use CRM surveys. It was agreed that both anonymous and identified surveys, submitted to the

Safety Officer, would be beneficial The specific content of these has not been discussed, but the sentiment was that students, instructors, and others would be given the opportunity to record the proper, improper, or missing CRM concepts as these applied to a given flight activity. Such surveys would be a complement to ERA Us present system of recording safety related incidents.

Presently, ERAU-Prescott provides a short segment of its private pilot ground school training which covers decision making, hazardous attitudes, risk assessment, stress, and self-assessment. From private pilot training up through commercial-instrument multiengine flight courses, "Aeronautical Decision Making Activities" are referenced in flight course syllabi. However, guidance on how such activities should be setup by flight instructors, and feedback on how they are being utilized to evaluate a student's judgments in flight, are not in evidence. Additionally, syllabus modifications have been made to accommodate CRM as included in the newly published (late 1994) FAA Commercial Pilot Practical Test Standards.

However, only in the most advanced courses (introduction to ATP Proficiency and Two-Pilot Operations and the capstone course High Performance Aircraft Flight Crew Techniques and Procedures) are students formally exposed to CRM training. In the former offering students are given eight hours of CRM concepts via lecture, class discussions, video tape excerpts, scenario analysis, character analysis, and role playing exercises. Some of the role playing exercises are video taped exercises where students are asked to make time-critical decisions after the stage is set via a verbal description of various in-flight situations. In the latter offering, the capstone course, students are provided with their first actual LOFT experience using a Frasca 242 simulator configured as a Cessna 340. Video tapes are made of all simulator activities and these are used as a debriefing tool along with the NASA/UT Line/Los Checklist (3/15/94) which is used with the permission of the researchers at NASA/UT.

The CRM Advocate will be updated as more progress is made. Any and all comments and/or suggestions regarding incorporating CRM principles into "grass roots" flight training would be welcomed by the Committee. Correspondence may be addressed to Mr. Wayne S. Cook, Flight Line, 3200 Willow Creek Road, Prescott, AZ 86301; or on Internet: cookw@pr.erau.edu.

Editor's Note: Wayne -- There appears to be "buy in" for the proposition that observation activities for teaching CRM would be effective, but then later that is discounted for a number of operational needs (Your consideration number 1.). Allow me to submit that the skill of "thinking about thinking" is the highest level of learning we as professional trainers and educators may ever share. What tools and processes may we deploy that allows a student to analyze and critique his own technical and interpersonal performance? How may we "grade" the primary flight student on his analysis of the (his) flight and not the actual performance of the flight?

by: Captain Tom Houle
USAir/ALPA

The industry has long voiced the opinion for the need of one central location for all the resources associated with Human Factors in Aviation. Last summer at the FAA sponsored Crew Resource Management Summit all the United States leaders in this field expressed a need for at least a bibliography clearinghouse.

In fact it was exactly two years ago at this conference when the facilitators of CRM held their first informal meeting to discuss the need to share effective teaching techniques. Several ideas emerged out of this meeting. The first was the need to share materials, ideas and techniques that work well in the classroom. Each individual carrier expressed their frustration in trying to develop all of these courses from scratch. It seemed that everyone was re-inventing the wheel each time with varying degrees of effectiveness. In each developers own mind this was success because their audience had never had this type of training before so that anything presented was almost automatically well received.

What is the International Aviation Human Factors Center (IAHFC)? The IAHFC is a central clearing house for all information and training materials concerning the application of human factors in aviation. The center will eventually be the one single source location of all training material, research reports and it will also act as the one central coordination point for all important meetings.

It is envisioned that one of the primary philosophies of the center will be to make this information as readily available as possible. With this in mind one of the first steps will be to establish yourselves on Internet.

The first phase of the center is a collection of video tapes and human factors training course materials. The second phase will be the cataloguing of research, reports, including NTSB accident and research reports. The final phase will be to develop national standards for teaching human factors and CRM at airlines.

Presently the IAHFC is a group of several centers of excellence. It's members include: Purdue University, Ohio State University, University of Texas, USAir, NASA, FAA, and ALPA. Purdue anticipates housing the operation, however, funding has not been secured as yet.

Three classes of membership will be established. Full access will be given to Part 121 & 135 carriers. The second category will be FAA, NASA, Military and research institutes, and the third category will be general users who will have limited access to materials.

Human Factors materials to be donated to the library can be shipped to: International Aviation Human Factors Center (IAHFC), 1107 Temfield Rd., Towson, MD 21286.

by: R. Key Dismukes
NASA Ames Research Center
Lori K. McDonnell
San Jose State University
Steven E. Gregorich
University of California, San Francisco

NASA Ames Research Center in conjunction with San Jose State University and the University of California have been studying LOFT debriefing techniques used at major U.S. Airlines. A preliminary progress report was presented at the 1995 International Aviation Psychology Symposium in Ohio. Their observations have focused on the following three topical areas:

1. Instructor techniques
2. Extent & character of crew participation
3. Content of debriefing.

The researchers hope the study will provide insight about the obstacles instructors encounter in trying to teach the FAA guidelines. In addition, the researchers are attempting to provide detailed descriptions of the techniques instructors use to assess the LOFT and which ones seem most effective. The researchers also hope this study will provide a window on more general issues of

crew training such as the validity of CRM concepts, how well concepts are being implemented, the impact of training, and how well instructors and crews can analyze and assess crew performance.

The study is based on observations at a cross-section of major U.S. airlines. The basic technique consists of sitting in on 6 to 10 debriefings from a cross-section of the fleets at each company. Permission is obtained from each instructor and each crew member to attend the debriefing and to audiotape the session. Assurance is given that all data collected is deidentified. Audio recordings are later transcribed into text and coded for: utterance length, speaker, target, utterance type, function of question, topic type, topic category, CRM subtopics technical subtopics

Preliminary results from 14 debriefings shows that 65% of the time instructors did most of the talking, followed by captain (20%) and first officers (15%). The Instructor utterances were about 50% longer than crew utterances. CRM topics comprised more of the comments than did technical comments. The majority of the instructors' comments on performance were either positive or neutral, 4% of the words involved criticism or suggestions on ways to improve. Instructors found less to talk about with high performing crews, therefore shortening the length of the debrief.

Although instructors are encouraged to act as facilitators, they often do a combination of lecturing and facilitation. Instructors use of facilitation techniques was limited and they often undermine their own attempts at facilitation by interrupting crew comments or by elaborating on each crew member's comments in a way that made any further discussion by the crew redundant. The researchers observations suggest that most LOFT instructors lie closer to the lecture end of the scale. Although they are clearly conscientious, the researchers believe the gap between expectation and practice is a function of instructor training. Preliminary results suggest that training departments have underestimated the difficulties of facilitating debriefings and the training required for instructors to facilitate well.

For a copy of the progress report, contact.-

Key Dismukes
NASA Ames Research Center
1357 Harrison St.
Santa Clara, CA 95050
Telephone.- 415.604.0150

by: Tom Leahy
CCAir/USAir Express

On June 6 & 7,1995, a CRM Workshop was held at the Trans World Airlines (TWA) Training Center in St. Louis, MO. It was hosted jointly by the Airline Pilots Association and TWA. There was attendance by CCAir/USAir Express, Continental, Delta, Southwest, USAir, USAir Shuttle, ALPA and Purdue University.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issues related to CRM and Human Factors training programs. Representatives agreed that CRM and Human Factors training issues are continuously being duplicated and re-invented from one organization to another. They discussed how cooperation and sharing of CRM and Human Factors training information would benefit the industry.

During the two day workshop, attendee's shared information on history and current and future CRM program offerings for their organization. The group of representatives discussed the needs of future CRM training programs and what their roles might be.

Another meeting has been scheduled for September 1995 (date to be determined). For more information on this Focus Groups efforts and how to become involved, please contact either: Captain Jack Eastman (TWA) 718.244.2790 or Captain Tom Houle (ALPA/USAir) 800.872.4763.

by: Norm Komich
USAir Shuttle

At a CRM workshop at the Ohio State International Aviation Psychology Symposium in April of this year, one of the issues discussed involved the question "Should a Captain have to respond to a call for "Go Around" by a First Officer or Second Officer?" The question was precipitated by the concerns of F/0's and S/0's expressed in the CRM classroom that their inputs were going unheeded by their Captains.

For example, the radar showed heavy weather on the route and the F/0 who was flying wanted to circumnavigate it. The Captain, however, wanted to continue straight ahead because the flight was running late. When the F/0 continued to express his concern over pressing on into the weather, the Captain finally told him "Look, you've made your input, now pipe down and maintain the present heading!" He did, and while they encountered some turbulence, it was not bad enough to warrant pursuing the discussion; still the F/0 felt that the picture on the scope had been bad enough to have warranted avoiding it and he consequently felt that the Captain had exposed the flight to a potentially dangerous situation by disregarding his input and flying straight through the depicted weather.

Therein lies the issue: it is one thing for the F/0 or S/0 to challenge the Captain when he is outside of a published black and white regulation or procedure. However, when the issue is not specifically addressed in writing and therefore falls into the "grey" area of "Maybe it is dangerous, but then again, maybe its not," then the training being provided in CRM today is not advocating a clear message for F/0's and S/0's.

For example, take the scenario of the DC-10 being flown by the F/0 who was landing at DFW with severe weather in the area. On short final (50' AGL), the F/0 was uncomfortable enough with the aircraft flight path that he announced that he was going around. The Captain, concerned over going back up into the weather, took control, landed, and went off the runway. In its final report, the NTSB stated "the Captain of .... was well within his authority to take the airplane from the F/0 Once again, the input of the subordinate crewmember was overridden by the Captain.

This philosophy was reinforced at the OSU workshop, where it was unanimously concluded that the Captain remains in charge, regardless of what the subordinate crewmembers desire, and he should NOT have to go around based solely on the opinion of the S/0 or F/0.

Editor's Note: Should the Captain continue the operation at any time he cannot make his crew comfortable? In either example, were joint expectations the same and the comfort zone agreed to prior to the critical phase of flight?

by: Jim Blanchard
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University & MITRE

A workshop was held on June 21, 22 and 23 to discuss and document flight crew accident and incident human factors. The workshop was convened by Christopher Hart, FAA Assistant Administrator for Aviation Safety. Participants represented 29 different industries/operators, 6 government programs, and 3 academic institutions. The task of the participants was to the outline requirements and objectives of a future system for accessing, integrating and supporting analysis of flight crew human factors data in the National Airspace System. The proceedings of the workshop will be used by the participants to further describe the future capabilities of the system and guide the production of a prototype, expected to be in use by late 1996. Closely linked to the FAA's desire to assist users in gaining the information they need in an accurate and timely manner, the future system is envisioned as a "jukebox" on which the users of human factors data "play" the "music" (analytical questions) they write and derive their own assessment of the meaning of the output. Strengths of the system include future plans to allow the users to link in electronically and apply scientific methods for assessing human performance.

For Additional Information Contact:
Jim Blanchard, 703.883.6758

by: Randolph Law & Paul Sherman
NASA/Univ. of Texas/FAA/Aerospace Crew Research

"Do Raters Agree? Assessing Inter-Rater Agreement in the Evaluation of Air Crew Resource Management Skills" was a paper presented at the Aviation Psychology Symposium in April of this year. To follow is an overview of the paper.

The works explored involve the issues surrounding the quality and judgment of performance ratings in evaluating CRM skills. The paper describes a tool being used to rate air crews' CRM skills and also presents a strategy for evaluation of inter-rater agreement.

The use of trained raters is normally associated with improved ratings quality. The training of raters leads to reductions in common rating errors, however questions still remain as to whether trained raters show adequate agreement in their ratings of the same stimulus. The preliminary results of the analyses of two samples of trained trainers each observing an example of air crew performance suggest a high degree of agreement regarding overall crew technical proficiency and crew effectiveness, for both above-average and below-average crews. The researchers urged caution as there was no use of experimental controls when obtaining their data. Although raters show a high level of agreement regarding crew technical and interpersonal performance ratings, raters do not always agree on when a specific CRM behavior should be rated for a given phase of flight. They claim despite these drawbacks, the agreement among trained raters evaluating crew performance bodes well for future efforts to quantify and evaluate CRM skills.

For more information or a copy of the paper contact:

NASA/University of Texas
Randolph Law or Paul Sherman
1609 Shoal Creek Blvd., #200
Austin, TX 78701
Tel: 512.480.9997

The material contained in The CRM Advocate back issues is the property of the contributing editors. No duplication of any kind is authorized without the express written permission of the editor. All rights reserved. For training and information purposes only. The intent of the editors is shared information, through controlled distribution to the benefit of the safety of flight.

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