Thanks for the challenge. Here goes.
The point of the cocktail party story is this: Sometimes we do not
draw the obvious conclusion from the available evidence. In the
cockpit, the red light sends an unequivocal message, triggers a
response. Signs of impending problems are often more subtle. The
aircraft entering a left turn as we descend towards Cali does not ring
the same alarm bells the red light did.
'Why not?' Understanding why not is important. Is it because the
obvious conclusion is distasteful, an aggravation to comfort, offence
to sensibility, a demand for recognition/admission of error? Refusal
to admit an unpalatable truth may be fine on the ground, at a cocktail
party, but it is defintely hazardous aloft.
People who have reviewed the available facts from the SilkAir disaster
may well be experiencing reluctance to conclude something they'd
rather not come to grips with.
On this forum, I occasionally sense that we are sneaking up on the
snake, about to pounce and pick it up by the tail, but we switch to
something else and the theme dies out. Unwillingness to conclude from
the facts? To conclude what? That over the last 15 years or more, the
most significant inroads into the accident rate can be attributed to
engineering excellence, that the human failure factor remains too
high. (As you know, that's especially the case in the
Private/Charter/Ag categories in this country.)
You'll have read in the papers that the con man, Peter Foster, is
being extradited back to Britain to get thrown into jail, the offence
being that he sold a 'herbal slimming tea'. A few cups of this a day,
the public was told, and fat people turn thin. Many tried it, and
nothing happened. The cops took him away, etc.. Imagine if the same
discipline was applied to folk selling safety prescriptions? Pack your
toothbrush when you're to attend the court hearing!
Taxying out, the other day, in a single engine 'plane, my mate (he's
both a pilot and a highly experienced flight engineer) said he didn't
like the sound of the engine. We came back in. It was found to be
failing, through excessive wear in two cylinders. I hadn't noticed a
thing! And I get many such reminders of the fallibility of my
judgement, my own reality aversion tendency.
Which goes back to the original point. Some people are more prone to
resisting acknowledgement of bad news that others. To the extent that
that is a function of personality, it can be tested for. To the extent
that it is a function of learning, it can be modified. I do both. Get
tested routinely (a), and work on my judgement 'muscles' (b). Because
I do (b), I'm better at (a). It may be only borderline effective, but
its better than nothing. All pilots ought to do it. Few do. They
should get in the habit, as it's only a matter of time before the cops
take an interest in the quality of their product.
I am going to throw in another observation. On this network, we ought
to be good at handling needling. My stuff is often provocative, and I
tender no apology for that. From my flying experience, I know that the
first response to the imperative for a drastic change in plan is to
take offence. But there is no place for sensitivity in the cockpit. At
best, getting annoyed by something merely subtracts from the sum total
of cognitive energy available for normal (or abnormal) operation.
Coping with being aggravated is good training, the value of which does
transfer from the keyboard to the cockpit.
Anyway, Kerry, I think you've got the right prescription for warding
off tropical torpor.
Cheers
Doug