1. Not integrating CRM into LOFT, PT and other operational training.
Absolutely TRUE! Believe it or not, there are some who still think LOFT and
our military MOST are not connected with CRM. Nothing could be further from
the truth; it was CRM assessment that created LOFT/MOST in the first place.
The aviation culture I participate in still have advocates of seperate, non-
integrated programs.
2. Failing to recognize the unique needs of your own airlines culture.
Absolutely TRUE! However, this was not really understood until recently, and
now we trainers get frustrated with the economics of training. The "bean-
counters" would rather spend a few dollars on a "one style fits all" approach.
When the cookie-cutter program doesn't work for a particular organization, the
preference is often to waive off the training, rather than design the training
for the cultural specifics that produce the error that will trigger a mishap.
3. Allowing the CRM zealots to run the show
I might debate this one. I, myself, have been labeled a "zealot, fanatic,
crazy," and others I probably haven't heard. Just recently, a supervisor in
instructed that our MOST missions would operate without headsets on.
Unbelievably, several other instructors agreed. Had it not been for one
particular "zealot", (moi), this degredation of training would have gone
unchallenged. While I don't think "zealots" should be allowed total control,
they may be the only defense against bean-counters and short-sighted
management. (Hugo's item # 12) The problem is that sometimes the "zealots"
need to be "salesmen" when working with managemt, not antagonists.
4. Bypassing research and data gathering steps.
Somewhat True. I must admit, I began a program or two without research.
Well, perhaps the research was "experience". A pre-survey is definately the
way to go, but that takes time and money, and often supervisors would rather
jump-start a program rather than to not do it, and I think I would rather an
organization have a CRM program, than not have. I have seen a lot of
research data go unappreciated. Perhaps the recent research of Ashleight
Merrit and Bob Helmreich will help us to understand the errors of history.
5. Ignoring the checking and standards pilots.
Aboslutely TRUE!!!! I know of a CRM facilitator who was busted on a checkride
because he did not brief CRM. The pilot asked if he had heard the words
"2-challenge rule, Time Out, Knock It OFF", and others briefed? The evaluator
said, "yes, what was that mumbo-jumbo?" The pilot then showed him the
training books, and the written SOPs that define the terms. The evaluator
insisted the pilot had failed, because he had not used the word "airmanship"
in the briefing. Need I go on?
6. Having lots of diagrams, boxes and acronyms
Not so fast GI! I would debate this a bit. I agree, the aviators can be
overwhelmed by models, and acronyms, and diagrams. To a point, they should
not be necessary. However, every instructor on this forum will admit that
memory aids are used by aviators. During an emergency drill in a simulator,
someone on the crew will often mumble through some sort of aid to remember the
proper sequence, or proper switch. Having a tool such as "Captain, you must
listen" will help one to be assertive, having a tool such as "QPIDR" helped
one crew discover that their airplane was rapidly deteriorating. These items
work, as aids, to the process. A few is necessary, a lot could be
overwhelming. I challenge my students to pick a couple from our list, and
learn them well. Then, when a crew collects into a plane, there are more than
just a couple within the team.
7. Making the program a one shot affair
Absolutely TRUE!!! Some good-minded managers are trying to remove
"repetition" from the training programs. What is the difference between
"repetition" and "reinforcement"? If one-shot affairs really worked, why
would we send pilots to "emergency drill refresher" every year? I routinely
ask some of my students if they have ever been to a CRM class before. The
usual answer is no. Then I ask them to recall a term I know was in their
introductory class. Some remember it. Did I repeat the training, or
reinforce it?
8. Using pop psychology and psycho babble
I'm not sure I understand this one, to be honest. Understanding what the late
Professor Mason taught about the" mind's limited ability to remember more than
one thing at a time" may have been "psycho-babble" to some, but in my class we
discuss the effects of it.
9. Turning CRM into a Therapy Session
I've never seen a CRM session that looked like a therapy session. Conflict
resolution could get close to that, I suppose, since most male aviators don't
like to express their feelings and vulnerabilities. Knowing that I'm a 9.1
and should turn into a 9.9, could be a theapy session, I suppose.
Understanding that each crewmember should participate in a pre-flight briefing
is not therapy, it's good team-work, in my opinion.
10. Redefining the *C* as Charismatic
I never heard of this before. Does this mean Charismatic Resource Management?
The objectives of the training should be focused on the "safe and efficient
operation of the aircraft". Where does charisma fit in? In a recent in-
company debate it was "policy and regulations" that decided the outcome, not
"charisma."
11, Lack of continuity (Hugo's?)
Absolutely true! One of the original C-130 programs died a few years after
birth. Probably for three reasons. 1--the accident rate dropped, so it was
perceived that the problem was cured. 2--there was no regulatory requirement
to continue the program, so economics won out. 3--the orginators of the
program (zealots, in training) were dispatched to other projects, and not
replaced, probably because of reason #1. Our current program is showing
lasting success because the initial, mission-specific, and annual refresher
lessons are using standardized terminolgy, standard presentation techniques,
and pro-active management that keeps the three connected. Some of the recent
student critiques are telling me that the program is getting better with the
improvements we've made.
12. Lack of commitment with CRM principles by the very top leaders of the
organization (Hugo's?)
See reason 2 of item 11. To this day, I see a difference in flying units and
their commitments to CRM principles. After visiting the hallways of a unit,
and listening to the members talk about their job, and watching the teamwork
of the various sections, I get a perception of the commander's commitment to
CRM. Then when I ask him to describe his CRM training program to me, his
answer doesn't surprise me.
Well, I might as well add a couple to the list myself:
13. Not supporting CRM programs with Policy and Regulations.
As I mentioned before, as a program matures, and shifts of organizational
culture challenge the value of the program, one anchor may well be Policy and
Regulations. How many SOPs exist because of a hard-learned lesson? If "bad
CRM" is to blame for a mishap, does "good CRM" become a new rule? If every
aviator would be required to attend CRM training, by law, then wouldn't the
managers also attend?
14. No program METRICS
I will admit Dr. Mancuso gave me some insight to this. Many supervisors,
especially at a high level, think the CRM program is designed to stop
accidents. When the accident rate goes down, the program is successful, and
it's purpose has been fulfilled. Without a better method to monitor program
successes, and short-comings, it s hard to justify the economic requirement to
maintain the program. This is a fascinating irony; a successful CRM program
will destroy itself, if the objective is short-sighted. A continuing
assessment program would keep the program dynamic, and responsive to shifts in
organizational culture and technology. Stopping accidents seems too
easy--reducing the error that causes accidents, now that's an objective for
training. Perhaps that's what would be called "good CRM" in item 13 above.
Greg Deen