>
>A note from another guy lurking in the tall grass...
>
>Two events spring to mind from Joel's post here.
>1) I had one of my more interesting rides in the jump seat of a 757 a
>few years ago. Early morning, cold (-35C) and the number one engine on
>start, ignites a puddle of fuel that had pooled by seeping through seals
>during the night. While the two in the "good" seats were setting up to
>start #2, the lead FA bursts into the flight deck (we could hear her
>bounding up the aisle) yelling that #1 is on fire. No indication on the
>panel, no fire alarm, nothing. Crew tells FA it can't be. Then there is
>over wing emergency exit light (passengers want to jump ship) and an
>eerie red glow from aft of the left cockpit window. Tower tells us fire
>trucks are on the way. Now the crew believes what the FA had to say.
>As the pooled fuel burned out, everybody calmed down. The left side of
>the aircraft was scorched, some wing root fairings buckled from the
>heat. The airplane was ferried to home base for maintenance. I don't
>know what might have been accomplished if the crew had immediately
>responded in a positive way to the FA's rush to the cockpit (strong
>message there). All I know is that the FA was the FIRST source of info
>about the fire.
>
>2) Some years back a 737 burned to the ground in Calgary, AB. Please
>excuse any stray from exacting details. As I recall, the first
>indication of fire was from an observent crew of another aircraft. The
>transcript shows interventions by the FA, but the crew in the front end
>chose to disregard the intervention of the FA, even tho' smoke was
>reported in the cabin. Confusing signals, like the 757 story above: no
>info on the instrument panel - no fire alarm, nothing, because, as I
>recall, fan blades has severed some wiring. Long story short: perhaps
>they should have listened more closely to the FA. A wonderful case
>study for a CRM course, which is where I came across the report.
>Thanks, Air Canada.
>
>Now, back to the tall grass...
>
>John G Breen
>ATS Team Resource Management Project
>NAV CANADA
>Edmonton, AB
>
>>----------
>>From: Joel Morley[SMTP:jmorley_at_ranaprocess.com]
>>Sent: May 14, 1998 12:51 PM
>>To: crm-devel_at_db.erau.edu
>>Subject: The C in CRM
>>
>>
>>Greetings,
>>
>>Gordon Breault's comments jolted me out of my normal place as an observer
>>of these discussions...
>>
>>>When was the last time a
>>>flight attendant crashed a jet? Sure, there may be that odd spilled cup
of
>>>McDonalds hot coffee in the aircrews lap, but that's like saying we
>>>shouldn't wear seatbelts because one jammed while stalled on the railroad
>>>tracks. It's the folks up front, folks, who gave rise to CRM, and all the
>>>reasons for focusing on the aircrew are just as valid today as they were
>>>when the program was birthed.
>>
>>While I cannot think of an example where a flight attendant caused an
>>aircraft to crash, I can think of numerous examples where intervention by
a
>>member of the cabin crew might have averted an accident or an incident:
>>
>>1) The Dryden F28 accident: if the cabin crew had communicated passenger
>>concerns regarding icing to the cockpit crew, the decision to take off
>>might have been averted.
>>
>>2) The 737 crash at Kegworth: Although the captain had announced to the
>>passengers that they were having trouble with the (wrong) engine, the
>>passengers and cabin crew could see smoke coming from what the flight crew
>>thought was the good engine. Again, communication of this fact to the
>>cockpit crew might have led to a different outcome.
>>
>>3) The Northwest Airlines DC10 which landed at Brussels: Although the
>>flight deck crew had lost situational awareness (and did not realize that
>>they were headed to the wrong airport), the moving map display in the
cabin
>>had raised questions among the passengers. A question posed in the
cockpit
>>might have resolved the situation.
>>
>>The point is that the comment above minimizes the contribution that people
>>in the system other than pilots make to safety. Cabin crew are privy to
>>information that the flight deck crew do not have (e.g. they can SEE the
>>wings and engines). Including them within CREW Resource Management serves
>>to communicate the importance of their contribution to safety and may
>>provide the impetus for cabin crew to ask questions and communicate safety
>>concerns.
>>
>>Regards,
>>
>>Joel Morley
>>
>>Joel Morley, Senior Consultant
>>RANA International Inc.
>>PO Box 527, Merrickville ON K0G 1N0 Canada
>>Tel: 613-284-0776 Fax: 613-283-6992
>>Website: www.ranaprocess.com
>>
>>Home Office: Tel: (613) 567-0535
>>
>>