Table of Contents

• STEAM GAUGE TO GLASS COCKPIT:
  Training Strategies for Smooth Transitioning from B747-200 to B747-400, by: Jose M. Anca Jr., Philippine Airlines
• CRM, TEAMWORK & SAFETY, by: Lucy B. Young, USAir 767 F/O
• REGULATING CRM: A Replay of Security Training?? by: William R. Taggart, NASA/University of Texas/FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project
• INTERVIEWS WITH INDUSTRY: CRM & LOFT, by: Jacqueline Kaye
• TRAINING OR INTRUSION? The role of the Check Pilot, by: Roy E. Butler, NASA/University of Texas/FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project
• CRM Training Video Available
• Conflict Management for Aviation Professionals, by: Jim Blanchard, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

by: Jose M. Anca Jr.
Philippine Airlines

Introduction

Competitive advantage, world-class standards, the magic of automation, keeping up with the state-of-the-art, increased payload with non-stop capability ... etc. These drive an airline to an advanced technology re-fleeting program. The drive starts from one contagious mind to another. It is drawn up into a fleet plan, tested and forged into a cost-benefit ratio until it finds its way into the private walls of the boardroom. A show of hands, a finalization of a board resolution and finally, a phone call to a bench of waiting bankers seals the future of advanced technology aircraft acquisition.

Unfamiliar engines, degradation of flying skills, agitation of an otherwise sacrosanct bargaining agreement, the "airplane-flies-the-pilot" disease, Computer-Based Training as differentiated from HCAT ("Human-Centered Automation Training" ... etc.). These result from the uncertainties and apprehensions of the flight operations and engineering sectors of the organization with the advanced technology fleet plan.

Both excerpts reveal an apparent tension. From the corporate boardroom, the now proverbial, "We buy it, you use it" and from the operational grassroots, "It's new, I don't trust it." Considering these polarities, we may summarily conclude that from the very beginning, a transition to an advanced technology state will likely fail.

However, the underlying foundation of these polarities are essentially complementary. Management must be convinced that it is not just buying the "fruits" of the technology but the technology itself, hence, management is responsible for ensuring that the human operator must be totally convinced and prepared to accept the technology. On the other hand, the human operator must realize that technology is but a mere tool to help him perform the task effectively and efficiently, hence, he should at all times be in command of the automation. Stretching the meaning of a hallmark research on automation and procedures into our discussion, "...begin with first developing an overall guiding philosophy of flight operations that states how management wants its airline to function. This step is often ignored, or brushed off with statements such as safety comes first" (Wiener, 1988).

This paper shall submit strategies that can be undertaken from the standpoint of management, herein aptly rests on the training function, for ensuring a smooth transition from a classic "steam gauge" cockpit into an automated flight deck. The data will come from a performance evaluation of pilots who underwent a Type Qualification Course offshore, with the Boeing Company.

The foundation of the training experience

The training program

By the end of January 1994, fifty (50) pilots completed the Type Qualification Course conducted by Boeing at its base in Seattle. The initial training format based on negotiations between the airline and Boeing was a series of Differences Courses (for those previously qualified in earlier B747s) and a longer Transition Course (for the instructor pilots and others who come from the DC I 0 and A3 00 equipment). A listing of the training courses duration are as follows:

Table 1: Comparison of Type Qualification Courses

As a result of negotiations from the purchase of B747-400s, a ground and flight training plan was mapped out by Boeing and Philippine Airlines. The initial option was to run two Transition Courses to accommodate the training of identified and selected Instructor Pilots from the airline and the succeeding courses, thereby composed of line pilots, were to be the Differences Course. Later on, during the conduct of training and as a result of empirical data from the training experience, the Differences Course was changed to Transition Courses. The wisdom in the shift is important as it portrays the positive organizational flexibility of both Boeing and the airline.

In anticipation of potential problems gleaned from experiences in other airlines' introduction of advanced technology aircraft, the Human Factors Division of the airline designed and implemented an Introduction the Glass Cockpit Seminar composed of CRM theoretic plus actual hands-on tutoring in the FMC using the airline's B737-300 Full Flight Simulator.

The pilots

The pilots who went for training are the most senior in the company, on the average having logged 25,000 ++ hours in varied equipment types. Their most recent Type Qualification Course was approximately 10 to 12 years ago prior to this Boeing training. Out of the fifty (50) pilots, ten (10) did not qualify. The post training anecdotal reviews from the pilots themselves (especially those who did not qualify) were traumatic and emotional. Many of the pilots were product of KLM flight training during the initial stages of B747-200 introduction in the airline in the late 70's. There is a general yet unwritten sentiment among the pilots that KLM training was the best they have ever had at that time. There was likewise and equally positive attitude toward the Boeing training since most felt that training from the manufacturer is first-hand and comprehensive. Additionally, the airline had just recently completed Type Qualification Courses with Boeing in a massive re-fleeting program of its domestic fleet with the Boeing 737-300. Hence, Philippine Airlines was not a newcomer to Boeing.

The training experience

Expert observations

The comments of expert Boeing Instructor Pilots were reviewed and tabulated in order to find out the apparent causes of the failures. The methodology used was a simple frequency count for each comment or statement in a particular maneuver or procedure. Thereafter, all the comments were grouped in what we felt were logical classifications:

Table 2: Classification of Expert Observations

Mastery of Procedures and Checklists

• Slow completion of Normal Procedures; Fuel Systems Procedures slow
• Does not adequately understand holding pattern exits
• Not sure when to call Checklists
• Missed calling After Start Checklist
• Took 40 minutes for Engine Start
• Pilot reverted to B737 and A300 procedures
• Used wrong Checklist ("gear door' instead of "gear disagree")

Data Entry and In flight Re-planning

• Unable to program descent speed restriction
• Unable to enter LNAV modification and approach data
• Unable to modify route without Instructor assistance
• Unable to make CDU entries
• Unable to enter "direct-to" and intercept course clearance
• Uncertainty with FMA, ND, PFD
• Difficulty with MCP operations
• Difficulty in setting NAV/RAD page
• Used FLCH for descent to minimums

Errors in ILS & Go Around Procedures

• Did not arm APP on radar vector ILS
• ILS frequency not tuned in

Advocacy

• Hesitant to take action without prompting
• Said nothing to Captain during high speed RTO

Technical Skill/Competence

• Took extra time in examining switches

Situational Awareness & Planning

• Captain had to call gear down three times
• Doesn't see the "Big Picture"
• Appears to be overwhelmed by "Glass Cockpit"
• Tended to be "behind the airplane"

Cognitive Sequencing

• Forgets long segments of clearance
• Does not seem to be concentrating
• During cargo fire, forgot to discharge extinguishers

Aircraft Handling & Flight Technique

• No flare at touchdown
• Had problems with 2-engine inoperative and maintaining proper approach path
• Airspeed and attitude control poor
• Airspeed below V_ref several times
• Aircraft Control Problems
• Manual ILS approach unacceptable
• V₁ cut-rotated rapidly at V₁
• Overshot missed approach

Lack of Crew Coordination

• Non-normal checklists being handled as if both pilots are using checklist instead of PNF handling the QRH
• Instrument cross-check weak
• Arguments with the Captain; lapses into native language and argues with the Captain

The data revealed that Data Entry & In flight Re-planning was the highest frequency (50); Mastery of Procedures and Checklists ranked second (27); Aircraft Handling and Flight Technique (25); Lack of Crew Coordination (15); Errors in ILS/Go Around (10); Situational Awareness (8); Cognitive Sequencing (7); Advocacy (7); and Technical Skill & Competence (1).

A majority of the failures occurred in the Full Flight Simulator Phase. Of the allotted 18 hours per pilot training in the FFS, training were terminated on the average at the 21st hour. However, for those who failed in the Fixed Base Simulator, in the allotted 20 hours per crew, trainings were terminated on the average at the 26th hour. Given this data, it is conclusive that all training were terminated in excess of the allotted time.

The three highest incidences of pilot failures in training were in Data Entry & In flight Re-planning, Master of Procedures and Checklists, and Aircraft Handling and Flight Techniques. These three, we submit, are the core areas wherein which recommendations should revolve from.

What we have learned: Strategies for Smooth Transitioning

Prior and in addition to Type Qualification Training, pilots should be given an introductory course in automation. We have also found out that the availability of an actual and interactive CDU, gave the pilots in general sufficient preparation for the training. The Introduction of Glass Cockpit Seminar utilized as many possible inputs from assessment tools supplied by NASA/University of Texas/FAA (Wilhelm, Merritt & Helmreich, 1994) and the initial research contained in Human Factors of Advanced Technology Transport Aircraft (Wiener, 1989). The total training experience in Boeing confirms that Glass Cockpit training is not just any other training but is in reality a different Qualitative experience" (Wiener, 1989). We cite also the difficulty of those coming from a three-man crew operation with reference to checklist performance. This is typified in one incident where "on non-normal checklists, (the procedure was) being handled as if both pilots are using a checklist instead of (the) PNF handling the QRH." It is cardinal knowledge that a three-man crew situation directs the PNF and (normally) the Systems Engineer to perform the checklist. This procedure is not typical in a two-man B747-400. There were cases in which two B737-300 captains, qualifying as B747-400 first officers, failed the course. The synonymous comment to them was that even with prior knowledge of CDU operation, they reverted to B737-300 procedures.

Although it is not an unqualified success (Orlady & Wheeler, 1989), Computer-Based Training and its opportunity for providing drills in the CDU may have valuable returns in preparing pilots for Type Qualification in the long run. Philippine Airlines has recently acquired CBT equipment and it plans to fully utilize it as a preparatory tool prior to actual Type Qualification.

Pilots in the classic-analog cockpits who are initially identified for upgrading (or downgrading) to glass cockpits would profit well if they are given preparatory information about the demand of automated flying, even while they are in their respective equipment. In all the classes conducted with the senior pilots, there was evident resistance to the automation by some of the older pilots. This was the same indication in another earlier study of U.S. pilots in the IOE phase (Wiener, 1989). The resistance were coming from: "It's just another airplane," or "I might not hurdle the training because of age."

The Pilots union must assume the role as a partner and not as an adversary in the training. Although this should be the ideal role of the union at all times, we suspect that because of the newness of automation training, more understanding patience, and active participation must be exercised by the pilot's union at a time when the airline is likewise grappling with the demands of the new technology.

Type Qualification (and more urgently, Recurrent Training) syllabi for automated aircraft must contain modules that focus on "cognitive skills" (Wiener, 1989). The major demand of automated flight is the ability of the crew to assess the situation they are in, the mode they are currently set, the information that is provided by the FMC and its relationship with the external information being put into (hopefully) the permeable walls of the flightdeck. This type of operation requires less of the motor skills but more of the management/supervisory abilities. It is highly probable that a pilot who emerges from the classic-analog to the glass cockpit may find himself overwhelmed by the availability of information around him. In one instance during the training, the Boeing instructor commented: "he performs better if given clearance one at a time," and then, in a similar case, an instructor in one of the classes made a vital option: "The problem was not whether you had to know and memorize everything. All of them were in the manuals given. What was important is that you should know where to look for the information."

Summary

The advent of new technology aircraft presents challenges especially to the Training Department. In this very short study of the training experience on the B747-400, we have identified the importance of preparing classic-analog pilots to be aware of the new demands of the technology.

To a certain degree, the training experience itself disproves the opinion that training in the automated environment is just like training in the classic-analog. New training devices are required in coping with particularly the operation of the FMS-CDU. More importantly, a new set of skills dealing with cognition and basic management is needed. The training experience that Philippine Airlines underwent in its Type Qualification Course for the B747-400 confirm earlier and incipient studies made by researchers regarding advanced technology aircraft training.

The next step for the airline is to see to it that the infrastructure: Policies, Standards, and Procedures should also be realigned to conform with the demands of advanced technology training and flight operations.

by: Lucy B. Young
USAir 767 F/O

One of the best safety tools that exists in aviation is the enhanced awareness that comes from reviewing "lessons learned" in previous accidents and incidents. Last year, the NTSB did a landmark study of 37 Part 121 accidents 1978-1990 that had flight crew actions cited as a causal or contributing factor. Much can be gleaned from the 302 errors that were examined and categorized into nine error types using a NASA classification scheme. Two of the most common error types, procedural and monitoring/challenging are worth examining further in that they relate to teamwork and crew resource management. Air carrier pilots operate in a most demanding environment, and knowledge of potential human error patterns can be extremely useful as a prevention tool. As one conference of air safety investigators summed it up, "Without awareness there can be no prevention."

It is important to re-iterate that flight crews are only one part of the air carrier system and elements outside the flight deck can actually lead to flight crew errors; pilot errors do not occur in a vacuum. The operational context and crew characteristics of each scenario was examined to shed some light on why these errors occurred, and in fact is very enlightening. Although this article generally speaks in terms of two-pilot crews, the concepts discussed herein would be applicable to three-pilot crews as well.

78% of the accidents occurred in the takeoff and approach/landing phase of flight. Eight out of ten of the takeoff accidents had errors made in the TAXI phase that directly contributed to the mishap, and of those eight, six involved procedural errors. In 73% of the cases, the accident occurred on the crew's first day flying together, and in 44% of those, the accident flight was the crew's first flight together. These crews were relatively unfamiliar with each other. Studies have also shown that even fatigued pilots made fewer errors than rested pilots who had never flown together before. A reserve pilot picking up a trip on a short call may be called upon to perform checklists immediately after arrival in the cockpit, and the crew may still perform quite well, but what if something happened soon thereafter? A crew briefing helps subordinates gain insight into what will be expected of them, lets them know that they will be supported by the captain, and ensures awareness of safety items such as short taxi, weather considerations, deicing, etc. This section of the NTSB study underscored the need for team building early on in the flight sequence.

Each flight crew is an assembly of unique people thrust into a confining and demanding environment where they are expected to perform as a team. Technically, pilots are very proficient but how will they interact with the others on the team? Airline flight crews are teams, and many air carriers address this important safety aspect through joint emergency evacuation training in recurrent training each year.

Crew resource management provides crew members numerous skills that can help them work well as a team. Poor teamwork, not the individual crewmember, is often at the root of a crew coordination breakdown and subsequent incident. Pilots practice these skills and receive feedback in LOFT sessions. Skills such as how to set the tone for the trip with a briefing, how to address conflicts with other employees, and how to draw upon all the expertise of the other crewmembers can be practiced with video feedback to review the effectiveness of team skills. The intent of this type of training is not to induce behavioral style changes, but to allow each pilot to exploit their strengths and identify their weakness' to hone their own team skills. Having these team skills in a pilot's repertoire can be critical in the event of an emergency, since during stressful times, pilots revert to well-learned behaviors. Which is better? A cockpit with strong technical pilots who do not interact well, or a crew of average pilots who work well as a team? Most flight crews would choose the latter.

Concepts and tools that maintain the team are just as important as those that build the team. Skills that can be useful here include: considering each others' job tasks, communicating needs and concerns in a timely manner, keeping everyone informed and supporting others by keeping them in the loop. For example, when the cabin safety video or demo has just been completed in the cabin, the flight attendants still need some time to do a thorough cabin walk-through and get strapped into their seats.

There are many procedural items that pilots are expected to accomplish: making required callouts (including altitude awareness), making accurate callouts, conducting and completing required checklists or briefs, following prescribed checklist procedures, and consulting charts or other sources for critical information. The NTSB study showed that errors in checklist usage were most frequent in accidents that occurred during takeoff, and that errors in making callouts were typically observed in accidents that occurred in approach and landing. Procedural errors surfaced in 29 of the 37 accident case studies and were the largest percentage. Most were errors of omission, meaning no action or untimely action by a crewmember. It is interesting that both captains and first officers made similar numbers of errors in this category, illustrating that proper procedures and checklist accomplishment rely heavily on the actions of both pilots.

The monitoring/challenging errors were surprisingly prevalent, seen in 84% of the accidents. Most errors were made by first officers. Safety can be compromised when an error is made by the captain and the first officer is reluctant to bring it to the captain's attention.

Two issues arise for the first officer who is uncomfortable with a captain's tactical decision: Is the captain's decision a faulty one, and when is the appropriate time to question this decision? The first officer may be concerned that his speaking up may be perceived as a challenge to the captain's authority. Challenging a captain's decision not to go around is more difficult to do in a timely manner than pointing out a straightforward error such as failure to turn on the TCAS before takeoff. The challenge/response structure of checklists provides one type of monitoring system. The complexity of tactical decisions made in today's environment necessitates the use of all available resources, and using the expertise of all crewmembers leads to enhanced teamwork through synergy (the whole is greater than the sum of the parts). Pilots have an obligation to express opinions that are clearly related to safety, and the five step effective assertion model can be a useful tool for accomplishing this: Opening, show concern, state the problem, propose a solution, and achieve agreement.

Putting together a tailored program for the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) is ongoing at many air carriers in the US. AQP is a special regulation that established alternative methods for air carrier training and checking, and stresses CRM and line operational simulations. Continuing reinforcement of CRM is the third cornerstone of CRM programs, per Advisory Circular 120-5 IA, and check airmen, instructors and flight managers are all part of producing this aspect of training. Crew resource management encompasses many areas of human factors as it relates to flight crew performance and enhanced safety. Inquiry, advocacy and assertion can benefit crewmembers by enabling them to advocate the course of action they feel is best, and thereby work in consonance as a team.

by: William R. Taggart
NASA/University of Texas/FAA
Aerospace Crew Research Project

In mid-December, the FAA issued the long-awaited proposed rule for requiring CRM training for both part 121 and certain part 135 operators. It should be required reading for all chief pilots and curriculum designers. Our research project here in Austin reviewed the proposed rule and offered comments and suggestions to the FAA. This article is a condensation and summary of our observations in the hope that it might be useful to others planning for CRM and LOFT.

For those that might not be familiar with who we are, we are members of the NASA and FAA sponsored Aerospace Crew Research Project located at the University of Texas at Austin. This human factors research project is commonly referred to in the industry as NASA/UT. The director of the project is Dr. Bob Helmreich, and he is assisted by Captain Roy Butler, John Wilhelm, and Bill Taggart. The project has been active in CRM issues in both aviation and space operations for over 25 years. We were significant participants in the development of the current advisory circular on CRM training, and the NASA/UT Behavioral Markers have been adapted for use by many airlines now engaged in CRM training. We are active in ATA working groups that support AQP implementation, and we conduct research with air carriers to assist them in auditing and surveying their own operational effectiveness and potential risk areas from a human factors and resource management perspective.

We commend the FAA for issuing the proposed rule, as we are convinced that human factors issues represent the most significant opportunity for affecting levels of safety within the aviation system today. As opposed to 10 years ago, there is now solid, empirical evidence that the practice of effective human factors training and assessment in combination with excellent technical training yields a higher level of safety and risk management than was previously achievable. However, we are concerned that the proposed rule could be implemented in such a manner that many of the benefits of the training will go unrealized for many operators. For the rule to be effective, the training must be linked to an assessment and evaluation program, and both of these elements must be reflected in the content of the technical training curriculum as well as training and flight operations manuals. In short, the CRM training must be integrated with existing training and checking programs in order to realize the safety benefits that can be gained.

We offer the following observations for the FAA and the industry concerning the effectiveness of CRM training.

1. Evaluation of human factors training should be a requirement of the rule. It makes little sense to mandate the training unless an evaluation program is included. The United States Air Force recently issued training requirements for CRM and included evaluation as part of the requirement. The effectiveness of the training program components should be evaluated and measured using tools that can test for shifts in crew performance and CRM skill acquisition. Measurement of training outcomes should include not only the CRM initial training program, but also recurrent training including LOFT simulator training or its equivalent. It is important to have an ongoing and continuous evaluation method that both the FAA and the airline community can use to compare program objectives with actual outcomes and results.

2. The CRM training needs to be designed to reflect the specific needs of the airline and its operating environment. We have analyzed numerous examples of programs that have been implemented where a pre-packaged program from another carrier has been implemented at another. The results have been less than optimal. For many small carriers, the most useful strategy may be to adapt existing resources from the industry to reflect their own organizational culture and needs. The proposed rule "includes initial CRM training for persons already employed by the certificate holder, And over new employees of the certificate holder, unless a new employee has completed the applicable initial CRM training, from another certificate holder. The FAA anticipates that this component will be very similar for all certificate holders." It is our experience that CRM training is best if it is designed specifically for the airline in question, even though there are certainly core skill areas that will be common. The major carriers that are doing new-hire CRM training require that new crewmembers attend their own program because this aids in building effective crew coordination. We recommend that this item be reconsidered.

3. The length of time needed for an awareness or baseline course will vary depending on the needs of the operator, and the degree to which the training is integrated with other events. The proposed rule states that the "FAA estimates that the proposed CRM training requirement will increase the present minimum programmed hours of instruction for initial and recurrent training. For initial training for pilots and flight engineers, the FAA estimates that CRM training will add 12 hours to present requirements. For initial training for flight attendants and aircraft dispatchers, the increase is estimated to be 8 hours. For recurrent training, the estimated increase is 4 hours for pilots and flight engineers and 2 hours for flight attendants and aircraft dispatchers ". It is our experience that most CRM baseline programs are between one and two days in length. Some of the more successful programs also include the training of flight attendants, pilots, dispatchers, and in some cases mechanics and gate agents, into an integrated program, as well as training targeted for flight crew members. We believe the proposed rule should encourage an integrated training approach as opposed to requiring a set number of block hours that can be satisfied with classroom lectures. The better programs are built upon the acquisition and practice of specific skills even in baseline awareness training courses. We think it more important that an air carrier determine whether or not the program is meeting the desired objectives rather than simply filling a set number of block hours that can be composed entirely of academic lecture and watching video material. The reaction of crewmembers to FAA required security training comes to mind here.

4. The time frame for compliance with CRM training requirements is set at 2 years for flight crew and 3 years for flight attendants and dispatchers for completion of the initial program. In our view, the time frame for flight crew training is extremely conservative. We recognize that more time may be required to develop and deliver new training for flight attendants and dispatchers. We also recognize that for many major carriers the number of flight attendants is very large. Our concern is that many operators may defer the training until the end of the compliance term. It would be beneficial if the FAA could offer some inducement or incentive for air carriers to initiate training at the earliest possible time.

5. There must be an extra layer of training for those involved in training and evaluation of the line crewmembers - the check pilots and flight instructors. In many cases, these key individuals have only received the same baseline training as the other crewmembers. Additional training is needed in learning to assess and debrief CRM skills. This applies to both line operations and simulator training.

6. There needs to be a requirement for FAA Standards personnel to receive not only initial CRM training but also the more advanced training discussed above. This should enable them to discharge their evaluation function more effectively. Along this same line, we believe the FAA needs to evaluate and improve its own internal methods for the selection and advancement of those that are involved in evaluating and inspecting the performance of flight crews. Traditional methods of inspecting and measuring compliance have centered on individual pilot technical and procedural issues. It is now recognized that evaluators need to be proficient in the human factors dimensions of crew performance as well as the technical aspects. Air carriers are now selecting flightcrew members for their people skills as well as technical skills. As new FAA staff are hired, using a similar approach would be very beneficial.

7. CRM principles and skill requirements must be included in the various flight manuals and procedures that the airline uses. We have found examples of air carriers that have developed good CRM baseline training only to later discover that the manuals and procedures in place did not reinforce, support, and require CRM and crew coordination.

In summary, our preference is for the FAA to use the rule to require the integration of human factors and technical training in order to improve on existing training and checking programs. We are convinced that aviation safety and the public interest will be best served if air carriers large and small invest in training programs that contain the following attributes:

a) Observed crew performance and incident data are used to direct training content.

b) The human factors focus is on usable skills and behaviors that relate to enhanced safety.

c) The human factors/CRM training is integrated with technical training and checking. LOFT is an excellent tool to accomplish this.

d) Instructors and check airmen are trained to evaluate and debrief on human factors issues as well as technical performance.

e) There is specialized training for areas such as: captain and first officer upgrades, automation skills training for advanced technology aircraft, and fatigue countermeasures for long haul and special operations.

f) Joint training is encouraged where relevant for operations and safety.

g) There is added focus on cultural issues unique to a particular air carrier and its operations

h) There is special training for regulators and inspectors on how to evaluate and assess human factors training and its effectiveness over time.

by: Jacqueline Kaye

In an attempt to keep our readers informed about what is happening in industry as it relates to CRM training and LOFT programs, we interviewed representatives from America West, USAir, Delta, and Southwest.

AMERICA WEST

In an interview with John Crawley, General Operational Subjects - Flight Crew Training at America West, he indicated the main objective of their 1995 CRM/LOFT training was to continue infusing CRM into every aspect of flight training. Historically, airlines have introduced and taught CRM concepts and ideas as stand-alone programs. Crawley says what makes America West's CRM program so unique is they have moved away from the traditional "spoon feeding" method, to complete integration of CRM. America West prides themselves on their ability to successfully expose their flight crew population to the latest CRM/Human Factors research findings. As a result of recent findings, America West has integrated CRM into both their 3 day re-current training program and their qualification LOFT. The first day of the recurrent training program focuses on general subjects, days two and three focus on aircraft systems. Initial, re-qualification and upgrade pilots experience total integration of CRM in America West's LOFT program. Within their 5 days of general subject pilot training for Captain upgrades, CRM has been woven throughout. At the conclusion of the 5 day training, an oral exam is administered by the check airmen to ensure adequate learning and understanding has taken place with respect to non-technical piloting management skills.

LOFT used by America West do not focus on any one CRM behavioral/crew effectiveness marker over another. Behavioral markers are carefully integrated into the whole experience so as to obtain maximum benefit from the training. At many airlines, LOFT sessions are viewed by the pilot population as just another check ride. America West has been working hard to change this view and believe there are definite learning benefits from creating an atmosphere that is so close to the "real" thing that one can hardly tell the difference. To add to the realism and diffuse any expectations the pilots might have as to what the scenario might be, each aircraft type has between 2 and 4 different LOFT qualification scenarios. These scenarios are rotated on a regular basis. America West has found that their "team" approach to LOFT instructing versus a single LOFT Instructor has contributed to improved flight crew communications. Their LOFT Team consists of a Line Check Airmen, Simulator Operator and a line-qualified Flight Attendant. In order to qualify as LOFT Instructors, team members attend 2 days of formalized LOFT Instructor training and learn about the roles they are to fulfill.

In an effort to encourage "self-learning" through LOFT, two phases of debriefing have been used. First the flight crew and the Instructor Team simultaneously and separately debrief themselves for 30 to 60 minutes. In the final phase of debriefing, the Instructor Team and the pilots together discuss the LOFT. This particular approach has been viewed as a win/win situation in the eyes of management and the line pilot. America West is taking full advantage of an non-obtrusive environment which lends itself to a more conducive learning milieu, an "Open Exchange," whereby the learning is taking place by the student.

When asked if there was anything Industry should know about America West's CRM/LOFT programs that have been particularly successful, Crawley responded with "total integration ... it is the way we do business."

DELTA AIRLINES

Delta has taken a very proactive stance with regards to training. The pilots and flight attendants have been participating in CRM together since 1991 says Ray Justenik, Manager of Human Factors at Delta. In 1994, the pilots and flight attendants, through a classroom mock-up, received 3 hours training together, with a theme on workload management. Joint training has continued in 1995. However, in an attempt to improve the overall effectiveness of the flight crews in communication, dispatchers have also been incorporated into the process.

Although the dispatchers have been included in the process this year, a baseline program for the dispatchers is being developed to improve upon the process and interaction. This program should be up and running by year end. In addition, maintenance should have a baseline program by year end. One of the major differences between the dispatcher baseline and the maintenance baseline is that maintenance will not be involved in the joint training with pilots, and flight attendants.

CRM has been effective at Delta. The pilots and flight attendants feel that communication has improved as a result of the joint training. Evaluation forms received to date, average 4.7 on a scale of 5 (5 being best/highest). Delta's focus is to translate the "academic applications and principles of the classroom," to line situations. Their striving for complete integration of CRM throughout training is a goal. Delta believes that CRM should be second nature.

When asked what has been particularly successful in CRM/LOFT at Delta, Justenik responded with sticking to their theme of workload management and overall integration of CRM into every facet of flight operations.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES

At Southwest Airlines, each year the CRM Steering Committee presents a fresh training program developed from a rotating list of CRM and human factors subjects. Committee Chairman Pete Wolfe says that the 1995 program draws upon NASA's ASRS data to include one of today's hottest topics, "The Hurry-Up Syndrome." The course also addresses the subjects of fatigue, cockpit-cabin communication and a review of 1994 on-line incidents.

The two-hour recurrent program, led by one of the flight training center's ground instructors, is designed as a structured discussion, rather than a canned lecture. The objective is to provide an opportunity for pilots to exchange insights gained from on-line experiences in each of the subject areas discussed.

Each year Southwest incorporates several topics in its recurrent training. By using more than one topic each year and by varying the subject matter, the course is able to address timely issues. The 1994 program focused on the implications of the new Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In addition, the theme of passenger irregularities and the recently upgraded capabilities of Southwest's dispatch office were concentrated on in 1994.

"CRM is an integral part of every ground school class, simulator session and checkride," says Wolfe. "Instructors and Check Airmen use observations of crew performance from all phases of training to critique and coach pilots. The aim is to optimize individual and crew performance."

Currently Southwest utilizes LOFT as part of its Captain upgrade training curriculum, and is considering adding LOFT to the initial training program. Although Southwest has not elected to convert to AQP at this time, the company continues to evaluate the concept for possible future application.

New hires are introduced to CRM and a variety of human factors issues during a two-day ground school course. "Our one-day Captain upgrade course provides a comprehensive review of many of the same concepts," says Wolfe, "but here the focus is tightly directed at the pilots' new role and responsibilities." Both initial and upgrade courses involve participants from other departments, including flight attendants, dispatchers, station personnel and mechanics. Both courses are scenario-based and rely heavily on realistic line situations to demonstrate CRM principles.

At Southwest Airlines CRM is an ongoing topic of discussion, appearing frequently in the Union's magazines and in the Chief Pilot's newsletters. Articles, submitted by line pilots and other personnel, cover a wide range of relevant topics. Information sharing is second nature at Southwest, and employees recognize that their contributions are important and valued.

USAir

We had the opportunity to talk to with Jon Adams, AQP, and Corky Romeo, CRM Coordinator at USAir. Both agreed that the pilot and flight attendant population have been receptive to recognize the importance of USAir's CRM program. Feedback has been positive over the past year. USAir utilizes facilitator/instructors for delivery of CRM in the classroom. These individuals are line pilots and are provided with the necessary tools to present and facilitate the information in the most professional manner. CRM facilitator/instructors have been working to not only maintain, but to also improve the CRM program currently in use.

During recurrent training, the line pilots and flight attendants receive I hour of CRM that is jointly facilitated, but conducted in separate pilot/flight attendant classrooms.

Last year one of USAir's focuses was on trainer training of CRM. This initiative was to prepare and ensure the trainers/facilitators ability to present the material at the highest level possible. This contributes to wider acceptance by the pilots and flight attendants. Trainer training enhances the facilitators ability to understand and find useful applications of the material. Developing a team environment was emphasized.

The 1995 initiative of maintaining the team, is the next logical progression from developing the team. Appreciation of others job tasks, and a shared understanding contributes to improved communication overall. Workload management, always plays an important role in the cockpit. Pilots have been receiving an increased emphasis on complex problem solving, which has led to a more aggressive approach to scenario design and development of LOFT.

The 1995 CRM classroom module emphasis of workload management is carried through o the LOFT theme.

Unlike America West's qualification LOFT and Delta's recurrent LOFT, flight attendants do not participate in the LOFT scenario. Although there is emphasis on workload management, this should not be misconstrued to mean that the other NASA Crew Effectiveness Markers (briefing, inquiry & assertiveness, feedback, communications, decisions, leadership/followership, interpersonal relations/climate, preparation/planning/vigilance, technical proficiency, overall effectiveness) are not as important.

USAir has initiated a Training Skills Development Program (TSD), which was co-developed with British Airways. The presentation skills program was introduced at the end of 1994 and USAir envisions it as a program that will continually evolve. The Team of 3 instructor/presenters consists of a combination of pilots and other personnel from both USAir and British Airways. It is the intent of USAir to have all flight operation personnel involved in training to participate in this program.

In addition to TSD, an Observation and Debriefing Skills course is in the developmental stages. USAir anticipates its introduction by year end for all check airmen.

USAir's Line Oriented Simulation Team is becoming more skilled at scenario design. LOFT has become much more realistic and line oriented. This skill will undoubtedly carry over into USAir's Instructional Systems Design development process for AQP. AQP will truly integrate or imbed CRM throughout the training experience and focus attention on needed trainer training.

by: Roy E. Butler
NASA/University of Texas/FAA
Aerospace Crew Research Project

With the introduction of the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), it is apparent that success in training requires both Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and technical skills. Yet, even though (CRM) training and its practice on the line have gained wide acceptance, there are still crew members and check pilots who raise questions concerning the value and intent of CRM training. This extends itself not only to the basic CRM training activities, but also to simulator LOFT training, and line operation. These questions have many nuances, but at the bottom of it all is this: Where is the line between legitimate crew-related training and an unwarranted intrusion into the crew members personal styles?

Most of us raise objections to "brainwashing" techniques used in some New Age training which deals with a wide variety of seminars and self improvement courses. The sensitivity groups of 20 years ago and the guided visions of today all have questionable value as ethical pilot training vehicles. It is important to address the concerns of the small minority of crew members who have indicated they feel that CRM training is some form of "Psycho-babble" and question its value in improving flight safety. Should a CRM training program teach, encourage or mandate anything other than the observable behavior crew members must exhibit while performing their jobs? If so, what? To what extent should a program attempt to shape or dictate personal beliefs, attitudes or values? These are questions that have been reviewed many times in the development of CRM training programs, and must be looked at continuously as the CRM training process matures. The answer lies, not in whether a change in attitudes and values should be the goal of CRM training, but rather to what extent and what kind of changes are appropriate. When we talk about attitude changes we are only talking about those attitudes that are operationally relevant (i.e. attitudes toward briefing, attitudes toward managing resources, or attitudes relating to building an effective team in the cockpit). We are certainly not talking about changing anyone's attitudes toward social, political, or economic values.

Does that mean that CRM enlightenment represents the ultimate bedrock truth? I seriously doubt it, and this is why emphatically certain CRM Zealots and the true believers disturb me. Their position and over-enthusiastic effort to promote CRM in many cases is counter productive. Some of the most zealous and intellectually brilliant are relatively junior pilots and do not have credibility within their airlines. Many are not aware of the development of pilot training over the last thirty years. It is not as simple as saying that a few enlightened airline training managers or psychologists created the concept of CRM. This is totally false. Despite the newness of the name, many of the concepts of CRM have been around for years under the umbrella of basic airmanship. Good airmanship, and leadership have always meant effective management of the crew and resources, and the majority of the military and airline pilots display a fair number of the CRM skills and specific behaviors now being taught and evaluated. The check airmen who have to sell CRM to pilots on the line and in LOFT are not particularly helped by the zealots.

Thankfully, from my own perspective, we have now gone beyond the less operational, more psychological approaches that fabricate plausible but abstract explanations for crew actions. The trend now, thanks to Dr. Robert Helmreich (conducting flight crew performance research at the University of Texas), is to get rid of the psycho-babble and the new age business management jargon (paradigm shift, advocacy, enlightenment, etc..). He has introduced behavioral markers that describe crew performance in an operational language and style that trainers can easily instruct and evaluate. The markers are intuitively logical and operational - in that they represent discreet actions or inaction that crew members can choose to use or to ignore. A check pilot or trainer with minimal training can evaluate these behaviors on the basis of were they present or not present. With additional standardization and calibration training they can also evaluate on a graded scale from poor to outstanding.

Over the past five years we have seen some distinct and positive changes in the development of CRM training. First, there has been a shift from training focused on individual style, to training based on the development of specific and observable CRM skills. Secondly, there is special training for check pilots and LOFT instructors which had previously been overlooked. In my opinion, these evaluation, briefing and debriefing skills have still not been given the time and emphasis needed.

CRM training is designed to develop specific skills and assist crews in accomplishing attitude and behavioral changes that improve the overall functioning of the crew as a team. Pilots know that to accomplish and follow the various policies and standard operating procedures in the Aircraft Operating Manual, Flight Operations Manual and adhere to the many aviation regulations, requires certain disciplined behavior. There is now acceptance that good CRM behaviors are also required. An airline not only has the right, but the duty to train, and expect appropriate compliance, to procedures and desired behaviors to accomplish a safe, comfortable, timely and efficient air transportation service.

I believe that the majority of crew members' attitudes toward CRM has changed. These attitude changes are important because they provide a foundation for the longer term change of behaviors and values within an organization. When doing the job well means responding thoughtfully or imaginatively to a variety of situations, people can't be told what to do in every one of those moments. Instead, they must be told about the values and attitudes desired to guide their behavior. The needed peer pressure to improve teamwork in the cockpit stems from the development of similar attitudes that start at the top and flow down. The crew members must have an awareness that a significant majority of attitudes regarding effective behavior within the whole organization are alike and in support of each other.

The Role of the Check Pilot...

To accomplish the changes in values, one of the key extensions of CRM training is the special training required for the check pilots and LOFT instructors. Because this group is particularly important, they benefit from additional training to evaluate CRM and learn to deal with CRM issues encountered on the line. Additionally, CRM evaluator training is important because the check pilot or instructor has the responsibility to set an example. The check pilot or instructor must demonstrate by example, not only technical competency but also how crew members are expected to behave and act toward other employees and passengers. The desired long term goal is to produce positive attitude changes in the line pilots regarding the use of CRM skills.

The check pilot and LOFT facilitators are trained in the philosophy, principles, and conduct of line checks, LOFT and CRM. Training enables them to effectively observe and critique individual and crew performance during a line observation or LOFT scenario. One of the central parts of several check pilot CRM training programs is the NASA[UT/FAA Line/Los Checklist which is used for data collection. Using the checklist, techniques have been developed to provide special training in observation, evaluation and debriefing of CRM for check pilots and LOFT instructors. Video taped LOFT simulations are used for practice in evaluating and rating specific observable behaviors. Additionally, instruction is given for using the checklist as a tool for debriefing crews on crew coordination.

Mistakes are inevitable. If CRM training were a sure thing, we would not need to use judgment about it. What must be expected of the check pilot or instructor and the crews being evaluated, is that collectively they learn from their mistakes, not that they never make them. It should be their concern to watch the growth of the CRM skills within themselves and other crew members. It is important for them to see that, as they collectively learn, their successes increasingly outweigh their failures. This concept of growth is a vital part of the CRM learning process. It is important to make certain that each crew member knows that his or her performance is developed and that this development is limited only by their individual contributions. Crew members must see the instructors and check pilots as individuals interested in, and helpful toward, the growth in knowledge and CRM skills.

Check pilots and instructors involved with CRM must be cognizant of the successes and failures of the crew members, and make sure that the crew members also see the consequences as related to total crew performance. At this point, a difficult aspect of the check pilot and instructors role arises. How can performance feedback be impersonal and still be effective? How can a decision or technique be discussed without the feeling that an individual or crew is being demeaned? Adequate communication and skill in debriefing can accomplish this. Communications skills and human insight are needed to develop individual satisfaction in the exercise of effective crew concept, and also to create fulfillment that holds the crew to their goal. No training program alone can do that. It is clearly the role of the line check pilot to make CRM operationally successful.

Airline Educational Services, a company specializing in producing technical training videos, has assisted Captain Jerry Cockrell, Ph.D. in the development of a Crew Resource Management video program. Designed for Part 121 and 135 certificate holders and Corporate Aviation, the 12-hour course allows crew members to learn and practice important CRM skills individually or in a classroom situation. This program is also an excellent instructional tool for universities and technical schools specializing in flight training.

Program producer Larry Moore believes this is the only independently developed CRM training series available today and it is the first complete "stand alone" CRM video course in the industry. "It was designed to allow airlines to add CRM training without the expenses connected with developing their own program. "However," Moore added, "airlines already conducting CRM classes will find that our program integrates nicely with theirs and adds a new dimension to this important subject."

The course content follows guidelines published by the Federal Aviation Administration in Advisory Circular 121-5 1 A. During 12-hours of intensive training, crew members learn and practice these critical skills: team building, information transfer, decision making, problem solving, conflict resolution, maintaining situational awareness, stress management and reduction.

In addition to the video instruction, this CRM program includes a master student manual which can be duplicated as needed. A guide for instructors is also included with the package should companies wish to incorporate the program into their own training series.

The Airline Educational Services Crew Resource Management Program has been developed and is taught by airline Captain and crew training professional Jerald ("Jerry") Cockrell, Ph.D. Jerry has more than 10, 000 hours flying time and is a current Boeing 737 Captain for a FAR-121 airline based in Denver. He holds a Ph.D. in Psychology and Education. Beginning his work in 1977, he was one of the earliest developers of CRM programs. Since that time he has conducted more than 200 CRM and Check Airman seminars for such air carriers as: United Parcel Service, Alaska Airlines, Air B.C., Air Ontario, Frontier Airlines, Overseas National Airlines, MarkAir, Reeve Aleutian Airways, and Henson Airlines. Jerry has worked with several corporate and government aviation groups including Mobil Oil, Arco, all branches of the military, the US Coast Guard and the FBI. Jerry also has the honor of being the first person to make aviation safety presentations in all 50 states, as well as in England, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Canada.

Airline Educational Services has established a special introductory price of $6,500 for the 12-hour CRM Seminar (including a master student guide, an instructor's manual, exercise materials and 10 video tapes). Airlines with more than one training center may purchase additional copies for $3,500. The regular retail price is $8,000. Recurrent programs will be available separately beginning in the Spring of 1996.

For additional information about the program contact Carolyn Cockrell at Airline Educational Services, 1-800-478-7030.

by: Jim Blanchard
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

This brief article is intended to supplement an understanding of conflict management techniques in aviation operations, and point out that the most important step in conflict management for airline employees occurs long before the flight leaves the ramp. Effective communication sets the stage for minimizing conflict in the operational environment. Beyond that, performing the duties of the position and respect for those duties by others sets the environment. The role of the professional aviator often makes it imprudent, and dangerous, to have a conversation in less than a focused, direct tone. Failure of the participants (flight crew, ground crew and management) to support this basic premises creates an environment that fosters conflict. It is important to recall from prior training that conflict may not be readily evident, nor severe or prolonged, just a nuisance. This article introduces a short list of tactics that help all participants anticipate and recover from the deterioration of a conflict-free environment.

To put this in flight crew perspective, PIC/SIC conversations can run from casual to formal in the course of a flight (sometimes instantly), and having the tones mixed in a short period of time often leaves one party offended (referring to the listener of the exchange that was expecting one tone and got another) because of the switch. Beyond having the team placed at an operational disadvantage due to a lack of common understanding about the conversational context, observations in formal research programs indicated that the "offended" party is also in a state of degraded performance trying to assess the reason for the conversational switch, rather than managing the reply or action required.

Two Critical Points of Conflict Management

Typically, a conversational switch is coupled with a requirement for action, and when a switch takes place between a superior and a subordinate, conflict (and degraded performance) can arise easily. Two critical points of conflict management training need to be applied during human interaction. First, message clarity is the single most important part of effective communication. The sender needs to recognize the importance of clarity and purpose in the message, and the receiver needs to state objections and clarify confusion immediately so that portion of the message can be improved. This clarification process should be conducted when the confusion occurs, but only to the extent necessary to gain appropriate feedback. Second, the tone of conversation is a critical supporting element in human interactions, and is set by the perceived senior participant. This is an important point for PICs to remember. Conversational switches are a way of life in aviation, but the management of the tone during conversations that follows is inherently controlled by the PIC.

Message clarity can be achieved more effectively in a number of different ways. The sender can seek to limit conversation not associated with the task during a time frame of minutes prior to the task. Basically, don't introduce the opportunity for conversational switches. The sender can think through the message before sending it. The sender can support the message with actions that compel the receiver to understand the message as sent, the first time. The receiver can do their part as well. Take a few seconds and seek to find the message first before replying that confusion exists. Do not reply with an offending tone or content, but simply a statement of fact that you do not understand a part of the message, and include the misunderstood phrase in your reply.

Remember that timeliness in resolving confusion is a critical point of reducing conflict, and forcing a sender to repeatedly clarify a message is not desirable.

Line-oriented training (LOT) exercises constructed for specific learning objectives are typically the preferred method reinforcing resource management. For flight crews, this is the LOFT, for others it is a role-playing example in a high-fidelity situation such as dispatch or hangar operations rooms. Formal observation of these exercises lead to a research project a number of years ago. This research provides an example of conflict management in action for flight crew members, and identifies specific actions for recovering from conflict on the flight deck. Additionally, it provides a LOFT example for training centers interested in this topic.

Research Project on Conflict Management in LOFT

Students and airline pilots in a graduate seminar on "cockpit resource management" were asked to participate in a LOFT flight simulator exercise using two-crew aircraft simulators they were familiar with and have operated as PIC. They were told it would be graded (as an attendance grade for the seminar). This request left them with the impression that it was a required activity and each had something to gain/loose by complying.

Each already had a commercial pilot's license or better, 25 percent of them were experienced airline pilots, and the rest had been flight instructing while completing school. The exercise was designed to elicit performance data on their use of the principles of conflict management during LOFT. The flights were video-taped and the results were analyzed (with the students) looking for the deterioration of the environment from conflict-free towards one that fostered conflict. To ensure certain amounts of conflict, the PIC played either end of a "forcing-smoothing" personality scale. Additionally, the role of the SIC was to fly the simulator, which lead to cognitive overload in certain instances. This, in retrospect, was a issue which remains unresolved, but suffice it to say for this article that the video-tape review sessions were instrumental in the learning process. Statistically, the results were informative since they supported the premise that the message clarity was the critical element of the process of effective communication when measuring effectiveness as correct and complete performance of a task, or series of tasks. More important, though, was the non-statistical and subjective data that tied the task performance and the perception of workload by the crew to the tone of the flying environment as set by the PIC in the preflight (in simulator) introductions. Summary results showed that all cases of a forcing personality by the PIC lead to immediate reduction in task performance, and subsequently higher scores of perceived workload by the SIC. The results of the smoothing personality were not indicative of either reduced or improved performance. What was most startling was the review of the video tapes revealed two strong signs of a conflict-enhanced environment. The first was the increased amount of request for clarity by the SIC during normal procedural operations, and the second was the lack of casual conversation.

In the case of increased request for clarity, two plausible explanations are offered by the researchers. The first proposed the SIC's seemed to using this conflict management "tool" to induce punishment upon the PIC, whom they held accountable for the miserable flying environment. In more than one case this was clearly evident in the de-briefing. The second explanation could be more closely related to the cognitive workload of the SIC who had the task of "flying and replying," which may simply have been to much. Coupled with the primary task of flying, the SIC was "buying time" to get the reply together by asking for clarification. Both of these actions by the SIC are typical of "burdened participants" in a conflict situation.

It is widely recognized by aviation human factors professionals that certain amounts of conflict are normal and tolerable in aviation operations. This article is intended to point out specific actions for aviation professionals to take that either reduce the likelihood of conflict, or indicate the need for conflict management in the operational environment. Sending a clear message and setting a neutral conversational tone are important actions for the sending participant, and seeking to find the message and reply accordingly, are actions of the receiver.

The material contained in The CRM Advocate back issues is the property of the contributing editors. No duplication of any kind is authorized without the express written permission of the editor. All rights reserved. For training and information purposes only. The intent of the editors is shared information, through controlled distribution to the benefit of the safety of flight.

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