Will regard to your debate with Jeff under the title 'automation-induced
error', discussing design and training, and primarily focussed on GA, may I
follow the reference to B747-400 and expand the debate again into
mainstream airline operations:
1. 'Human-centred' and cockpit ergonomic design advances (airliners) during
the last four decades have been so dramatic that the 1950s cockpit would be
almost indecipherable to many pilots today. (The Concorde is a marvellous
machine, but try to identify cockpit instruments and controls in 10
seconds!). The 747-400 embodies most positive advances, which include more
logical switch positioning, focussed flight instrumenation, glass displays
and FMS. These aircraft ARE well designed by historical standards. There
are nevertheless many other factors to improve.
2. Related issues are complex, and do not distil down to just two
factors. Apart from aircraft design and training, safe operations are
affected by designer vision and experience, commercial policies, politics,
user-feedback, pilot recruitment, pilot experience, industrial climates,
company cultures, and regulatory environments, to mention a few.
3. We live in a fast moving world, and there is today a large and growing
body of pilots operating with advanced flight decks in airline operations.
I regret that some of the excellent inputs to this forum have great
relevance, but to a time slightly earlier than today.
4. Quality training (transition), coupled with regular and validated
re-inforcement (recurrent) training is, in my opinion, critical to safe
airline operations. Design improvements will continue, promoted by
technology for sure, and involving direct user (line pilot) participation -
I hope.
In the air, the pilot is still where the buck stops. I believe that the
expression 'automation-induced-error' does not serve the purpose of
encouraging improvement; it is hardly fair to designers, in the same way
the 'pilot error' was never fair to pilots. Designers have worked wonders,
making high technology airliners of today easier to handle, simpler to
operate, with lower levels of motor skills required (FOR NORMAL
OPERATIONS). Improved design does add up to significant advances in
aviation safety, but exposes human limitations more. However, to cater for
abnormal events, pilots must learn behaviours which protect against
complacency, maintain discipline and professionalism (human factors). They
must be able to react instinctively to takeover from automation when
necessary. These behaviors, and training priorities are more important
than ever before.
If you have read thus far, thanks for surviving!
John Bent
Cathay
At 12:00 PM 10/16/97 -0400, you wrote:
>
>Jeff,
>
>Thank you for your comments on my GA auto pilot scenario. I totally agree
>with you that design is the first place to look for human error. In fact I
>think it is so obvious that I did not include it in the scenario! My point
>is that we still have airplanes out there from a c-172 to a 747-400 that
>were designed wrong from the standpoint of automation (not considering the
>human) and pilots are flying them. There is not much more we can do with
>these "designed for error" machines but teach people to check and cross
>check for their own errors.
>
>In the case of our c-172, we did mount a switch guard to prevent inadvertant
>engagement of the autopilot but that is only a partial solution. A better
>disangagement procedure would be better solution as you say.
>
>For a better presentation of my position on design vs training solutions,
>please read my book (with Stan Trollip) "Human Factors for General
>Aviation". I have clearly stated there and do so repeatedly in my classes as
>I have in the Symposium on Aviation Psychology that our first focus in
>seeking why an error ocurred is to look at the design. I too have a saying
>that I used that came from my mentor, Stan Roscoe:
>
>"Design to minimize the need for training;
>Train to complete the job left undone in the design."
>
>You will find this in my book.
>
>Thanks.
>
>Dick
>
>At 02:51 PM 10/14/97 -0400, you wrote:
>>
>>
>> Mr. Jensen,
>> I received a copy of your E-Mail through a colleague with
>> the FAA. I don't think she intended any of us to respond
>> directly to you, rather, I believe she just wanted to
>> share your insights. I think that we must all be very
>> willing and open to discuss our opinions so that we can
>> grow as a discipline and take a more consistent and
>> dominate role in the industry. Now, allow we do address
>> some concerns I had with your message.
>>
>> As you are no doubt aware, human factors began with a
>> focus on selection, progressed to training and finally
>> sought design solutions to human-vehicle interface issues.
>> This progress did not occur very quickly, actually it
>> took decades to reach its current state. It is in this
>> area of design that I think we can make our most
>> significant and beneficial impact.
>>
>> For example, consider a related automatic system that is
>> in wide use and well known by most of the adult population
>> of this country - cruise control systems. Imagine
>> stepping on the brake while using a cruise control system
>> in your car and having the system working to keep the car
>> at the set speed. Thank goodness, someone was thinking
>> when the automotive industry developed a cruise control
>> system that included a disengage function associated with
>> the braking system. Do you think intensive training
>> should have been the proposed solution to this system
>> design and operation issue?
>>
>> The particular incident you relayed to us, impressed me as
>> being one of pilot error only. Actually, the error of
>> failing to recognize that the autopilot was engaged and
>> manual control was inhibited has not been limited to
>> general aviation aircraft piloted by low-time,
>> inexperienced individuals. This same error has occurred
>> in transport category aircraft by highly trained
>> individuals. So much for training solving everything!
>> Although, I do admit that the pilot in this incident
>> failed to receive (or seek) adequate training and
>> familiarization with the aircraft systems; training and
>> experience should not be the only solution. This
>> substantiates the need for special human factors
>> considerations for general aviation (Part 23) aircraft,
>> and the need for the FAA and industry to work together for
>> viable, effective and safe solutions.
>>
>> It was not very comforting to me as a human factors
>> engineer with the FAA to see someone trained in human
>> factors, a person teaching others about human factors, and
>> a learned and published author in the field failing to
>> recognize or acknowledge that perhaps the design
>> (operation logic) of that system had something to do with
>> the incident. While I agree with you, that inadequate
>> training is an aspect and contributing factor with many
>> human errors, I think that requiring much training,
>> particularly to override what the majority of the
>> population would naturally do, portends of poor design as
>> well.
>>
>> With all this being said, I simply wanted to express my
>> thoughts on the subject and open the door for more
>> conversations and cooperation with you. Feel free to
>> respond either in writing or call me at (316) 946-4184. I
>> work at the Wichita ACO in KS.
>>
>> Thank You for Your Time,
>> Jeffrey Holland
>> FAA Engineering Research Psychologist
>>
>>
>> P.S. I have created the following adage: "To Err is
>> Human, To Aniticipate and Compensate for Errors is the
>> Goal of HFE"
>>
>>
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