Re: Group think

Peter J. Wolfe (pjwolfe_at_ix.netcom.com)
Sat, 07 Mar 1998 13:00:31 -0800


Spence & Greg,

You both raise relevant questions about two very different ways in which
crews (groups, teams, etc.) can fall prey to group think.

As you point out, the Bay of Pigs and Challenger events were situations
in which the outlook/attitudes of those who were in the decision
making loop had evolved over a fairly long time period (days, weeks,
months). Over time they had (somehow) convinced themselves and their
colleagues that their course of action was correct, and that those who
disagreed or expressed concern were simply misinformed or were trying to
implement an alternative agenda.

The poor flight plan or poor "real time" decision making that Greg refers
to is somewhat different, in that the time-frame is much shorter. Many
work groups face such situations, especially those in which the task is
accomplished by a group of specialists whose understanding of the overall
project/mission is somewhat limited. The situation is made even worse
when:
a. only one person is given the "big picture" of what is to be done
b. that (one) person doesn't know what's involved in the supporting tasks
c. team members aren't given time or opportunity to provide input
d. questions are discouraged & conflicting opinions are squashed vs.
respected and carefully weighed for their merit.

In deed, this latter situation DOES come up quite often and it's a big
part of the situation that's been labeled -- the Hurry Up Syndrome.

Without question, BOTH the short term and longer duration situations are
made worse if those who question/challenge are disregarded or threatened
with dismissal from the team/project if they don't "get on board and pull
in the same direction as the rest of us." If/when that occurs, the risk
of group think is emminent.

When this thread began, I believe that it asked; does anyone have any
good examples of group think in the aviation setting?

Perhaps the best example I can think of comes from the UAL videotape of
its DC-10 crew on flight 232. A couple of items in that tape really hit
home:

Item #1 -- make sure the receiver understands your message

When Capt Haynes contacted United's dispatch center, he said "we've
lost the number 2 (center) engine" ... the video then showed the
dispatcher's response; "understand, you've lost #2".

As I watched the video, I realized that the message was incomplete and
did not convey the incredible seriousness of the situation. Neither the
words themselves nor the tone/manner in which they were spoken had given
the dispatcher any indication that this was anything more than a
relatively minor problem.

The dispatcher was concerned, but not overly so, and he began the
routine of checking those things that should be considered in continuing
the flight to its destination on the two remaining engines.

Capt Haynes apparently sensed that the dispatcher really didn't
understand the severity of the problem, so he immediately made a series
of follow on transmissions that clarified the situation.

As a training scenario: imagine what might have happened if the follow
on transmissions HADN'T occurred and there was a lenghty break before the
two spoke again. During that break the dispatcher's mind would work one
problem while the flight crew is working another very different one.

When they speak again, the dispatcher and his co-workers in SAM are
"hearing" whatever is said in terms of a simple #2 engine failure and
have a mental picture of the plane/crew doing what's expected in such
situations. It's not hard to see how the coordination between the two
could have broken down completely. In that situation, it would be easy to
understand how the cockpit crew might view SAM as more of a nuisance
(asking "stupid" questions) than a valuable source of support.

Item #2 -- ask your crew if there's anything you've overlooked or not
done while the situation is unfolding.

Capt Haynes asked everyone on the flight deck, including the Training
Captain who'd come forward from a seat in the cabin, if there was
anything else that should be done or any alternatives that should be
considered.

If anyone had a right to expect total focus and no-extraneous-inputs, I'd
certainly think Capt Haynes and this situation would qualify. Instead, he
invited input ... recognizing that, in the time available, others might
just be able to offer an idea could improve their chances.

By inviting their input and giving each idea careful consideration, he
not only showed great respect for the capabilities of his fellow crew
members, but also prevented the likelyhood that they'd get caught in a
trap created by group think.

Hope this helps. Pete