The CRM Advocate
Issue 94.1

Published Quarterly for the Professional Air Crew Trainer

January, 1994

Contents

 New ATA Committee Solicits Input on Joint Pilot/Flight Attendant Training Issues

by:
Gary van Hartogh, USAir
412.747.3059

Is your company conducting joint training sessions involving both pilots and flight attendants? If not, is such training planned for future courses? Believe it or not, for many companies, the toughest challenge in setting up joint training is deciding which subjects to address. ATA's Training Committee has formed a focus group to collect ideas on topics for joint courses.... and You Can Help. Don't miss this chance to give your input to an industry-wide effort that will help shape the joint training courses of carriers around the world!

Question # 1

What topics have addressed by your company's program? (Answer only if currently conducting joint training for Pilots and Flight Attendants.) Keep answers brief. For example:

  • Subjects for Preflight Briefings
  • Boarding / Handling of Irregular Pax (Ill, Intox, Unruly)
  • Cockpit / Cabin Coordination During Mechanical / Wx
  • Delays
  • Coordination Required For Irregular Ops - Enroute: Serious Illness / Severe Turbulence / Mechanical

Question # 2

What Topics Should Be Addressed In Joint Training Session? Use the one-liner format shown above. About the survey and deadline: Your responses will serve as the foundation of an industry wide survey to be conducted during March 1994. So, in order to incorporate your input, We Need Your List Of Topics By Monday, February 14th! Fax your response to: 412/747-3679 (ph: 412/747-3059) Address your fax To:

ATA Joint-Training Survey
c/o USAir Flight Training Dept
Attn: Gary van Hartogh 1
5 Commerce Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15275

Finally, please let us know how to reach you: Name/Address/Company & POSITION/PHONE & Fax. Thanks for your help.

 Australian Airlines Pilot/Flight Attendant Integrated Crew Training

by: Captain Ray Baker
and Kerry Frost

Introduction

To satisfy the Australian regulatory requirements for emergency procedures refresher training, Australian Airlines conducts a 2 day Annual Proficiency Check Course for its aircrew members. Approximately 70 courses are conducted each year at the Australian Aircrew Training Center. The focus of this presentation is not on this legislated course content; but on an expanded application of procedures and their human factors implications. To gain maximum benefit from this 2 days of training, the attendees must be an integration of pilots, flight engineers and flight attendants, that is, a flight's operating team.

The integrated course has been in continuous operation since June 199 1, with each course normally comprising 16 flight attendants and 4 technical crew members.

Background

The concept for this form of training did not develop over night. In its present form it has flowed on from a previous initiative, that being the introduction in July 1985 of technical flight crew resource management training, the courseware being locally developed and unique to Australian Airlines at the time and known as Aircrew Team Management (ATM).

It soon became evident that this form of human factors training could be beneficial to our flight attendants. Despite recognition of the advantages of such a course by flight attendant management, it was felt that no possibility existed for each flight attendant to complete the primary 4 day course so it was duly relegated to the too hard basket.

However, about that time a program was introduced to give flight attendants some technical knowledge, over and above that imparted to them during induction training, that would make them feel more comfortable with day to day operations and confident in their responses to passengers' questions and concerns. Items covered during that briefing session were, for example:

First flight of the day square wheel syndrome, aircraft standing start takeoff procedure, reasons for large power reductions after takeoff, causes of turbulence, go around requirements and implications of crosswind landings. Included in that information was their safety related role as an aircrew member. This included the direct communication to the flight deck of anything considered to be immediately dangerous, such as fire, smoke, visible structural damage, etc. This did not always have the desired result as supported by numerous events from line operations.

With the accumulation of evidence from examples from our own and other operators experiences, it became evident that despite the careful dove tailing of safety related procedures involving technical flight crew and flight attendants, no guarantee exists that such procedures will work unless training is conducted to ensure a bridging of the chasm that separates the 2 aircrew groups in respect of their everyday work disciplines.

Planning For Course Introduction

Approximately one year before the planned commencement of integrated training a committee representing the various areas of interest was formed. It included representatives from both technical crew and flight attendant scheduling, flight attendant safety instructors, management representatives from each group, a technical flight crew representative and a technical crew ground instructor. This advanced planning ensured that the respective scheduling sections were prepared. A review of the equipment necessary to support the practical training and detailing of the work necessary to bring the cabin safety trainer up to a respectable B737-300 representation was completed. To this end, a local manufacturer was identified to complete the work on our mockup and attended committee meetings to ensure regular progress reports were provided to assist in the monitoring by training center staff. Refurnishing of the mockup was in the hands of our Engineering and Maintenance Department, who attended meetings to ensure the coordination of their work progression and that of the outside contractor.

It was ensured that reports were passed to each of the aircrew organizations throughout the development program. Considerable time and development went into the course format, especially in respect of the examinations for each group and the scheduling of the human factors exposure relative to the practical exercises, the accident review video, and its follow up questionnaire.

We were aware of the problems other airlines had experienced with integration, in some cases resulting in the return to separate training. This made us more determined to ensure our program would be successful.

Course Objectives

  • To enhance effective crew coordination.
  • To practice communication skills as part of a team.
  • To understand and appreciate each other's role, both on a daily basis and in an emergency.
  • To understand the information each other requires to perform their job effectively; and to be aware of the possible consequences if that information is not provided, or is incorrect.
  • To create an environment of trust and support where a Flight Attendant is confident to pass on concerns to the Captain without fear of intimidation where a Tech Crew ensures Flight Attendants are fully informed, work load permitting.

Teamwork can only be effective with mutual respect.

Integrated training clearly had to be more than ' just putting both crews in the same room and completing our existing revalidation program.

The course duration was half a day and consisted of-.

  • A visual and oral review of emergency equipment and aircraft location
  • A revision of aircraft emergency features
  • A review of land and sea survival policy
  • A practical exit operation session (minus crowd control techniques)
  • A written exam

The task which faced the planning committee was enormous; we had to:

  • DESIGN A COURSE allowing maximum crew participation whilst still meeting the regulatory requirements.
  • UPGRADE THE TRAINING FACILITIES to cater for practical chills in most conceivable emergency scenarios and in an environment resembling a current aircraft type.
  • STANDARDIZE THE REFERENCE BASE

This meant production of a new Safety and Emergency Procedures Manual suitable for both Technical and Cabin Crew. It replaced the existing Flight Attendant Manual.

Course Content

Crowd Control Techniques, i.e. shouting commands, was now combined with Exit Operation. This meant that Tech Crew now had to shout commands something they'd never done before.

The second change was to the Assessment. We decided that much of the previous program revisited information which all crewmembers already knew. By conducting a written assessment at the beginning of the course, this would demonstrate crew proficiency in these areas. The onus was now on crew to study prior to the course. Therefore, the time previously spent on revisiting old material was now allocated to practical sessions and new information. We also introduced practical assessment of evacuation drills for Flight Attendants.

The more unique aspects of our program demonstrate our commitment to improving crew coordination and communication. We designed practical drills to reflect potential emergency situations and also to pursue any concerns raised from on line incidents e.g., one area of concern was inaccurate communications, "Flames" mentioned when only a white vapor, assumed smoke was seen.

Inflight Fire Procedures

We included a session to practice teamwork and communication in several inflight fire scenarios. Our Inflight Fire Procedures involve a team of 3 Flight Attendants performing very specific actions and communicating exact details with the Tech Crew. Everyone knew their procedures, and the written exams certainly verified this but it wasn't so easy when we began to practice!

People could play their own role, but would become frustrated with each other. Mistakes were made, feedback given, more practice, until finally, you could see everything failing into place.

Bomb Search Procedures

Another area of concern for Flight Crew was bomb search procedures. We had 2 incidents on the ground where Flight Attendants were asked to search the aircraft; and an inflight incident which resulted in an inflight search and a diversion to the nearest airport.

All 3 incidents were hoaxes, and although our procedures .were adequate these incidents did indicate a need for improvement, again highlighting the need for clear communication. This was another practical session which was very well received.

Crew Communication And Coordination

In this key session we reviewed a fatal accident in which Human Factors was cited as a major contributing factor, the British Midlands aircraft which crashed at Kegworth in 1989. The lessons from this incident are very powerful and promoted excellent discussion between Tech and Cabin Crew. Tech crew saying... "But naturally you would tell us if you were concerned about something" ... and some Flight Attendants confessing that there were occasions when they hadn't, because they were afraid of looking foolish or they felt intimidated by the Captain.

This session usually culminated with a senior Captain personally reassuring Flight Attendants that they would always be welcome to and in fact MUST pass on any concerns to the Flight Deck, and that no one would make them feel stupid.

The discussions flowed onto other topics; crew are usually too busy to discuss issues on line, and now in class people were encouraged to share and clarify mutual concerns. Some issues were resolved...... e.g., Captains, after hearing about the difficulties of coping with an intoxicated passenger inflight, now support Pursers when denying boarding to such a person.

However not all issues could be resolved. We found that it wasn't the answers that mattered. It was the dialogue that was important and the understanding of the reasons behind each others' actions.

Sadly, the lessons of inadequate communication are still being learned in our industry. Another accident which occurred at Dryden, Canada, also in 1989, was included for discussion in this year's program.

Apprehensions

Some people were resentful, some apprehensive, and some simply reluctant to change. Typical tech crew objections;

  • Increase in time commitment from half a day to one and a half days. Some Tech Crew were concerned that an extra day's training would financially disadvantage them, this concern was unfounded.
  • The basis of the course required Tech Crew to cross the threshold into what had traditionally been seen as the Flight Attendants' domain.
  • The fear of looking silly in front of Flight Attendants.
  • Reluctance to cross type; e.g., an A300 Captain not wanting to operate B737 exits.

Flight Attendant Concerns

Flight Attendants, on the other hand were delighted at the prospect of combined training. At last Tech Crew would see that they did more than serve tea and coffee.

Their concerns were more assessment related. The changes to the program now required more effort to achieve revalidation.

In the past, the thorough revision session prior to the predictable exam virtually guaranteed a pass... and in fact, no one had ever failed. The revision session is now eliminated, exam questions regularly change, and a practical assessment has been added.

Passing was now no longer a formality, and failure was a very real possibility for those who had not prepared adequately. Failure meaning a process of supplementary exams, retraining and loss of face with the peer group. Also the potential for repeated failures resulting in termination.

It is difficult to feel enthusiastic about something if you feel it will have a negative outcome. Therefore it was vital that we overcame these fears.

Selling The Course

We needed to lift the image of the Training Department. The Training facility had to be perceived as capable of meeting the training requirements. This resulted in improved classrooms and upgrading the Safety Trainer to resemble a working B737 cabin interior.

Instructor Enthusiasm And Consistency

If we expected crews to be motivated and professional then instructors had to set the standard. All instructors played a part in and implementing the program and were very committed to making it work. Our instructors set a high standard for an enthusiastic and effective team.

Creation Of Video Production Team

Some of our Flight Attendants had previously worked as Television cameramen and production crew. We utilized this talent to produce training videos, e.g., Fire Procedures and Sea Survival. This had a great halo effect. Flight Attendants were proud to see talent from their @ being used; and not only in production......... some stars were born.

Consultation With Crew Associations

We discussed our plans with the Associations. They supported us in our ambition to improve the practical and interaction content of the course. This also enabled them to allay any fears passed on to them by their membership.

Squash The Rumors!

We published a booklet outlining:

  • course content
  • assessment criteria
  • preparation guidelines
  • expected participation rationale for changing
  • and the benefits we hoped to achieve.

We also held meetings where people could ask questions and clarify any concerns.

Have We Been Successful ?

To really know, we would have to see how we performed in a real emergency. I hope we are never tested to the full extent. However, I believe we have been effective.

Rapport has definitely improved between the 2 groups. In the first year, Flight Attendants and Tech Crew often related incidents complaining about each other. In the second year, the stories are more positive. More incidents are being related about supporting each other and how problems were solved through good communication (i.e., concerns passed on to the Captain.)

In fact, as further proof of the bonding process....... Tech Crew, at their own request have joined the Flight Attendants for First Aid in this year's program!

Everyone is asked to complete a course evaluation sheet, rating sessions on a scale of 1 to 5, and to give constructive feedback. 93% of crew rated the course in the 4 & 5 bracket, 6% in the 3 bracket, and 1% in the I & 2 bracket.

Feedback indicates we have had an overwhelming acceptance of the material presented, the training methods used, and particularly of the integration of crew for training.

Conclusion

Our experience with Integrated Crew Training for emergency procedures refresher training indicates significant improvement in crewmembers' ability, confidence and commitment to their safety role in simulated but relatively realistic emergency situations. This has resulted from our improved understanding of other crew members' primary duties, the practiced interaction necessary to cope with the various scenarios used, the expression of crew member concerns and explanation of reasons for certain procedural actions used in an emergency. This explanatory liaison between technical and cabin crew members has been most beneficial. A willingness for each group to communicate more openly with the other has become more evident in day to day operations.

Crew members' cohesion and support has developed where little previously existed, mostly out of ignorance generated by each group training in isolation.

With each group there is more appreciation of the other's importance in an emergency. Training results indicate much improved all-round performance and therefore a greater probability of improved passenger survival in an emergency.

 The Dryden Accident: A Training Video for Pilots and Flight Attendants

by: Brenton Hayward, Qantas Australian Airlines
Melbourne, Australia

Abstract

In recent years aviation researchers, regulators, accident investigators, and practitioners have placed an increasing emphasis on the concept of systems safety. We have recognized that few events occur in isolation and that the future of aviation safety involves rigorous examination of the total environment in which our crews operate. Australian Airlines commenced integrated emergency procedures training for all flight crew in June 1991. An integral component of that training involves the extension of annual recurrent human factors training to all cabin as well as technical crew. The current cycle of this training centers on a classic "systemic" accident which occurred at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989. "The Dryden Accident" Training video reconstructs relevant components of this accident from a human factors/safety system perspective and is used to stimulate discussion amongst course participants in relation to their own operational environments.

Introduction

Australian Airlines commenced integrated emergency procedures training for all technical and cabin crew in June, 1991. This introduction was preceded by many months of intensive

preparation for the expanded two day training syllabus. While a single day of training had satisfied the Australian regulatory requirements for emergency procedures refresher training, it was believed that an expanded course would achieve the further objectives of focusing on the human factors implications of procedures, and of building increased understanding of each others' role and enhanced teamwork between technical and cabin crew members.

Australian CRM Training

Australian Airlines has conducted Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training for technical aircrew (pilots) since 1985, in the form of an in-house three day residential program known as Aircrew Team Management (ATM). In the interim, it has been demonstrated that ATM has achieved widespread acceptance amongst crew members at the airline. ATM has also been successfully introduced as the basis for human factors training at Air New Zealand, and Australian Airlines' courses are regularly attended by pilots from the .armed services, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), and a number of regional airlines. A further recent and welcome addition to the ATM courses are line managers and air traffic controllers from the Air Traffic Services division of the CAA.

A Systems Approach To Safety

In recent years aviation researchers, regulatory bodies, accident investigators, and operators have placed a growing emphasis on the concept of systems safety. We have recognized that few events occur in isolation and that the development of a safer industry is reliant on rigorous examination of the total environment in which our employees operate. We are not alone. Many of the principles vital to safe aviation operations are also pertinent to the operations of other large and complex socio-technical systems, including those of the oil, shipping, rail, and nuclear power industries. The world of Professor James Reason (I 990, 199 1) and his colleagues at the University of Manchester has broken new ground in the study of organizational accidents, and in the identification of systemic principles which can be applied in the development of successful operational safety programs within organizations, including airlines.

Integrating Human Factors Training

In accord with this systemic approach, it is now broadly accepted within the CRM community that the definition of the "C" in the acronym should be extended beyond the cockpit door, and evolve to include all flight crew rather than simply cockpit crew. Some of the latest CRM programs are even making efforts to include not only flight attendants, but maintenance personnel, dispatchers, other ground personnel, and (as at Australian) air traffic controllers (Helmreich, 1993). Hence the term Crew Resource Management is now more ideologically sound, and in fact will be supported by the forthcoming second generation Federal Aviation Administration CRM Advisory Circular. While many airline human factors practitioners strongly support this shift in principle, few have succeeded in convincing management to spend the dollars and time necessary to even include flight attendants on full CRM training courses.

While Australian Airlines has recognized for some years that significant benefits could flow from the inclusion of all flight attendants on the complete ATM training course, several attempts to achieve this have proven unsuccessful. As an alternative strategy, it became apparent that an expanded emergency procedures syllabus, including elements of annual ATM recurrent training, could go a long way towards achieving the objective of integrating human factors training for all flight crew.

Further support for integrated training came from the perception that cockpit and cabin crew relations may have deteriorated as a result of the 1989-1990 Australian domestic pilots' dispute. While post dispute crew relations at Australian were not as strained as they appear to have been at some carriers, dispute or not, there was concern that crew communication and cooperation hat been impaired to some extent as a result of the traumas of this protracted and frequently bitter struggle.

Crew Communication And Coordination

A component of the integrated emergency procedures training syllabus is the Crew Communication and Coordination module, which also serves as an element of annual ATM recurrent or refresher training, a company requirement for technical aircrew.

Kegworth

For the first training cycle, which commenced in June, 1991, this module centered on the British Midland Airways B737-400 accident at Kegworth in January, 1989. A video reconstruction of the relevant aspects of this accident was produced and served as a successful basis for stimulation of discussion on crew communication and coordination issues amongst attendees.

The Dryden Accident

In line with the core philosophy of providing fresh but operationally relevant stimuli for discussion in each training cycle, it was decided to focus the 1992-1993 Crew Communication and Coordination module on an aircraft accident which occurred at Dryden, Canada, in 1989. In brief, the accident occurred when a Fokker F28-1000 series aircraft, undertaking a scheduled passenger service, crashed on takeoff from the small town of Dryden, Ontario, on the wintry afternoon of March 10, 1989.

Attempting to takeoff in heavy snow, and with the upper surface of its wings contaminated with ice, the aircraft struggled to fly, but could not generate enough lift to stay airborne. The aircraft clipped the tops of trees, ploughed through a ridgeline, and finally came to rest in deep snow, in a heavily wooded area less than a kilometer from the end of the run way. The accident resulted in the loss of 24 lives, including those of three operating crew members. Four additional people, including the lone surviving crew member, were injured.

The crash prompted an immediate investigation by the then Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB). However, public concern over the safety of the recently deregulated Canadian aviation industry was elevated by the accident, and within weeks the Canadian government reacted to this concern by appointing Alberta Supreme Court Justice Virgil P. Moshansky to head a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Dryden accident and the circumstances which surrounded it. The CASB investigation of the accident was subsumed by the Commission.

The Commission's Findings

The Moshansky Commission was given a broad mandate, and elected to use it. It spent three years and millions of dollars in a wide-ranging investigation of not just this accident, but the total Canadian aviation transport system, the system which allowed this accident to occur. The Commission's final report was released in March, 1992 and runs to five exhaustive volumes (Moshansky, 1992). They include 198 separate recommendations for change to the Canadian aviation transport system.

The Commission's findings reveal much about the corporate factors, inadequate preparations and procedures, flawed judgments, and poor crew communications which led to the Dryden accident. In one of the most wide-ranging and penetrating accident investigations ever conducted, the Commission found fault with airline management, government regulators, accident investigation procedures, crash fire and rescue operations, flight crews, ground crews, flight dispatch, maintenance operations, and flight operations documentation and training.

The Australian Connection

David Adams, now Deputy Director of Policy with the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI), was with the Canadian Aviation Safety Board at the time of the Dryden accident. He was placed in charge of the Human and Survival Factors group of the accident investigation team, and was subsequently recruited to serve as a specialist investigator with the Commission of Inquiry. He has since presented a number of monologues on this accident and the lessons to be learned from it. Australian Airlines was able to access Adams to assist in the preparation of the training module for the current course, including his invaluable participation in the production of the 18 minute video which is the centerpiece of the module.

Dryden: The Video

"The Dryden Accident" includes detailed reconstruction of relevant components of the accident scenario, news footage of the aftermath of the crash, and commentary from David Adams relating to his conclusion on the human factors aspects of the accident, in addition to the Commission's findings. The video is used as a stimulus for discussion of various aspects of the accident scenario, including corporate pressures, particularly those resulting from operating in a deregulated environment, crew communication, teamwork, and role definition / ambiguity.

Crew Response

The response of Australian's crews to "The Dryden Accident" has been overwhelmingly positive. The video has been highly successful in stimulating discussion amongst and between cabin and technical crew members, so much so that most sessions run overtime and are frequently continued outside the classroom. While the proximate cause of this accident - wing icing - is not a frequent occurrence in Australian's sphere of operations, the myriad of contributory factors in this accident chain provide participants with much food for thought in relation to their own operations, duties, and responsibilities.

Other Airlines And Institutions

The video has recently been acquired for use on the in house flight crew training programs of a number of other airlines, including Aer Lingus, Air Canada, Air New Zealand, Ansett Australia, Cathay Pacific Airways, Delta Air Lines, and Southwest Airlines. It is also in use with a number of other aviation training, research and regulatory establishments, including the Systems Safety Directorate of Transport Canada, the NASA/University of Texas/FAA Aerospace Crew Research Project, the UK's Cranfield Institute of Technology, Germany's New Training Institute, New Zealand's Nelson Aviation College, the Sydney College of TAFE, and Australia's BASI.

Summary

While the concept of integrated emergency procedures training is not new, participation in training where crews are simply rostered together for repetitive sessions built only to meet the basic legal requirements for safety training may prove no more beneficial than training in isolation. The Australian Airlines model of expanded integrated training is of value because it provides participants with new, operationally relevant and interactive training experiences, many with a human factors orientation, which not only meet the requirements of the legislator, but provide a vehicle for the development of better teamwork and improved relationships amongst crew members.

"The Dryden Accident" is one example of the type of powerful training technology which can be employed to achieve these aims. Australian Airlines has experienced tangible benefits in terms of improved understanding, communication, coordination, and cooperation amongst crews as a result of this endeavor. As noted above, the reaction of crews has been overwhelmingly positive and supportive. While any addition to expenditure is difficult to justify in the economic climate which faces our industry today, I would encourage any of you who are considering a similar venture to press forward with haste. In Australian Airlines' experience, the potential benefits far outweigh the costs.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Davit Adams, Kerry Frost and Captain Ray Baker in providing background material for use in the preparation of this paper.

 Digital Debriefing Systems for CRM

by: Captain Lou Nemeth, USAir
704.588.0863

Last issue we reported to you about a research effort to build and test a Computer Aided Debriefing Station (CADS). This research is the combined effort of USAir, NASA/UT, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Resource Options, Inc. as subcontractors. Unfortunately, some of our readers misinterpreted that article to understand that CADS was up and functioning. It is not. It is planned to go into BETA test at USAir in May 1994. A similar system - Deja Vu - is offered by Concurrent Computer Corporation, with US sales offices in Oceanport, NJ Concurrent's telephone number is: 800.631.2154. - The Editor.

Concurrent Computer Corporation's Deja Vu digital debrief and analysis system provides the capability to record multiple channels of video, audio and real time data simultaneously onto computer disc (magnetic storage). The data is accurately synchronized and is instantaneously available for playback and review by pilots and facilitators.

Deja Vu was developed in consultation with Aer Lingus and allows users to enable a higher level of learning through the ability to relive the flight. Earlier debrief systems relied on the use of video tape, and suffer from the inconvenience of slow serial searching to retrieve areas of interest during debriefs. Because digital random access methods are used, marks" are available instantly and repetitively in any chosen order.

Captain Neil Johnston, of Aer Lingus, reports that the flexibility and spontaneity afforded by this approach contributes significantly to the quality of the debrief and allows a relaxed and non-confrontational review of flight deck activities, crew actions, and interpersonal behavior. Following the debrief the recorded information can be instantly erased.

 Communications and Pilot/Flight Attendant Crew Performance

by: Lucy B. Young
F/O USAir

Crew Resource Management has become an integral part of most, if not all air carrier training programs, and as CRM melds into organizational operating philosophies, improved safety and efficiency have resulted. Flight attendants and pilots are now armed with a basic knowledge of human factors concepts coupled with new skills enabling them to apply this on the line. As CRM evolves, entering a "third generation" of training, cockpit and cabin crewmembers can benefit greatly by training together or receiving parallel recurrent CRM training to address common concerns. One of the primary CRM skills that must receive continual emphasis is in the realm of communications, especially between cockpit and cabin crewmembers.

The communication process, so critical for effective functioning between cockpit and cabin crews, is fraught with barriers and filters, especially in a dynamic flight environment. The best way to establish a clear and effective channel for communication between crewmembers is the team building phase of a flight sequence, when the captain briefs the crew, setting the tone for subsequent interaction on the trip. Research has shown that the team formation process establishes the climate for interpersonal relationships which if done positively, enhances information exchange and participation by the other crewmembers. Briefings are like money in the bank in that they build a cohesive team from a group of diverse people AND address the technical aspects anticipated in the operation. A thorough crew briefing reduces ambiguities about who is going to do what and when they will do it, possibly eliminating confusion further down the line.

The sterile cockpit procedure outlined in FAR 121 limits cockpit activities during critical phases of flight to those pertinent for safe operation of the aircraft. Non-adherence to this rule can be disastrous, as shown in the Delta 1141 accident on August 31, 1988 where the crew was distracted by non-operational conversation with a flight attendant in the cockpit and failed to extend the flaps properly for takeoff. A paradigm may exist however, that inhibits information flow to the cockpit by cabin personnel hesitant to bother the pilots below 10,000'. This barrier can be eliminated by a crew briefing that stresses the need to keep the captain apprised of ALL safety related items even during sterile cockpit periods. An example of this type of communication preventing a possible catastrophe which occurred in March 1993 on a USAir 737-300 when a deadheading crewmember informed a flight attendant that the ground spoilers were still extended as the flight was cleared onto the runway for takeoff. The flight attendant called the captain immediately on the interphone to convey this critical information to him. The takeoff was discontinued and maintenance found a broken spoiler actuator cable.

Barriers that can degrade crew communications include complacency, distraction, confusion, fatigue, peer pressure, poor situational awareness, "significant others", stress or supervisory pressure. Barriers are like filters in that they can distort or block information transfer, or cause communication not to be initiated at all. Any of these can be overcome by interaction with other crewmembers who can, through teamwork, bring the original crewmember back into the loop or help them advocate their concern to the captain.

An example of a high-stress environment that requires crisp, clear, unequivocal communication between all of the crewmembers is the loss of an engine on takeoff. Although often regarded as a technical maneuver, it actually requires intense activity by the pilots along with rapid information transfer between the flight crew and ATC and between the cockpit and cabin crew. Normally four pieces of information should be conveyed from the cockpit to the "A" flight attendant. At USAir, these four items are remembered using the acronym "TEST". These letters stand for Time, Type of Emergency, Brace Signal and Take Special Instructions. LOFT scenarios can help flight crews practice these skills, and smooth communications inevitably lead to better functioning crews in an emergency situation. LOFT scenarios are being videotaped at several air carriers which enable students to play a major role in the debriefing process and learn interactively how to fine tune their cockpit management techniques.

Facilitators in Crew Resource Management classes are a focal point for ongoing training in CRM skills, and can use line incidents to effectively illustrate CRM concepts. Further enhancing pilot / flight attendant teamwork is the use of a pilot and flight attendant facilitator in each recurrent class, with the ultimate goal being combined pilot / flight attendant CRM training. This type of team teaching demonstrates the motto "Train like you fly, and fly like you train". The overall objective is to prevent accidents through improved communication in air carrier operations, and keep safety at the highest possible level.

 Pilot/Flight Attendant Coordination

by: Dr. Tom Chidester, American Airlines
and Laura Vaughn

Since April of 1990, Flight Attendants at American Airlines have been involved in recurrent CRM training. Those classes began in an effort to correct a problem described by Flight and Flight Service management, and line pilots and flight attendants - a perceived decline in the quality and quantity of communication between the cockpit and cabin crew. Over the past three years, some things have changed and some have not. AA recently had the opportunity to hear opinions on where they are today from a group of pilots and flight attendants brought together as a focus group. This article is part of a response to the issues raised by that group and by pilots and flight attendants in CRM training classes. It reviews those issues, describes some actions that have taken to improve cockpit - cabin coordination, and details one example-information provided through flight attendant home study.

Over the past three and one-half years, approximately 5500 pilots and 7500 flight attendants have participated in joint training in AA's Crew Resource Management. Pilots have attended as part of their annual recurrent CRM training, with an average of six of the 29 classes conducted each month including flight attendants. Flight attendants have participated as part their qualification training for B-757, Intentional, or First Flight Attendants duties. For the most part, comments on these classes have been favorable, especially as it has evolved from an open-ended discussion of issues or complaints, to a more structured discussion of communication and coordination in abnormal or emergency situations.

But we have to recognize that these classes came in response to perceived problems in cockpit - cabin communication, and should be judged not on whether people enjoy them, but on whether they improve communication on the line. There are several ways to make that judgment, ranging from studying incident frequencies overtime, to interviews, to objective observations. Subjective comments from pilots and flight attendants in our classes suggest that communication is improving, but that we still have a way to go. We are frequently told by captains, for example, that they learned something in the class that they use in an introduction or briefing on almost every trip.

At the same time, more objective measures provide mixed feedback. American participated in a 1992 NASA study that sought to compare leadership and crew coordination among pilots from five different airlines. The results of that study were quite complimentary to American's pilots, rating them at the top along with one other airline on Situation Awareness, Communication, Teamwork, and Technical Proficiency. However, the one point of critique of American in that study concerned briefings, especially coordination with the cabin. The NASA observers commented that captains sometimes did not brief the number one flight attendant before flight. Both pilots and flight attendants feel that an introduction or briefing is very important, but often it does not happen.

Comments From A Focus Group Of Pilots And Flight Attendants On May 26th

ORD Flight and Flight Service sponsored a focus group of pilots and flight attendants, held in ORD operations. Eleven pilots and 14 flight attendants participated under an agenda designed to:

  • establish some common ground and respect through
  • an incident review highlighting the critical role of both groups in an emergency, then turn to
  • identifying problems occurring on the line and
  • identifying solutions in the form of information, behavior change, and policy or procedure change.

The issues raised by the group fall into several different types and they require different kinds of solutions.

Some of the most frequent comments focused on issues between individual pilots and flight attendants. Flight attendants expressed the desire to be part of the "informed group," especially concerning delays, mechanical problems, and turbulence. Captains reported feeling that their authority or position as Captain was often not respected by flight attendants. One example was being ignored when trying to initiate a briefing, another involved flight attendants who set limo pickup times, which is the captain's responsibility. Male flight attendants in particular expressed a desire to be treated as professionals -jokes and remarks concerning their assumed sexual preference are taken as a sign of disrespect. These are the types of problems most readily addressed by passing the word along and are topics for articles.

A second group of comments emphasized perceived conflicts unaddressed by Flight or Flight Service procedures. Both pilots and flight attendants complained of the frequency with which briefings are skipped or ignored. Both groups reported conflict over food, service, and amenities associated with the crew rest seat on international flights. Pilots suggested the timing of cabin write-ups could be better standardized among flight attendants to avoid reporting during descent. These problems can be corrected through procedural statements to update old information or to standardize timing of actions requiring the attention of both groups.

A third group of comments requested additional training opportunities. Both groups had praise for the pilot - flight attendant training they had seen, including the joint CRM class. However, both groups wanted more opportunities for joint training.

A final group of comments focused on issues of policy. These cannot be easily resolved through an article, through training, or through discussion among pilots and flight attendants. We mention them here because they will probably continue to be a major focus of attention. Perhaps the strongest example of policy issues is the complaint by both groups of the degree to which crews are "mixed" from trip to trip. It was the opinion of the pilots and flight attendants in the focus group that the crew should be paired through each sequence. Though the reasons for this may not be obvious, that proposition represents a very expensive policy change.

Comments from the focus group echo comments from the CRM classes and the feedback from the NASA study. They reflect things that have improved and issues that continue to be problems and barriers to communication, and they give us a picture of where we are. At the same time, there are a number of programs that are ongoing to address pilot - flight attendant coordination issues. The next section gives an overview of those programs.

Pilot - Flight Attendant Programs

There are several programs in place to improve the working relationships between pilots and flight attendants. The most obvious are the joint CRM classes, which are now occurring approximately six times per month, down from ten per month at the height of the growth plan. In addition to those recurrent programs, new-hire pilots were briefed by flight attendant procedures staff, and flight attendants were briefed on a range of cockpit - cabin issues by Flight Training Fleet Managers, until the end of hiring this year. Also new Captains attending the duties and responsibilities program have a briefing and question and answer period with the administrator in charge of Flight Service Emergency Procedures.

ALL of these efforts will continue and will better support cockpit - cabin coordination. Perhaps the best recent example of those efforts is contained in the Flight Attendant Home Study (HS) completed and distributed in June. There were a number of issues and articles emphasizing pilot - flight attendant communication, and the next section reviews some of their major points.

One Example: 1993 Flight Attendant Home Study

A part of each Flight Attendant's annual recurrent training is a home study package which focuses on any new, revised, or enhanced information. It also includes informative background on how or why an existing policy or procedure was developed. A high priority of the publication is to present issues or scenarios relevant to both cockpit and cabin crewmembers, often citing actual events from reports on record. Every effort is made to encourage a positive cockpit cabin relationship and support the kind of effective communication exchange that we know is critically important to safety and service. In every situation, direct and specific communication with the Captain is emphasized. Among the topics covered in this year's homestudy are Turbulence, Sterile Cockpit procedures, APU Torching, and an article on our pilot flight attendant CRM programs. Here are some excerpts:

Turbulence posed a considerable threat in the first quarter of 1993. A total of 56 incidents resulting in 17 Flight Attendant and 12 customers injuries were reported. The HS stresses the importance of immediately responding to any information provided by the Captain and taking assertive action in the cabin when unexpected turbulence is experienced. "Above all, do not wait to feel turbulence before you respond.. if the Captain advises you of expected turbulence in enough time, take precautionary measures like stowing carts and securing galleys as well as making a compliance check."

Every effort is made to encourage a positive cockpit - cabin relationship and support the kind of effective communication exchange that we know is critically important to safety and service.

Sterile Cockpit is an issue which continues to be cause for some problems. The HS article reviews the policy and gives specific examples of when it is and is not appropriate to contact the cockpit. It mentions that in two instances during 1993, F/As called the cockpit immediately following sterile to report a smell of smoke in the cabin. Flight Attendants were reminded that sterile cockpit can be interrupted "for any emergency or safety related item that could potentially be of danger to the passengers, crew, or A/C." The HS also mentions that the final set of P.A.s should not be given during final approach, since the P.A. can be heard through the cockpit door on some A/C and can be distracting. Flight Service procedures emphasize that these P.A.s be given after landing and turning off the active runway. Also, the concern raised by pilots in the focus group - that writeups are sometimes presented during the sterile period - was addressed in the home study. The HS reminds them to bring those items to the cockpit as early as possible. Here are the examples of situations that would not justify interrupting sterile cockpit:

Guidelines For Sterile Cockpit - Calling Or Entering The Cockpit

  • Fire in the cabin
  • Exit door ajar or cannot arm/disarm door
  • Burning odor in the cabin
  • Medical Emergency
  • Cart Stowage problem
  • APU Torching
  • Fuel spilling from A/C
  • Passengers moving or standing
  • Extreme temperature change
  • De-ice problem
  • Suspicious, unclaimed bag, package
  • When A/C is moving on the ground, call cockpit if emergency conditions exist (unusual noises, bangs, scraping sounds, smoke, fire, etc.)

No Cockpit Communication

  • Non - Safety related log book items
  • "Too hot, too cold"
  • Entree preferences
  • Gates information
  • Misconnected baggage
  • "How much time do we have?"
  • Catering problems
  • Obnoxious, but not dangerous passengers

Torching was discussed in the HS because there were several industry events of torching. The HS emphasized several goals. First, to provide a basic understanding of what causes torching. Second to ensure F/As know it is generally NOT cause for an evacuation, and third, to give them some guidance on how to assertively control the panic in the cabin torching is likely to cause. In essence, the message that we continually underscore is the criticality of effective communication. "Although torching does not occur often, it is not abnormal to happen. Being familiar with procedures is important. It is essential to get control of the situation and calm passengers who may panic due to seeing flames. Assertively move to the area and "command" passengers (if necessary) to remain calm and be seated. Explain what is happening in order to reduce their fears. Use the P.A. system if necessary".

One interesting article in the home study listed the top 10 reasons for the submission of an irregularity report by a flight attendant, and we thought this would be interesting to pilots as well (see pie chart).

It is interesting to note that the top 4 incidents are all medical / first aid related. You should have confidence in the F/A's ability to handle these situations. Remember we have new 24 hour reporting procedures for blood borne pathogen exposure risks. OSHA requires we offer follow-up care to anyone who has had a potential exposure.

Progress And Challenge

So, where are we? Is it fair to conclude that some things clearly have improved between the cockpit and cabin over the past three years? American Airlines has gone through a great deal of change through explosive growth, and maintaining effective working relationships between pilots and flight attendants has been one of the challenges. Each side of the door has its own set of duties, responsibilities, and frustrations. On perhaps the majority of our flights, it appears that there are independent challenges resolved by physically - separate crews. But the reality of flight operations randomly calls our attention to the interdependence of pilots and flight attendants. Almost every safety problem encountered on one side of the cockpit door soon becomes a problem for the other.

It was concern for possible safety consequences of a perceived decline in pilot - flight attendant communication that drove us to emphasize cockpit - cabin crew coordination. It drove us to look for and implement joint training opportunities and to work to make our procedures consistent. If there is comfort to be taken on this subject it lies in the content of our emergencies and incidents. The behavior of both pilots and flight attendants facing abnormal operations or emergencies has been very professional and highly coordinated.

 CRM and Automation: A Lively Combo

by: Dr. Earl L. Wiener, University of Miami

For nearly 15 years I have been engaged in studying the human factors of cockpit automation for NASA Ames. I was primarily interested in traditional subjects -- workload, cockpit layout, procedures and checklists, transition training, human error, etc. I was always interested in CRM, not just as a cockpit technology, but as a sort of "social movement," but I felt it was for others to worry about. I felt that I had my hands full with automation.

But I was soon to become enlightened. From 1985 to 1988 I was engaged in a field study of transition of pilots into the B-757 with Northwest and Eastern. In jumpseat rides and simulator and LOFT exercises I observed, I believed that I was seeing something new-- the influence of cockpit technology on crew coordination and communication-- on CRM. Some of those observations are listed below -- a full discussion is not possible due to space constraints. For those who wish to know more about this, please contact me and I will send you references.

Please note that these issues that I have identified are based on my observations and opinions. They have not been "scientifically" verified.

1) Who does what? There appeared to be a breakdown of the traditional standardization of who performs which duties. There was a lot of volunteering to do the other pilot's duties, and some confusion about who was and had done a certain duty. Procedures and standardization people take note!

2) Supervision. The design of the cockpit, and the demands of the automation (particularly CDU entry) seemed to make supervision by the captain more difficult, and likewise for cross-checking between the PF and PNF.

3) Shift of authority. The first officer appeared to take on more authority in the glass airplane. This was probably not due to an intentional usurpation of authority, but to more subtle factors such as the fact that the F/0 was often more proficient, or at least much faster, than the captain on CDU manipulation. It may have also been related to the "who does what" breakdown, and the fact that the PNF seems to be a very busy person on the glass planes, more so than traditional aircraft. I would like the make the following generalization: in the glass cockpit, the PNF (whoever) and the F/0 take on more responsibilities than usual.

4) Independence of crew members. Crew coordination depends on a steady flow of communication back and forth. We found that in the glass aircraft, the demands of the automation tended to divide the crew members into two separate units, almost as if they were two persons working independently at two computer work stations. (As an extreme example, I have seen both pilots entering data on the same CDU page at the same time). If this is true, it is certainly addressable by CRM training. I must add that our LOFT experiment at Delta, which compared performance of crews in DC-9 and MD-88 simulators, flying the same scenario, was not supportive of this finding. The results of that experiment showed more pilot-to-pilot communication in the MD-88 compared to the DC-9. From these observations, I would conclude that CRM training is, if anything, more important in the highly automated than the traditional cockpit, and failure to communicate is particularly critical. The approach pioneered by Delta and adopted by several carriers, of a dedicated, model-independent automation module before the pilot first encounters the glass cockpit, appears to be sound. Future CRM training should take note of the peculiarities of the high technology cockpit, and be tailored to its special demands. As a beginning, there should be close coordination between sim instructors and CRM course designers. As carriers increase the use of LOFT, it would be helpful if the sim instructors could pass on to CRM staff what they see in the intersection of CRM and automation, and perhaps verify, or fail to verify, the observations of this author.

Earl L. Wiener is a professor of management science at the University of Miami. He is presently involved in a study of flight training for automation at Continental.

 More Different Than Alike - New USAF CRM Programs to Stress Combat

by: Tony Kern, Major, USAF
Chief, Cockpit / Crew Resource Management
Air Education and Training Command

Military aviation is beginning to look at human factors training through the same lens as it does other forms of training, stressing realism and the combat environment. Traditional military CRM training programs have been very effective in the heavy transport arena where courses are easily adapted from existing airline programs. Crew members from fighters and bombers, however, have remained lukewarm to programs they see as "airline stuff." The unique flight environments of the bomber and fighter communities have not been adequately addressed until now. The USAF is currently developing guidelines to establish and require aircraft specific and mission specific training programs for all USAF crewmembers. During this process it is essential that operators provide inputs and feedback on the new training programs.

The development of these guidelines is taking the form of an Air Force Instruction (AFI) supplemented by each Major Command (MAJCOM). It is grounded in war fighting theory as well as the traditional theoretical domains of CRM, i. e., aviation psychology, physiology, industrial engineering and the like. Basic Air Force Doctrine (AFM 11, Vol. II) states:

War is a violent contest between thinking, acting, and reacting antagonists... Violent force, or even the threat of its use, injects levels of physical exertion, emotion, and ferocity that tend to undermine rationality on all sides. Ultimately, only man, not technology can cope with the unpredictable (p. 17).

The friction of war is so important to the nature of Air Force training, that any human factors training program that does not address mission specific combat scenarios is simply inadequate. As far back as Clausewitz On War, the inherent benefits of "artificial combat" have been realized, and programs such as RED FLAG and the various Fighter Weapons Schools are now standard parts of an aviator's maturation process. Military CRM training must also include combat and mission specific dimensions. The institutionalization of the mission specific CRM program, using actual combat examples (both positive and negative) are steps in this direction. Researchers have collected over 800 "critical incidents" of effective and ineffective CRM across ten major weapon systems that will be used in these programs. No longer will Air Force training programs be limited to a few mishap reports to be rehashed as training examples.

Although much of existing CRM theory can and will be utilized in "Awareness" level programs taught during Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT), the specific requirements of low level, high speed operations, or air to air intercepts under AWACS control, require a significant extension of current theory. Designing mission oriented simulator training (MOST) scenarios takes on new meaning when the student is a 24 year old crewmember, traveling at 600 miles per hour and at 400 feet AGL. This environment may require a decision on whether to penetrate a potentially lethal threat ring of a surface to air missiles (SAM) or break over a ridge line that has a 50% chance of hiding a deadly AAA bank with a probability of kill (POK) of .85. Basic situational awareness still applies here, but decisions in these complex environments must be trained differently than airline style decision making. The greater number of inputs and the immediacy of the requirement are unique to the military combat environment. Additionally, mission accomplishment priorities must be factored into these scenarios.

The new Air Force guidance to address these challenges will require five levels of training.

Awareness

Traditional CRM training offered during UFT stresses fundamental concepts, terms, and motivation, and serves as a road map for a career spanning training systems.

Aircraft And Crew Specific

Taught at the Formal Training Unit (FTU) during initial qualification in the aviator's primary weapon system, this short course will detail specific communication, decision making and risk management aspects of the particular aircraft environment.

Mission Specific (Continuation)

The essence of the overall CRM program, this level will be taught at the aviator's mission base. It will stress actual experiences related to the combat mission of the wing or squadron.

Instructor / Evaluator

This closes the training loop by training instructors and evaluators to provide inflight instruction and evaluation. It makes CRM "need to know" vs. "nice to know."

Supervisory

The target audience here ranges from squadron operations officers to MAJCOM commanders. This level stresses organizational value of CRM, diagnostic tools, and advocacy skills.

Are we teaching anything new in these programs? Probably not. The fact is that aviators have been passing along decision making, risk management, situational awareness, and judgment skills for decades. This has been an informal process, mostly done word of mouth (WOM).

Are we teaching this information in a new way? Definitely. CRM training programs crystallize essential elements of human factors and deliver it systematically, in bite sized portions at critical junctures in an aviator's flying career. In short, the USAF feels that this training is so important that it is time to organize and manage the instruction. Although it's hoped that the WOM process continues, formalized, structured programs can ensure that everyone gets the information at a point in time where they can integrate it with other aspects of their flying development. For example, aircraft specific communications considerations will be offered at the FTUS, and mission related decision making skills at the operational bases. CRM training will give the operator what is needed, when needed, and to let him or her get on with the business of becoming one of the world's finest aviators.

The challenge for the military training community is to provide CRM training programs that are academically and technologically current, in the form of a career spanning, building block training continuum. The components of these programs must be combat oriented and based on actual military examples, We can no longer afford to rely on modified airline programs to meet the needs of tomorrow's combat crewmember.

The challenge for crewmembers and supervisors is to give the new programs a chance, provide inputs when asked and to critique the new programs thoroughly and honestly. CRM is here to stay, let's make it work.

 Letter to the Editor From Capt. Norm Komich, USAir Shuttle

... I'm working on a project to that I hope will enhance the quality of CRM training programs. ... so I would appreciate your perspective on what I'm attempting to accomplish.

To facilitate CRM Program Development throughout the industry, I am establishing a CRM Reference Library at ALPA headquarters in Herndon, VA with the following goals:

1) A central "pool" of CRM videotapes which can be loaned out for two week periods.

2) Some of the most highly used resources in CRM training are NTSB accident reports. However, there are many "CRM war stories" which did not result in any type of incident or accident but which carry a powerful message of how poor CRM can cause problems. These war stories can be similarly utilized to discuss what went wrong and what might have been done differently to avoid the resultant problems. Consequently, I am establishing a "Pool" of such war stories which will be sanitized of names and carriers and categorized into CRM topic areas, for example, Pilot / Flight Attendant, Communication, Situational Awareness, etc. A master listing would allow anyone to request a copy of specific stories.

3) A central pool of recurrent and specialized CRM modules. Each year, I develop a new CRM program for recurrent training. This program evolves considerably as I present it in the classroom. By the end of the year I have a well tuned teaching aid which I then must put on the shelf to gather dust because there is no formal avenue for sharing it. This is an unacceptable waste of resources, particularly when one considers how CRM issues continue to impact the safety record of the industry. This pool would provide an easily accessible method to share such modules.

.... I readily solicit any critique (constructive or otherwise) from you on the desirability of this project. Many thanks for the time and effort in responding. Sincerely, Norm Komich.

 CRM Program Development: A Time for Interaction

by: Captain J. Norman Komich, USAir Shuttle

In an interview in the Oct 1990 issue of the Airline Pilot magazine, Clay Foushee was asked about LOFT and CRM training. In his answer, he stated "If I were running one of these programs, I'd have a major exercise every year with my flight training and operations staff to completely revise the scenarios." I wholeheartedly support that statement, but I find myself wondering "Why limit the discussion to only the personnel within one's own flight operations department?"

Motivated by the need for a new CRM curriculum for recurrent training once a year, such an "annual review" has become common amongst CRM program developers. When the individuals responsible for determining the next years curriculum pool their thoughts, what is the source of their ideas? In spite of years of emphasis on the NEED for CRM training, there is still little formal guidance available on HOW to teach CRM concepts. Discussions on this subject with a number of air carriers indicate that their ideas are typically spontaneously generated by those individuals within the group. Experience is proving to be THE mentor on teaching CRM. If this 'experience' is limited to those within one flight operations, I pose the following four questions:

1) How many years of a CRM program must pass before the "Law of Diminishing Returns" takes hold within one flight operations group?

2) How much redundant effort is presently occurring? If it is, can the CRM industry afford the reduced margin of safety associated with such reinventioning of the wheel?

3) Are the line pilots all over the world getting the VERY best CRM training they can for the time, effort and expense put into their training?

4) Is this system addressing ALL the problem areas associated with CRM issues?

1) Taking each question in order, the answer to the first takes into consideration the basic CRM concept that synergism amongst members of a group produces a better outcome then efforts by individuals. Why is CRM program development any different? Which will have the better outcome, one flight operations department, or several working in concert? Perhaps it's time to practice what is being preached.

2) The next question, on redundancy is somewhat subjective but with regard to a safety issue as critical as CRM continues to be, the aviation industry can ill afford to waste time accomplishing something that someone else has already done. Historically, there was an initial reluctance to open CRM programs to others. This was precipitated by the initial cost of establishing a program as well as the proprietary attitude associated with the "culture" of individual airlines. This attitude has changed over the years as more and more CRM programs are opening their doors to outsiders; the CRM industry needs to strive for ALL programs to have such a policy. Additionally, the Northwest Airlines annual CRM workshop, held twice so far, is the first formal opportunity for such interaction between a variety of operations including various air carriers, the FAA, the military, etc. The worldwide CRM industry needs many more of these.

3) The third question of the quality of CRM training being presently received is also somewhat subjective. Entire presentations have been given on the quality of CRM programs. Suffice it to say here that while significant gains have been made in improving teamwork both in and out of the cockpit, the CRM industry needs to look at what must still be done, and not just relish what has already been accomplished. I base this conclusion on the fact that CRM "war stories" continue to be told in which an accident or incident did not occur but the safe arrival was simply too close for comfort. Because these don't result in an accident, but only a reduction in the margin of safety, such "dirty laundry" is not typically aired for the public. However, line pilots are acutely aware of it. As a current line pilot who also flew in three different military reserve units, I question pilots from a wide cross section of air carriers, and I continue to hear such stories. They serve as evidence that while the CRM industry has come a long way, it still has a long way to go.

Before discussing the specifics of assuring the very best quality of CRM training, let me take a moment to discuss some characteristics of pilots in training and their instructors. Pilots attending training typically fall into one of three categories:

  • extremely conscientious people furiously writing down everything that the instructor says in a notebook for future reference,
  • those who simply sit and listen,
  • and those who already know everything and have forgotten more than the instructor will ever know; they typically read the paper and daydream in class. Needless to say the three groups form a typical bell curve with I and 3 at the extremes and 2 making up the majority in the middle.

My experience has shown that the better instructors have two objectives with regard to any pilot training program:

  • To establish the "MEAT" of the program, i.e., the message to be taken out of the classroom and carried into the cockpit,
  • To present this in an entertaining and stimulating manner so that the class accepts and retains the message. Instructors have achieved this through a variety of approaches including humor, shock, and interactive involvement.

A good CRM program developer interprets material provided by academia, the FAA, the NTSB, aircraft manufacturers, etc. and puts it into a language that the line pilot will listen to, remember, and use on ensuing flights. IF the goal is truly to provide the highest quality CRM training available, the entire CRM community should combine it's efforts toward developing this type of training staff.

Determining what constitutes the "meat" and then translating it into an entertaining presentation is the key to a successful CRM program. The introductory first class in any CRM program attended by those who have never heard of CRM before is relatively easy. The subject is so new and different when compared to traditional ground training that it is typically well received, even by many of the "group 3" crewmembers. However, once the newness wears off and the honeymoon is over, optimizing the effectiveness of the CRM class by keeping it fresh, stimulating, and productive is a constant challenge for the CRM program developer. With that in mind, I offer the following suggestions to the CRM industry to optimize the quality of all CRM programs.

A1) To allow sharing of successes in developing CRM programs, the aviation industry needs to continue to work toward opening its CRM program doors to everyone. The following scenario occurred in March of 1993. 1 received a phone call from a pilot at a large regional airline who was seeking assistance in starting a CRM program. I asked what sort of assistance they were getting from the their code sharing carrier and I was very surprised at the response: "None". So, while the CRM industry has made a lot of progress in this area of sharing, there is still a long way to go.

A2) CRM Program Developers need to be more open to constructive criticism from peers outside their operation. I make the observation that "CRM Program Development is a CRM ISSUE!" Every CRM class addresses the captain who feels he knows everything and that the other two crewmembers have little to offer in the way of advice. Likewise, I see the enthusiastic CRM program developer so caught up in the excitement and power of their program that their receptivity to criticism is minimized. The CRM industry could use a little humility when it comes to seeking outside critique in making a CRM program the very best it can be. When one preaches two way communication in the classroom as a CRM concept, they need to be sure to take their own advice. I cite as an example of the need for this the statement repeatedly made by the CRM program director for one major air carrier: "We still consider CRM to be COCKPIT Resource Management and not CREW Resource Management. Our captains are going to ALL be properly trained in CRM skills and consequently the flight attendants do not have to be." When it was pointed out that it was unlikely that one eight hour class would bring every Captain into the CRM fold, he did not want to hear it. Such naivete could conceivably result in a less effective CRM program.

B1) Quality videotapes are an excellent teaching tool. I realize that the production of such items costs money. However, such items should NOT be looked at as a source of revenue but rather as an opportunity to make the whole aviation community safer. Withholding such tapes generate NO additional revenue. When such tapes are shared, it is often not until they are outdated. When I have raised this question with others, I have been challenged on the premise that in addition to the monies involved, there is a reluctance to air dirty laundry when negative issues are presented. I understand such protectionism. However, as with ALL negative issues raised in CRM classes, these should be introduced not with the intent of looking backwards to say "what a bunch of dummies," but rather to look to the future to assure that we don't make the same mistake when confronted with a similar situation in our own careers. A quality CRM facilitator can often convey the philosophy of "there but for the Grace of God, go I" in such instances.

As two examples of the need for the above, I cite the search for copies of the videos on the two DC-8 accidents: the freighter at Salt Lake and the fuel starvation at Portland. After calling every resource I could, I was told by one carrier that I could have the copies for one thousand dollars. I eventually got them for nothing through the Air Force. Regarding the L-1011 windshear accident at Dallas Fort Worth, after repeatedly viewing the video on that accident and repeatedly being denied a copy, I finally learned that it cost five thousand dollars and the signing of multiple legal documents to procure copies. Now it is becoming more readily available for nothing. Notwithstanding the legal ramifications of litigation following an accident, the CRM industry needs to reevaluate what does and what doesn't constitute a revenue source when it comes to aviation safety and then reconsider making these videos more readily available to others.

B2) One of the greatest teaching tools for pilots is "Hangar Flying". There needs to be a forum for the CRM industry to use these highly effective stories for putting a CRM point across.

B3) Instruction of the various CRM concepts varies widely in technique and success. Again, there should be the opportunity to share and exchange such techniques, with explanations of the evolution. Typically when a CRM program developer puts an annual curriculum together, this curriculum undergoes an evolution process as it is presented to flight crews month after month. The final product might vary considerably from the first class. Again, it is a terrible waste to have another CRM program undergoing the same "reinventioning of the wheel" when they make the same mistakes. There simply needs to be a more formal avenue to share such knowledge.

B4) There are a wide variety of meetings which are held each year to discuss CRM issues. The concepts, conclusions, theories, perceptions, etc., which arise from each of these meetings often do not make it to the line pilot. Consider such efforts analogous to the football team which struggles 99 2/3 yards to the one foot line but fails to score, thereby accomplishing nothing. The airline industry can ill afford to waste such efforts; they need to assure that ALL such pertinent data makes it to the line pilot. Additionally, everyone should have access to these meetings whether a member of the organization or not. There needs to be an active worldwide Network listing of CRM program developers to assure all are aware of such gatherings. Also, there should be ONE source of information about what the CRM calendar holds for the future listing ALL pertinent meetings.

4) We have arrived at the last question of whether the CRM industry is addressing ALL the CRM issues it should. One special point of interest regarding these subjects is that they are earmarked for special groups. We no longer develop CRM programs to cover the "masses" of the entire pilot force; rather, we design a special curriculum to address the specific needs of specific individuals. Developing the Meat and the Delivery of such a specialized curriculum is far more difficult than the generic CRM program and consequently mandates even further industry interaction. I acknowledge that some carriers have already begun to address these issues, but again, why does the industry tolerate such duplication of effort when someone else begins to address these issues for the first time?

A1) New Captains and new first officer upgrades deserve special CRM attention which addresses those specific issues they will be confronted with in their new position. Again, how does one determine what these issues are and how to effectively teach them?

A2) Over age sixty flight engineers are put in subordinate seats after flying as captain for many years. Most handle it well, but what about the one who does not?

A3) Regression due to furloughs is a significant change not due to choice but rather by mandate. At present, the training for such downgrades only involves checking out in the equipment even though there is much opportunity for disgruntlement.

B) Bringing other groups including Fight Attendants, dispatch, maintenance, agents, cleaners, etc., into CRM classes effectively takes a certain flair.

C 1) Overly assertive first and second officers have been an issue for a long time. The Detroit ground collision between the DC-9 and B727 during reduced visibility highlighted the requirement to address it again.

C2) Some individuals now say, "I want CRM in this cockpit," but then fail to respond to crewmember input.

D) The FAA is allowing carriers to address deviations through voluntary disclosure and mandatory crew training.

E) CRM should cover intra cockpit stress due to a merger or strike, two highly volatile issues that can generate conflict.

F) In the authors' opinion, one of the biggest compromises to safety is the individual who doesn't react to training. In Sept. 1989, ALPA ran a full day workshop on this subject titled "The Remedial CRM pilot problem". However, the war stories continue to be told. To date despite an acute awareness of these individuals, we can only tolerate them. From a safety perspective, this in unacceptable. This is an issue that must be addressed more formally and one that MUST have interaction between groups, particularly when there is any note of success.

NOTE: I acknowledge that the above items are typically highly sensitive. Nonetheless, with the appropriate emphasis, the entire aviation industry can benefit from addressing them.

Let us not lose sight of the true goal of ALL CRM programs; the true goal of ALL CRM programs is to produce safer and more efficient flight crews for all of aviation. Interaction between CRM programs is one key method toward achieving that goal.

 Captains' and First Officers' Spheres of Influence

by: J. Randolph Law and John A. Wilhelm
Aerospace Crew Research Project
Department of Psychology
University of Texas at Austin 1

Abstract

Although the "crew" is increasingly the unit of focus for technical and CRM training, a recent study documented that individual crew members exert influence over the crew in unique ways. The actions of captains and first officers influenced the overall performance of the "crew" both positively and negatively. Captains most often used briefings and leadership behaviors to influence crews. First Officers, on the other hand, influenced crew performance by their use of Inquiry / Assertion / Advocacy, Preparation / Planning Vigilance activities, and Technical Proficiency.

Introduction

Recent trends suggest that crews are becoming the primary unit of training and evaluation. Pan American and United pioneered "crew based" training in the 70's. Increasingly, both proficiency training and proficiency checking are accomplished with a "full crew". This technical training is accomplished with line pilots occupying the seats, as opposed to training center personnel. The notion is, of course, that the training will be more realistic if line crew members are used during training. Crew management becomes part of the technical training exercise. Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is a notable example of full crew training. In this realtime exercise a crew flies a complete mission in the simulator. At the end of the "flight", their performance is critiqued as a crew, with special emphasis on the use of CRM skills. Furthermore, the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) will require that the crew become the "unit" of most training activities, and that both CRM and technical performance will be evaluated in this environment. These trends are very encouraging given strong evidence that the majority of commercial aviation incidents and accidents are primarily caused by crew errors 2. Although concentrating on the crew as the focus of training is a step in the right direction, it is prudent to remember that the role of each individual crew member is an important factor in determining which types of actions and decisions are most salient in the training, evaluation and operational environments.

The Crew Observation Project

In pursuit of a better understanding of crew member dynamics in the operational environment, specially trained professional pilots and check airmen from our research group systematically record the CRM and technical performance of crews in actual line operations using the Line/LOS Checklist 3. Most ratings are made at the "crew" level. However, if a particular crew members actions have a significant impact on the crew ratings, the specific behaviors used are also documented. With these observational data, we have found significant differences in CRM skills between airlines on several of the measured dimensions. Information gathered by the project is unique in that it is perhaps the only database which documents crew performance in normal, line operations (as opposed to incident or accident data bases). The second main thrust of the project is to collect systematic observational data in LOFT and LOE. In this setting we can see crews performing under much more stressful situations than typical line flying.

Crew Vs. Individual Performance

The focus of this particular article is on behaviors exhibited by Captains, FOs, and SOs that significantly influenced the performance of the overall crew. Although previous reports have documented the behavior of individual crew members within a particular organization using company observers, the present effort looks across many organizations using human factors experts (trained together) to observe crew interaction and performance 4.

Results

Since 1990, we have made observations on 1,625 line flight segments and 203 LOFT flights across several major and regional domestic air carriers. Of these line ratings, 34% had at least one crew member rated as significantly influencing at least one of the behaviors. Since each individual within the crew can influence multiple crew rating dimensions (e.g., briefings and workload distribution), and more than one crew member per team can be rated (e.g., captain and FO), the number of individuals and behaviors rated can be larger than the number of crews from which they came. Indeed, 929 instances were obtained across all line crews where at least one individual's behavior was rated.

It is interesting that from the 203 LOFT flights observed, over 60% of crews had at least one crew member rated (as opposed to 34% of crews in line operations). Individual influence on crew performance is more pronounced in this more demanding training environment. As we build our database of LOFT observations, we will be able to contrast behaviors of crews in this setting with that of typical line operations.

Captains were rated as particularly influencing the overall crew performance much more often (58%) than FOs (35%). To no one's surprise, the captain's behavior is most "potent" in influencing the crew performance. SO's were not part of the crew complement in the majority of our observation flights. We do not have enough observations to make reliable conclusions about this group so they will have to be left out of this report.

When cross-tabulating crew position by behaviors, we could see from "eye-balling" the data that certain individual CRM behaviors were much more frequently noted for one crew position than others. For example, captains were seen as significantly influencing crew ratings of Briefings (N = 93) much more often than FOs (N = 19). However, captains make up the majority of all the individual ratings. How can we tell if the higher briefing numbers for captains are because they have a higher frequency for all ratings, or because that type of behavior (briefings) is really more associated with captains compared to other positions? One way of accomplishing this is to first determine how often we would expect captains to be noted for their briefing behaviors if crew position and individual CRM behaviors were not related.

Before we begin describing which "behaviors" were associated more with one crew position than would be expected by chance, we must note that every behavior was noted as having influenced crew performance at some level. For some behaviors, such as "communications", both crew members used it to influence the crew in the proportions expected. Most behaviors, however, tended to be more or less associated with a crew position than expected.

The Captain's Domain

Using this procedure, we would expect to see 67 "captain briefing" behaviors if crew position and individual CRM behavior types were unrelated. However, we see there are 93 "captain briefing" behaviors observed, suggesting that, indeed, briefing behaviors are most associated with captains compared to the other positions 5. A statistical technique is then used to determine whether the difference between "expected" and "actual" results would likely have occurred by chance. Using the same techniques, captains were seen as influencing crew ratings of Leadership / Followership significantly more often than others as well.

Given that captains so often influence crews using their briefing and leadership behaviors, do they tend to impact the crew positively or negatively? Briefing and leadership behaviors had a positive effect in about two thirds of the instances noted. Indeed, examples of captain's use of the other behaviors tended to be negative somewhat more often. Captains must be aware that their briefing and leadership behaviors are the most potent "arrows in their quiver." When completed poorly, effects on crew performance are just as "potent" as when completed well.

Captain's Briefings: Positive Effect: Captain's Leg, 727

  • BRIEFINGS: Briefed both observer and flight attendants on anticipated turbulence - discussed alternate routings and altitudes, set good tone for crew.
  • LEADERSHIP: Crew well ahead of aircraft, updated passengers/cabin and crew about weather. Captain open to both cockpit/cabin, they knew they could communicate, but were aware the captain was in charge.

Captain's Briefings: Negative Effect: Captain's Leg, 737

The FO had just gone illegal so they had to call for a new one.

  • BRIEFING: captain said "Standard emergency procedures" when asked for briefing by FO. FO needed more orientation since this was the only leg they flew together.
  • COMMUNICATIONS, LEADERSHIP, GROUP CLIMATE AND OVERALL CREW EFFECTIVENESS reflected this lack of crew familiarity.
  • CRITIQUE: none observed.

Captain's Leadership: Negative Effect: Captain's Leg, L-1011

Captain was not exhibiting any leadership, FE seemed to be filling the void more so than FO.

  • BRIEFING: Minimal briefing, FE briefed observer and flight attendants.
  • CRITIQUE: not evident.
  • LEADERSHIP and OVERALL CREW EFFECTIVENESS: Flight overall was not very well run. Captain didn't seem interested. Rest of crew tried to pick up the slack.

These, and other examples, are given for illustrative purposes only, but were taken from actual line flights.

The First Officer's Domain

Using the same techniques described above, FOs were found to influence overall crew ratings most often in their use of

(1) Inquiry/Assertion/Advocacy,
(2) Preparation/Planning / Vigilance, and
(3) their Technical Proficiency.

Similar to captains, FO's individual impact on overall crew ratings was predominantly positive (i.e., 2/3 were positive in outcome). When an FO influenced the crew significantly, this was most often through the use of Inquiry / Assertion / Advocacy, their Preparation / Planning / Vigilance activities or their Technical Proficiency. These "potent" FO behaviors, like those of Captains, may have either a positive or a negative effect, depending of skill level. Listed below are some positive and negative examples taken from our line observations.

FO'S Inquiry/Assertion/Advocacy: Negative Effect: Captain's Leg, MD-88

Autothrottle was inop, captain's VOR/LOC heading display flickered. 2-3 degrees off course. FO did not give data for economical climb - was intimidated by the Captain's leadership style and his own lack of experience. Neither talked about plan or action. FO complacently followed where led.

FO'S Inquiry / Assertion / Advocacy: Positive Effect: FO'S Leg, MD-88

Captain was a line check airman not giving a check ride. Captain misunderstood hold short clearance after landing the FO appropriately explained 3 times the proper action and prepared to step on the brakes. Captain came to senses and stopped, profusely thanking the FO.

  • LEADERSHIP: Captain was an excellent mentor, FO high time in MD-88.

FO'S Preparation / Planning / Vigilance Positive Effect: Captain's Leg, 737

Excellent, timely backup by the FO for the Captain. Noticed windsock prior to takeoff, alerted of strong winds. Planned route relative to turbulence. ATC changed runways, FO kept up with/set radios for the Captain. Captain almost turned off wrong taxiway, but FO stopped / corrected him.

FO'S Technical Proficiency: Negative Effect: FO'S Leg, MD-88

On departure, deviations around much weather were necessary. Captain very knowledgeable and ready to help, but FO kept trying to fly and handle frequency and heading changes on the panel by himself

FO'S Technical Proficiency: Positive Effect: FO'S Leg, 737

Outstanding stick and rudder, operations and system knowledge.

  • BRIEFING: Although both pilots high time and in the middle of a pattern, and a shuttle operation at that, briefings were well completed.

Implications For Training

All of the CRM behaviors have an impact on crew performance, whether used by Captains, FO's or SO's, and thus should be covered in any basic CRM course. Good communication skills, for example, are important and necessary skills for all crew members.

However, the information presented above can be applied to the training environment to produce tailored CRM training. The data suggest that different emphasis should be applied in CRM training for Captains than for FO's. For example, briefing and leadership skills should be two of the primary areas of emphasis for Captains. Given that captains have their greatest impact on crew performance in these areas, assuring that they impact overall crew performance positively is of utmost importance. Similarly, FO training should highlight their critical influence on team performance through Inquiry / Advocacy / Assertion and Preparation / Planning / vigilance. These skills must be learned well so the outcomes are positive, not negative. The FO's technical proficiency as a potent influence in how well the crew performs should also be discussed by FO's.

Another implication is that when an FO upgrades, the behavioral skills which have been used successfully may now no longer be the ones which are called for as a Captain. Captaincy training should have special emphasis in these "behavioral" aspects of the new role.

Conclusion

Although crew training is essential for a complete and effective pilot training program, understanding the special influence of particular crew members is also needed in order maximize training goals, and ultimately to enhance crew effectiveness and flight safety. Continued research in this area is extremely important. Although initial findings are suggestive, as of yet we do not have enough data to examine differences in crew member influence between line operations and LOFT. We are very appreciative of airline support for our research efforts to date. We believe that a continued cooperative atmosphere will allow us to gather more information in the training and operational environments that will yield additional concrete recommendations concerning CRM training practices and content.

1 The research reported herein was supported by FAA Grant 92-G-017, and NASA Ames Research Cooperative NCC 2-286. Robert L. Helmreich is Principal Investigator for both research efforts.

2 For example, see Billings, C.E., & Reynard,W.D. (1984). Human factors in aircraft incidents: Results of a 7-year study. Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 55, 960-965.

3 The Line/LOS Checklist is used to make global evaluations of the CRM and technical behaviors of crews, one evaluation per flight segment. Each crew is rated, according to the obsever's judgment, for their use of Briefings (conduct and quality), Inquiry/Assertion/Advocacy, Critique, Communications/Decisions, Leadership - Followership, Interpersonal Relations, Preparation/Planning/Vigilance,Workload Distribution/Avoidance of Distractions, and Conflict Resolution. Two summary measures are evaluated: Overall Technical Proficiency and Overall Crew Performance. All ratings use a 5-point rating scale which ranges from 'poor' to 'excellent'.

4 We have noted slightly different emphasis on certain behaviors in reports generated by check airmen rather than from observers, and from airline to airline. For details, see Law, J. R., (in press) Position-specific behaviors and their impact on crew performance: Implications for traininging. Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio State University.

5 T'he "standardized residual" (SR) statistic determines whether the difference between expected and actual frequency counts for each cell is due to a "real" association between the variables, or merely due to "chance" fluctuations. An SR with an absolute value greater than about 2.0 suggests a "real"or "reliable" association exists.

 Part One: Captain's Perspective - Balancing Effective Assertion and Followership (Or how to Distinguish Mutiny from Helpful Assistance)

By: Captain Lou Nemeth, USAir

One of the distinct problems encountered by airlines as they implement human factors training is encouraging constructive input from all crewmembers while at the same time maintaining our effective command structure. It is desirable for crewmembers to feel confident and comfortable bringing information to the captain. It is not desirable for other crewmembers to feel that by bringing information that they have somehow assumed responsibility for the command of the aircraft. Teamwork implies that there is a leader and followers. Followers have clear responsibilities in our organization. This two part article will explore one of those responsibilities.

You might recall one part of CRM Phase I training called Effective Assertion. As the science (art?) of human factors evolves, this is now being called advocacy. Advocacy is a five step model that encourages followers to advocate or express their point of view freely on the airplane without upsetting the chain of command. Advocacy also allows captains to view new and alternate information as helpful rather than as an affront to their leadership. As you may remember from Phase 1, the five steps of the model are:

Opening
Expressing Concern
Stating the Problem
Proposing a Solution
Achieving Agreement

In Phase 1, many examples were shared of pilots expressing concern and not completing the model. Pilots like to let others know they are uncomfortable but often have difficulty proposing solutions and achieving agreement about those solutions. For example, you may recall a flight at DCA where the first officer said "...those engine gauges don't look right" (expressing concern). Had the first officer gone further and said, ".. those gauges don't look right, they are too low and we need to add power..." the flight may have turned out differently (stating the problem and proposing a solution).

Implied in leadership is followership -- followership includes the team skills of support, anticipation, listening, communicating and working together toward common goals while respecting the chain of command. In the classes last year, these are exactly the traits that captains suggested were essential to a good first officer. Followership is not only a skill but also an attitude. Attitude may be defined as an internal state that affects an individual's choice of personal action toward some object, person, or event. Attitudes are determined by others (and learned by the individual) over long periods of time. For example, if a first officer elects to inquire once about the takeoff flap setting, it is impossible to say what his attitude is toward advocacy.

A cockpit with a clear leader and follower is certainly more desirable than one without leadership and followership (the cockpit is not a democracy). Followers have a professional responsibility to advocate their points of view through INQUIRY under the Effective Assertion Model. The human factors group at USAir emphasizes good followership skills and attitudes and the need for assertion. Since the CRM curriculum was created by line pilots, the course strives to enhance the chain of command, as every team needs a coach and every coach needs a team.

Is it possible to advocate or express your views too much? CRM emphasizes clear and frequent communications on the flight deck about flight operations, but is there a point where there may be too much of a good thing? This is the key to being a good leader or a good follower. A good leader will deal with information brought forward in such a way that the follower will understand that the information is welcome and has been dealt with appropriately. A good follower will understand that followers are responsible to bring information and that the leader will deal with it. If a leader fails to lead or a follower fails to follow, it will create confusion and distraction in the cockpit. Distraction was one of the RED FLAGS of situational awareness loss.

There were plenty of examples in Phase I CRM where crews were distracted by non-operational conversation and lost the big picture. Part of the art (or is it a science?) of being a good captain is considering information and its impact on the safety of flight. It is also a portion of the art of being a good first officer.

The question before us then is how to balance effective assertion with good followership. Here are a few guidelines:

Captains (Leaders):

Brief the anticipated "hot buttons." In other words, if the operation may become controversial, anticipate it and talk about it before it happens. State your preferences. Example, "I prefer flaps X anytime the numbers support it." Remember that briefings are not limited to the first leg of a trip, they may be used anytime the situation warrants.

Suggest to the subordinate crewmember that while their input is important to you, if it is not safety related the discussion needs to be postponed to some other time when the aircraft is not in motion (the crew room or hotel).

First Officers, IROs, S/O (Followers):

Before invoking continued questioning, inquiry or effective assertion consider the impact on safety. Your personal preference may be flaps Y over the captain's preference for flaps X, but by advocating flaps Y are you really making an impact on safety, or are you making an impact on the captain's ability to manage?

 Part Two: F/O's Perspective - Balancing Effective Assertion and Followership (Or how to Distinguish Mutiny from Helpful Assistance)

By: F/O Lucy Young, USAir

Phase I of CRM training provided USAir pilots with the "awareness" of many different areas of human factors that are commonly encountered on the line. Many concepts and tools were introduced that can be used by crew members to perform their jobs smoothly and safely. The course got great reviews by the pilot group and has brought USAir into the forefront in this type of training. Phase 11, the videotaped LOFT session, began in May 1993, and phase 111, recurrent CRM, started in January 1993 as part of all aircraft recurrent and F/A recurrent syllabi. These actions will keep pilots updated and refreshed in CRM principles and cover actual line examples of crew circumstances for class discussion to enhance safety and communication.

Many a pilot has thought about assertiveness and its proper application in the cockpit or cabin. Generally speaking, it is standing up for what the pilot thinks is right. In flight operations, it is more specifically bringing information to the other crew members' attention in order to keep the operation safe or procedures within certain parameters. Since the captain is the leader of the team, the other crew members have a responsibility to keep the captain apprised of all factors affecting the operation of the flight, so he / she may make decisions based on ALL pertinent information.

Pilots generally know when to speak up and to back up and support the captain in decision making. A very authoritative captain may tend to stifle crew assertiveness and a very passive captain may cause excessively assertive behavior on the part of the crew. A good balance is ideally attained by the captain being authoritative enough to command the flight effectively, yet seeking inputs from the other crew members.

Crew briefings have been extremely effective in establishing clear leadership and command authority, and the atmosphere can be created where crew participation can flourish. Assertiveness with respect, not insubordination, is the goal for the "followers" in the crew! The 727 overrun accident in Ketchikan, Alaska is a classic example of where leadership / followership was clearly out of balance, and verbal and nonverbal indications of this were present.

Assertiveness by necessity must increase with workload, as inputs may be missed or unheeded in a busy cockpit. In addition, the level of authority must be appropriate for the workload. In one, simulator study, 25% of crews crashed after an unannounced exercise in subtle incapacitation! Vigilance is critical as is the assertiveness to assume responsibility if the captain is incapacitated. Performance generally rises with stress level until a point at which degradation is shown, so first officers can alleviate some of the workload by anticipating flight crew actions and procedures to assist the captain and avoid last minute rushes in the terminal environment.

CRM affords many concepts that are helpful to the flight crew, and it all aims toward enhancing captains authority, keeping safety paramount, and providing the finest air carrier service in the industry.

 Evaluating CRM

by: Stanley N. Roscoe, President
ILLIANA Aviation Sciences Limited
Arcata, California and Las Cruces, New Mexico
707.839.1271 and
Director, Aviation Psychology Department,
Aero Innovation
Pierrefonds, Quebec, Canada
514.696.9310

Abstract

Typically pilot selection tests account for about 25 percent of the variance in measures of success in pilot training and bear no evident relation to operational performance. Beyond basic intelligence and motor skills, pilot performance is believed to depend largely on "situational awareness," the overarching ability to attend to multiple information sources, evaluate alternatives, establish priorities, and work on the alternative with the highest momentary priority. Crew duties add a social dimension to individual performance that is now addressed by training in crew resource management. The solo WOMBAT test was designed to measure the situational awareness and stress tolerance of individual crew members, and the DuoWOMBAT addresses the abilities of crews to manage their resources.

Background

Psychologists have developed accurate measures of human intelligence and somewhat less precise but nonetheless useful instruments for describing human personality factors. Unfortunately we have been less successful in assessing human aptitudes for controlling air and surface traffic or deciding what to do on a final approach following a midair collision between planes landing and taking off over the same airport. The military have invested huge sums developing and validating selection batteries that account for no more than about 25 percent of the variance in training success and have no evident correlation with operational performance.

The long range prediction of who will rise to the surface in an operational crisis is based on a foundation of psychological quicksand. As can happen with flight crews and air traffic controller teams, the individuals involved may have all the skills and knowledge normally required but be unable to put them together in the confusion following the hypothetical midair collision over the airport. To cope with the problems encountered by crew members working with other crew members, most of the world's airlines have instituted training in crew resource management. By consensus, CRM has high "face validity."

The costs of mistakes in selecting and evaluating crew members are not limited to those resulting from mismanagement of critical operations. It is also costly to train individuals who can pass all training tests but then are unable to stand up under the stress of operational chaos. Although certain personality tests are believed by some to reflect traits conducive to effective and harmonious interactions among crew members, until recently there has been no objective test specifically designed to call for the working exercise of those traits. The PC based DuoWOMBAT Crew Resource Management Test has been designed to meet that need.

Approach

Historically, aptitude tests have been crippled by the notion that performance of complex team operations depends on a collection of individually simple abilities. Consistent with this idea, batteries have been developed to test reaction time, manual dexterity, short and long term memory, spatial orientation, and the like. The fact that such batteries account for only about 25 percent of the variance in training success depends in part on the correlations among the so called factors measured by the individual tests. Any one or two of the tests provides almost as much predictive power as the entire battery. Administering the rest of the battery is a waste. David Hopkin (1993) of the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine has advanced the notion that situational awareness is a unitary though complex human quality, above and beyond the sum of the component abilities currently measured by psychomotor test batteries. The original WOMBAT Situational Awareness and Stress Tolerance Test was designed to address the complexity of this overarching unitary quality by creating a situational scenario of similar complexity. The automatically adaptive scenario calls on a testee to scan multiple information sources, evaluate alternatives, establish priorities, and select and work on the alternative that has the highest priority at the moment.

The solo WOMBAT test was designed to assess the operational aptitude of individuals working in complex situations without regard to their interactions with other individuals in a team or crew relationship. The latter situation calls for additional personal attributes, primarily social in nature, that have gained the attention of airline management and government regulators, leading to worldwide formal training in CRM. To assess the actual benefits of CRM training, an objective measuring instrument is needed.

To measure how well crew resources are managed, the solo WOMBAT has been expanded into the DuoWOMBAT Crew Resource Management Test. Two testees, sitting side by side at two networked WOMBAT terminals, work out joint strategies for trading off duties to maximize the team's combined score. The 90 minute test consists of two 30 minute phases of dual performance of the various subtasks sandwiched between three 10 minute solo phases (10, 30, 10, 30, 10). The three solo phases provide a learning curve for each individual to serve as a basis against which the team's CRM performance is evaluated.

While situational complexity is necessary to test situational awareness and crew coordination, it is not sufficient. To avoid confounding basic aptitude with the effect of prior training in specific tasks such as flying airplanes, the elements that comprise the test must be unlike any real world activities (unlike operating computers, unlike controlling any specific vehicle). Furthermore, the individual subtasks must be simple enough to allow their mastery in a short practice period before combining them in the test situation. Sufficient situational complexity is achieved by the manner in which the individually simple subtasks are combined in an adaptive scenario involving multiple sources of information and multiple response alternatives.

The WOMBAT test is a game designed to embody all these demands and constraints. The individual tasks involve pursuit tracking, pattern recognition, short-term memory, and spatial orientation, and on each a testee can reach an asymptotic performance level after a short practice period. The 3D tracking task is unlike anything called for in real world vehicle control. In a quadrant location task, as each pattern of numbers is learned, it is replaced by a more difficult pattern of greater scoring value. A two back serial digit canceling task, with no real world counterpart, is both tedious and frustrating. The 3D figure rotation and matching task is a game that requires spatial orientation and calls for a self assessment of confidence.

These four tasks comprise the menu of scoring alternatives available to each testee on request. Each task is relatively culture free in that it has no real world counterpart, and each can be learned quickly by the apt testee. The attention demands of the WOMBAT game are expanded by the ever changing information presented by peripheral indicators. To score well, the testees must monitor the peripheral indicators vigilantly. They must follow the shifting priorities of the various activities as indicated by their potential scoring values and current scoring rates and also detect indications of failure modes that may require immediate termination of one activity in favor of another.

Validation

The difficulty of developing tests of high predictive validity for complex operational aptitude involves several factors, the first of which is the usual clouding of operational performance criteria against which to validate any such test. if measures of complex operational performance are unreliable, as they typically are, there is no way that the high predictive validity of a test can be shown statistically. The pass / fail criterion is virtually useless when all operational personnel are given whatever amount of simulator refreshment is needed for periodic recertification, and rating scales are no better when almost everyone receives the same rating. Like CRM training, the evaluation of CRM testing initially must be a matter of face validity.

However, the objective evaluation of CRM training and testing is not beyond reach. By consensus, the airlines' CRM training programs have an observable effect in the desired direction on crew behavior in the cockpit. If that is indeed the case, the change in the individual crew members behavior should be reflected by improved performance on the DuoWOMBAT test (beyond that attributable solely to taking and retaking the test). Conversely, continued practice on the DuoWOMBAT would be expected to develop team behavioral strategies that would readily transfer to the operational situation.

Reference: Hopkin, V. D. (1993). Situational awareness in air traffic control. Paper presented at a conference on Situational Awareness in Complex Systems, held in Orlando, FL, February 13 by the Center for Applied Human Factors in Aviation, a joint venture of the University of Central Florida and Embry - Riddle Aeronautical University.

The material contained in The CRM Advocate back issues is the property of the contributing editors. No duplication of any kind is authorized without the express written permission of the editor. All rights reserved. For training and information purposes only. The intent of the editors is shared information, through controlled distribution to the benefit of the safety of flight.

 

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