Bill Taggart's list of top ten killers could easily be retitled to "The top
ten byproducts of not using disciplined Instructional Systems Design (ISD).
Hugo's initiative to compile this list is a very useful one and I hope that
we can publish the final product on this web site. It appears, however,
that we are mixing apples and oranges by confusing the factors that kill
CRM programs with the attributes of CRM programs that have direct
negative effects on operational behavior and safety (e.g. killing people
and bending airplanes). There is a very important distinction.
Bill Taggart's list is a list of factors that kill CRM programs. It is
not coincident that this list could also serve as the top ten reasons you
want to use disciplined ISD. Early generation CRM program development
guidance in North America was shaped heavly by UT Austin. ISD and training
science was, and still is, grossly underrepresented in this guidance. In
the early 90's the folks at UT reported that a disturbing number of CRM
programs were failing or were experiencing reversals to pre-CRM levels.
The UT folks had the opportunity to "kick through the wreckage" of some of
these dead and dying programs. Bill's list is essentially a post-mortem
report. The November 1997 GAO report on CRM put the final nail in the
coffin by confirming that the official guidance for CRM program development
outside of AQP remains inadequate.
80-90% of the problems that Bill sites in his top ten list are immediately
fixed by implementing a disciplined ISD approach to CRM training design.
The GAO report applauds the success of CRM within AQP. The guidance
documents for building AQP were written primarily by training development
experts. Industry designers of CRM within AQP have had to use disciplined
ISD and have, by default, negated many of Bill's program killers.
Back to the challenge that Hugo has offered:
May I suggest that we use Hugo's 2 factors as the start of a new list of
"CRM and Human Factors program attributes that have adverse effects on
operational behavior and safety". The two factors that Hugo recently
contributed have adverse effects on operational behavior and safety.
1. Lack of continuity
2. Lack of commitment with CRM principles by the very top leaders of the
organization
I would like to add a few:
3. Lack of desired learning outcomes (management skills stated as verbs)
for CRM training sessions
4. Lack of a system that systematically exposes pilots to known error
producing conditions
5. Lack of defined systems for identifying and exposing error producing
conditions on the line
6. Lack of clear links between the people that identify error producing
conditions and the people who shape policies, procedures, and training.
7. Lack of protocols for using industry and company safety findings to
build focused training solutions.
8. Lack of clear guidance (a set of standard management skill
expectations) that pilots can understand and translate into operation
9. A CRM program that tries be more than a skill development program.
10. Lack of a human factors program that resolves human performance
challenges beyond CRM skill development (physiological, ergonomic, etc.).
11. Lack of programs that systematically build, refine and reinforce CRM
skill on the line (overreliance on the 1-2 hours per year used to shape CRM
skills in the simulator).
12. Trying to make a CRM program into a human performance program.
(Exacerbated by titling a CRM program a "human factors" program.)
13. Lack of any viable means to identify human performance trends in
safety data (FOQA, ASRS, etc.).
Just a few to get things rolling...
May I also suggest that we leave Bill Taggart's original top ten killers
list unaltered as a reminder of the inadequacy of early generation CRM
program constructs.
Best Regards,
Vince Mancuso