Long time no chat. I hope all is well. I agree with your analysis that
the military has learned valuable lessons through various debriefing
styles, but there may be a culture within a culture lurking.
For example, my military background is somewhat different than yours. I
flew C-141s and unless it was a formation airdrop or a local trainer
sortie, I never saw a debrief (well maybe once or twice if we actually
scared ourselves on an airlift mission). And believe me, there was a lot
to be learned from our everyday airlift missions if we actually conducted
debriefs, but we don't. I wish we did.
I know from my experience as a T-37 Instructor Pilot and a T-1 Instructor
Pilot (along with various CRM programs) that debriefs, if properly
conducted are of the utmost value, but strangely, these debriefing skills
that are so ingrained in the training environment do not make their way
into the airlift system.
This may be the small group accountability you are speaking of, for if we
were not in formation in the C-141, we really did not speak in a formal
fashion as to the lessons learned over the flight. However, in the F-4 you
rarely traveled without a wingman or three so there was a bit more
accountability to be had. For the wingman is usually forced to wonder,
"what's lead doing now?" and will bring those questions to the debrief.
Whereas when the entire crew is sitting in the cockpit together, i.e.
C-141, B-737, things are usually cleared up with a quick question or even a
bit of body language, so crews feel the issue has been resolved. While the
issue may be resolved easily, multiplace cockpit crews miss the lesson
learned that can usually only be brought about through a debrief.
It would be great if crews were able to resolve whatever issues may arise
while airborne, then have the skills to debrief and study lessons learned
in a productive manner when they reach dispatch or the hotel. I know some
airlines have been teaching their left seaters to do this, I wonder if it
is really happening in practice.
Regards,
Capt Andy Newman
USAF T-1 Instructor Pilot
----------
> From: V. Mancuso <vince_mancuso_at_CompuServe.COM>
> To: CRM Developers Group <crm-devel_at_db.erau.edu>
> Subject: Culture
> Date: Monday, September 07, 1998 11:14 AM
>
>
> Hello Folks,
>
> I fly for an airline that has traditionally hired around 95%
> military-trained pilots. I also fly in the Air Force Reserve as a T-38
> Instructor Pilot. One would think that the pilot culture and the manner
> in which pilots conduct themselves in these two flying organizations
would
> be very similar. My experience, however, is that the manner in which
> pilots conduct themselves is vastly different in the two organizations.
I
> believe I have identified two fundamental differences (and will likely
> identify more as the months roll on):
>
> 1. The reverence the organization has for perfection
> 2. The acceptable methods for dealing with deference to experience and
> position
>
> In military flying, perfection is a religion. Consequently individual
and
> small group accountability is very high. Formal debriefs are an expected
> part of every mission. Within the context of these debriefs, all
> crew/flight members have the formal sanction to debrief anything or
anyone.
> In commercial flying, the reverence for perfection and the acceptable
> methods for deference are largely determined by the individual captain.
> Individual and small group accountability varies significantly between
crew
> pairings. The result is a wide variability in both items listed above.
>
> I would like to share with you an excerpt that my commander has
prominently
> displayed under the glass on his desk:
>
> ********
> "There is a subtle tendency to protect your ego in the debrief instead of
> focusing on lessons learned. If you're giving alibis during the debrief
> explaining why you didn't do things perfectly, chances are you're not
> getting everything out of the debrief that you could. It's human nature
to
> rationalize substandard performance as the result of outside factors.
Good
> fighter pilots have the discipline to honestly admit their mistakes to
> themselves (and others) whether or not a gradesheet comment is written.
It
> pi**** them off when they get gunned on a mission. They spend time even
> after the debrief reviewing how they screwed up and how they're going to
> make certain that it never happens again. The ones who excel drain every
> bit of learning from every debrief. If you haven't got the determination
> to analyze your performance in precise detail, or the humility to admit
> errors at your present skill level, your progression to higher levels
will
> be slower than it should be.
>
> There is also a tendency to focus on others mistakes during the debrief.
> Typical examples are blaming GCI, RAPCON, the rejoin platform's airspeed,
> or 2's wide base position. Even if your individual performance was only
a
> small part of a debrief ask yourself: How could I have improved our
> execution."
>
> *******
>
> The fact that my commander has this prominently displayed and lives by it
> says more about the culture than any verbal picture I could paint.
>
> I would be interested in the perspective of others who have flown both
> military and civilian. I would also be interested in learning form our
> resident scholars on culture whether my experience matches existing
> theories on cultural influence on performance.
>
> Best Regards,
>
> Vince Mancuso
>
>
>
>
>