1. That the Pilot IS "in control" as ever.
2. That fixed thrust levers (in autothrust) have never contributed to an
accident (moving ones have - some fatal). At the most critical time for
engine failure (V1 on the runway) "moving thrust levers" DON'T MOVE! Fixed
thrust levers (in autothrust)teach pilots to look for REAL aircraft
performance - speed and speed trend; not to look at a mechanical feedback
system which can fail!
3. That the 7,000 + pilots flying this technology take to the sidestick
like ducks to water.
4. That a GREAT DEAL of human factors thinking has gone into these designs
- the automation is a "complement to man", not a replacement.
5. That flight envelope protections are arguably not for discussion any
more, if you want improved levels of flight safety (avoidance of CFIT
accidents). Bank and envelope limits are similar in concept to brake
ant-skid, which has been with us for years (planes and cars), releasing
the brakes when we apply them on wet runways! WHY ALLOW PILOTS TO EXCEEED
AIRFRAME, PERFORMANCE, AND AERODYNAMIC LIMITS? Designers can certainly
allow pilots to skid on runways, stall, and break the airframe, but what
REAL rationale is there for this?
6. That your doubts are understandable, in that you may be yet another
victim of ill-informed media hype and inter-manufacturer rivalry which
have developed a strong mind set against these superb designs!
Power to automation - SENSIBLY AND THOUGHFULLY DESIGNED!
A full appreciation of the facts will dispel your doubts!
John Bent
At 14:26 25/03/97 -0500, you wrote:
>I do have a serious thought on this: there can be no doubt that
>differences in levels of automation, and differences in tasks
>automated exist among manufacturers and airlines. More important, I
>believe, is the underlying understanding of the role and needs of the
>pilot who is in "control". It is my opinion that a certain European
>manufacturer has made a fundamental, fatal error in isolating the
>pilot from essential aircraft feedback by making the (side) stick not
>proportional, and disconnecting the throttles from movement by the
>autopilot. What is the jet doing? What is the real power setting?
>Moreover, it could be argued that the bank limit (55deg, I beleive)
>is detrimental; someday a pilot will need to go beyond it to save the
>jet and HAL won't let him. I conclude that an excess of accidents in
>the life of this airframe has already occurred because the crew
>couldn't cope with the automation and no basic, "manual flying" mode
>is available. To be impartial, a noted safety researcher, Dr. C.
>Billings, who has intensively studied automation accidents, does not
>agree with my inferences. I should also state that I have some time
>with fly-by-wire (F-16) which has built in limiters to keep the
>pointy end forward and prevent stalls and departures (at least one
>accident might have not occurred without them). There is no doubt
>that automation will continue simply because the technology exists
>and because of the assumption that it lowers workload and increases
>safety. It has however grown without much consideration of the
>human. Opinions my own. Geff McCarthy MD
>
>