Sorry, Hugo, I can't find that information exactly, but maybe this will
help. Hope that it isn't too much. First, some background.
The commission which investigated this accident did not specify an exact
cause of the accident, but cited the flightcrew's selection of an
inappropriate autoflight vertical mode and confusion as to what vertical
mode the autoflight system was in.
I have been trying for three years to get a copy of the English version
of the report titled, in French, _Rapport de la Comission d'Enquete sur
l'Accident survenu le 20 Janvier 1992 pres du Mont Sainte Odile (Bas
Rhin) a l'Airbus A320 Immatricule F-GGED Exploite par la Compagnie Air
Inter_ The investigation was conducted and the report published by the
French Ministere de l'Equipment, des Transports et du Tourisme.
So far, I have been able to obtain a copy of the French version of the
report (which I cannot read) and just portions of the English
translation, which (complete) runs to over 300 pages.
The following appears in the English version, starting on p. 183 and
extending to p. 245:
"CHAPTER 2.1 - ACCIDENT SCENARIO ANALYSIS ... CHAPTER 2.2 - ANALYSIS OF
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING DIRECTLY TO THE ACCIDENT ... 22.36 - Lack of a GPWS
... 22.366 - Conclusion In fact, the only conclusion to be reached with
regard to the GPWS is a statistical one. From this point of view, the
results are clear: equipping aircraft with GPWS and evolving appropriate
policies for using it significantly reduces the number of flights into
the ground."
On pp. 314 - 316:
"CHAPTER 3.2 - ... CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO THE MECHANISMS OF THE
ACCIDENT In analysing the mechanisms of the accident, the Commission
reached the following conclusions:... 32.5 ... the accident was made
possible by the crew's lack of perception of the resulting discrepancy
in the vertical course ... 32.6 The Commission attributes this lack of
perception by the crew of [sic] the following factors ... 32.67 - the
absence of a GPWS together with an appropriate usage procedure ..."
In an AW&ST article on the final report (Sparaco, P., "Human Factors
Cited in French A320 Crash", Aviation Week & Space Technology, January
3, 1994, pp. 30 - 31) the following appears (which apparently refers to
a part of the report that I don't have in English):
"Air Inter aircraft were not equipped with a Ground Proximity Warning
System (GPWS) at the time of the accident. This was at least in part due
to airline managers' opinions that the systems were subject to too many
false alarms, particularly on the type of operations flown by the French
airline."
That's a pretty long-winded way to say "I can't find anything, Hugo",
but the fact that AW&ST DID NOT speculate on the union issue may be
significant. Maybe other CRMers can fill in the gaps.
Ken
-- Kenneth H. Funk II Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon, USA funkk_at_engr.orst.edu http://www.engr.orst.edu/~funkk