I have found the discussion on behaviour reversion very interesting.
Some time back I completed a post-grad thesis on the Airbus Cross-Crew
Qualification process, in which I researched a whole lot of different
concepts relating to the feasibility of flying related and unrelated
types.
Now a couple of years later I have had some first hand experience of
flying unrelated types - hence my interest in the discussion on
reversion.
I am a Training Captain on the Airbus A300 (an analogue, 3-crew, "old
generation" aircraft). Two years ago, with 2 years on the A300, I was
sent on a contract to fly the Airbus A340 (new generation, glass
cockpit, 2-crew aircraft). I found the conversion to type fairly
complicated as there were many new philosophies and concepts to learn.
I found the new aircraft very friendly ergonomically and the
philosophies easy to learn and adapt to. I found few transfer problems,
probably because the aircraft are so different.
Two years later I am back on the A300, and have just completed the
simulator phase of the re-conversion. I now have some practical
experience of behaviour reversion over the 5 sessions! Funny enough,
nothing major, mostly procedural differences. The biggest problem was
the manual throttles (yes, they call them that on the A300!). They are
incredibly sensitive on the A300, and I was continually overcontrolling
the thrust.
Also the "go-levers" were always forgotten on the go-around! The A300
had little levers on the front part of the throttle quadrant that you
"click" to activate the automatics for the go-around. The A340 requires
that you advance the thrust levers forward to the stops for the go
around. Twice I simply whacked the thrust levers to the stops to get
TOGA, much to the disgust of the Flight Engineer who watched his pet
engines rev into the red!! However, he said something subtle about the
"old F%$#_at_" and I stopped that nasty behaviour forthwith!
In a nutshell, I feel the following aspects occurred, in answer to Paul
Baxter's description of the reversion process:
<<Step one is error diagnosis>> The errors that I made I could identify
and diagnose fairly easily, being aware of the problems of transfer. I
required little input from the trainers apart from them pointing out
deviations from SOPS and techiques. Most of the errors were mistakes,
not learned errors.
<<Step two involves teaching the person the difference between his or
her "old" and "new" way, i.e, the way they normally or often do it, and
the way they *should* be doing it.>> This was fairly easy, as I feel I
was returning to past habits, rather than having to learn new habits.
<<But you have to start with what the person already knows, which is
their error.>> Perhaps, but only in specific circumstances, where there
is nothing to "return" to. Perhaps my situation was unique?
<<....It returns to haunt you when you least expect it.>> True, but only
until your Flight Engineer calls you an old _at_#$% :-)
<<But when the going gets tough and stressful *then* and only then will
you find out whether what you taught them has really *taken*. It is in
those moments, as you rightly
point out, that people revert to their early experience, their familiar,
well-practiced routines, even though these may be sub-optimal,
completely innapropriate or downright dangerous in the situation.>> I
am very interested to find out what experiences I will revert to. My
"older" A300 behaviours, my "old" A340 behaviours, or my recent A300
re-training behaviours (identical to the old A300 training)?? Watch
this space! I would be interested to hear how Paul views this in the
"Old Way/New Way" philosophy.
I still believe that transfer problems are more prevalent when the types
are quite similar and the differences subtle. I believe the differences
between the A300 and A340 are so vast that transfer would be less of a
problem that between different versions of the same aircraft, unless, of
course, they are designed to be operated concurrently (a la Airbus
CCQ).
Any comments?
Mike Malherbe