Steve,
I agree. If normal, standard CRM procedures are to be part of a flight
operation, then they should be part of EVERY checkride. And by that I
do not mean that the PF should be "led" through a checkride by the PNF,
but the PNF should certainly provide every input that he or she would
during a line operation.
If CRM functions have to be "turned off" for an examiner to determine if
a pilot is competent, then there must be something wrong with the
examiner. When it is apparent that excessive "CRM intervention" is
required for successful completion of a checkride, then the checkride
was not satisfactory. I've given (and taken) a lot of checkrides over
the years, and it has always been obvious when one pilot is carrying the
other.
My opinion is that CRM procedures are--or should be--an integral part of
ALL flight operations. If we allow these procedures to be "turned off"
as a part of checking procedures (and it happens quite often
unfortunately), then we are saying that CRM is a nicety that is not
really a required part of the operation. I think that is the wrong
message to send; that was the reason for my original posting.
After all, we don't routinely disable stick shakers, or fire warning
systems, or GPWS, or altitude alerting systems, or other warning systems
during checkrides to be certain that the pilot can fly without them if
they should fail to function. (Yes, I know we do fail things, but we
don't tell a pilot that warning systems will not be available for the
entire checkride.)
Among other things, good CRM is a warning system. And CRM is just as
important as other warning systems or we are all wasting our time
working in the field! When an examiner "turns CRM off" as a requirement
for a check, then that examiner is showing that he or she lacks an
understanding of CRM.
Anyway, that's my opinion.
Mike Courtney