> The decision to accept RW 19 caused mental stress to both pilots, thereby
> reducing their situational awareness (of flight path and obstacle
> clearance).
> Another psychological fact is proven again: as soon as a decision is taken,
> we try to stick to this decision and look for facts supporting it and ignore
> facts, that do not support our decision.
> Maybe also "regression" was somehow involved in the accident sequence:
> mental stress causes us to regret to attitudes and actions learned earlier,
> although they are not appropriate in the actual situation; flying in radar
> environment most of the time and accepting direct routings is "usual
> business" in our part of the world, but it was not appropriate in the
> situation of AA 965. Maybe the stressful situation caused the "Regression"
> to the feeling of operating in a radar-environment (as they did most of the
> time).
This is a very interesting analysis and I wonder if you are familiar with the field of naturalistic decision making. This field
studies decision making in contexts of high stakes, dynamic conditions, uncertainty and shifting goals. This would include the
context of aircraft flight. One of the key findings is that people use their experience to size up a situation as prototypical,
then select an appropriate course of action for the prototypical situation. People often do not deliberate about different
situation assessements, nor do they deliberate about what to do once they have the situation assessed. This has been shown in
numerous domains such as aircraft pilots, firefighers, critical care nurses and tank commanders (to name but a few).
Although this decision making strategy may lead to errors, it more often allows the decision maker to act quickly and
effectively when time is critical. When poor decisions are made, it is often because the information made available is
incompatible with the way people naturally process information. Or, critical information may be missing. My company, Klein
Associates, specializes in the study and improvement of of decision making through the design of the work space and training.
This would include the improved design of navigational displays that you mentioned in your email to Hideatke Sakuma.
We recommend a couple of articles to learn more about these subjects. I do not have electronic copies to provide, but can mail
the following two articles to anyone interested:
Kaempf, G. L., & Klein, G. (1994). Aeronautical decision making. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald, & R. Fuller (Eds.), Aviation
psychology in practice (pp. 223-254). Hants, England: Avebury Press.
Klein, G. (in press). How Can We Train Pilots to Make Better Decisions? Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Thanks,
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Terry Stanard, PhD
Klein Associates Inc.
1750 Commerce Center Blvd. North
Fairborn, OH, 45324
Voice: (937) 873-8166 Ext. 114
FAX: (937) 873-8258
terry_at_klein-inc.com
www.decisionmaking.com
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