>
> I've got a quizzical spin on "Group-think". While there are
>documented
>cases of unsuccessful events such as the Challenger launch, and the Bay of
>Pigs, is "group think" also evident in airplane mishaps?
> Several recent Air Force mishaps have all had one element in common:
>poor flight planning. During the investigations , conclusions were reach
>that said, somewhat simply, "the crew did not do an adequate job of planning
>the mission". Examples are things like filing to an instrument approach for
>which the aircraft is not equiped to execute, turning toward a mountain
>immediately after takeoff inspite of published departure proceedures that
>direct otherwise, and finally, not reviewing a video depicting the hazards of
>a challenging airport design and not understanding warnings such as "extreme
>rates of descents required" which are written on the approach plate.
> It interests me that the mishap report will assess some level of fault
>on the crew for "poor planning", and I wonder if the crew knew that they had
>done a poor job before they started the takeoff. When the pilot lines the
>airplane up on the runway, advances the power and begins the takeoff, at that
>moment of time, does everyone on the crew think they are "OK"? Do they know
>they are in an "error chain"? How many CVRs contain cockpit conversation such
>as "let's go crash"? I don't think this happens.
> And yet, good people, in good airplanes, depart on a course of action
>that, from a historical perspective, is called "flawed and fatal". Did the
>crew, the "group", think that they were well-planned for the flight, or did
>someone have a doubt, but not insert skepticism into the group's plan?
> Can "group-think" be countered by "aggresive skepticism"?
>
>Greg Deen
>Raytheon
Greg,
I think you're on the right track. I'd like to throw in another
"group-think" wrinkle. The aviation business changes so rapidly that
many times the group doesn't get (or take) a chance to "think" or even
speak up. Aviation types (of which I am one) tend to be so mission
oriented that when there is any type of change, they have a tendency to
"suck it up and press on". This can lead to intentional or unintentional
choices that may be disastrous.
While I believe there needs to be significant emphasis on avoiding the
pitfalls of "group-think", I think that many of the contributory factors
will not occur if we continue to stress the fact that the accomplishment
of the flight is not exclusive of the need to survive the flight. The
old "wind the clock" idea can still help clarify many things before the
throttles are advanced.
Spence Byrum
Crew Training International (CTI), Inc.