They were not experienced in weather conditions such as at DCA that day. I
was scheduled to fly into DCA that day and spent most of the day in ORF on
weather hold. Even in ORF, the wx was miserable with very heavy snow
falling. Even experienced pilots conceded it was not an easy day to operate.
Also, they had been taught a stall recovery which used only maximum takeoff
thrust, not full power. When they got the shaker, they did not shove the
throttles through the radar (radar power). This was one correction from the
accident investigation and it revealed once again we often use normal
thinking in emergency situations. In this case, the over riding point in
training was not to overboost the engines during recovery... just use
maximum thrust rather than take the engines to firewall thrust. That changed.
Also, in many events, you will find the crew may question something but NO
ONE makes a firm decision. In some cases, both pilots sit there and watch a
flight devolve.. and in the debrief after the incident or accident, both
will say, "If the other guy had just said he was uncomfortable or how does
this look, I would have said let's go around."
One would also need to investigate the mood of the company at that time. Air
Florida was going great guns. They came out of nowhere and were the
darlings of the industry. They were buying airplanes and had expanded to the
point they were flying DC-10s from Miami to Europe. It was a very heady time
for the company... they could do no wrong...
So, in this case, you have company issues, training issues, crew issues,
weather issues... lots of stuff. Your problem is not going to be information
or events. It will be focusing your scope..
Wiley