Yours is a thought provoking piece!
You are right, who really measures CRM? Here at Cathay, our logic is that
we have multiple "human factor" behavioral markers which are scored on
every check. Our argument pre-supposes that it is these human factors
(communications, appropriate assertion, team managements etc..)that are
fundamental to safe and appropriate behaviour on flight decks, enhancing or
inhibiting correct judgement, technical, procedural, and manipulative skill
development and proficiency. These skills usually feature in some way in
lining up the "holes in the Swiss cheese" (Prof Reason) prior to incidents
and accidents. Our confidence in this assumption gains ground as each year
of QAR/flight safety feedback data accumulates (together with written
reports), and will probably soon be further validated with confidential
reporting now being introduced. There are also some shining examples in
our recent history which show our crews functioning as super-teams. In one
case (an engine fire after unstick on a night heavy-weight take-off) the
crew functioned superbly as a team, returning their passenger safely to Kai
Tak in 11 minutes).
You are right though, it is a difficult area to "prove" to a serious level
of scientific rigour. "Without data, you are just another person with an
opinion".
John Bent
Flying Training Manager (Development)
At 09:45 AM 6/20/97 +1000, you wrote:
>G'Day CRM Developers!
>
>In response to Hugo Oscar Leimann Patt's question about legal consequences...
>
>(Which in case anyone cannot remember it went something like this....)
>
>"Now our challenge are the owners of the money. CEOs are reluctant, and we
>don't have many arguments to convince them. In our last meeting I exposed
>the legal consequences the security manager of Air-Inter suffered after its
>A-320 crashed near Strasburg 1992 (negligent homicide for not have
>installed GPWS in the planes). (see quote bellow) Now I'm looking for new
>episodes. Perhaps ValueJet, or Air Ontario (after Dryden) etc. Please, if
>any of you have some data to quote aboute legal consequences to managers
>for negligent behavior, please mail me"
>
>This is a really interesting area to us at the University of New South
>Wales where one of our current projects involves training ab initio pilots
>in CRM. As far as we know, there are very few institutions do this, but we
>believe in the basic premise that IF CRM IS SO GOOD, WHY DO WE LEAVE IT
>UNTIL PILOTS GET TO AIRLINES? (or indeed don't!). To answer this question,
>we needed to look for really good metrics to assess the effectiveness of
>CRM (the subject of many discussions on this group!) and so far we really
>haven't found much that PROVES conclusively in a way that commands academic
>integrity or indeed could easily persuade the non-believers of CRM that
>they should be paying for training in this area. Our students don't get the
>choice because we are all believers that CRM is a 'good thing' but even
>then can we honestly say that our course content is correct other than by
>sitting back for X years and see how our students do as pilots?
>
>We asked industry how they measure the true success of CRM and the answers
>can be a little depressing at times. As aviation is so safe, it is just
>about impossible to measure in terms of accident clean-up rate (except if
>you happen to be Al Diehl's A6 "81%" Interceptor squadron!) and in the
>non-jeapordy world of CRM training where LOFT's cannot be failed, this
>gives us few clues. We even asked a large international airline how they
>continue to justify CRM training to their accountants in terms of results
>(if I sound like a non-believer here it is because I dare to play devil's
>advocate!!) or return on investment. The answer was "I remind them of their
>duty of care. I ask them what they would say to the coroner if one of our
>aircraft crashed and they were asked why they stopped doing CRM and all the
>other major carriers continued". Should we really be resorting to negative
>arguments and how does this help the small carriers who currently do not do
>CRM? Surely we have the ability to collect the evidence to suggest to a
>coroner (or whoever) that management would be negligent if they did not
>start / continue CRM training?
>
>I can't help getting the feeling that there is too much anecdotal evidence
>floating around in our field which seems to support our assertions but
>remain open to question. For example, I have attended CRM training courses
>where the British Midland B737 accident at Kegworth in 1989 is used as an
>example of poor CRM. As a negative example where trainees can say 'why
>didn't the tech crew check what the flight attendants had seen etc.', it
>seems to serve a purpose, but when I hear the point made that "...if the
>crew had only practiced CRM" and then "...if the crew had only been trained
>in CRM" then I start to get uneasy. I refuse to go pilot-bashing here and I
>apologise to Captain Hunt for using him as an example here, but we have to
>ask ourselves WOULD THE CREW HAVE ACTUALLY ACTED DIFFERENTLY IF THEY HAD
>DONE CRM TRAINING? I am sure that all of us who have sat in on courses have
>seen individuals who really don't want to take in the message - may be
>these are the ones that always were and may still be accidents waiting to
>happen? Just because crew records say that employee X has done CRM training
>doesn't mean that they are trained and we need to know how to pick these
>people out. It is easy to look at an accident with hindsight and say "if
>the crew only applied the following CRM skills then it wouldn't have
>happened" but in the real world...
>
>If CRM is really as important as we all believe it to be then one day we
>will have to start to grab the bull by the horns and start to pull out
>those individuals who just don't get it! I would also suggest that ab
>initio CRM is the place where this should happen. It is no good the big
>carriers developing to the stage where they refuse to recruit 'CRM-unable'
>individuals if these guys are going to go off and fly secondary level
>airline of GA aircraft in the same sky. CRM is not a fix-all, but at the
>same time it is really serious stuff and not a jolly outing in 'having a
>nice time with your fellow crew'.
>
>(I think I am going on a bit!)
>
>Finally, I wanted to suggest an example of legal consequences for
>management by going outside of aviation (which is something we can all
>benefit from doing once in a while!). If you take a look at what happened
>following the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987, airline
>management might just get a scare. In case you don't remember it, the
>accident occurred to a Roll-On Roll-Off ferry operated by Towsend Thoressen
>(P&O) shipping as the ship left Zeebrugge with its bow doors open and
>capsized with great loss of life. Although the initial cause appeared to be
>crew error (the assistant bosum, whose responsibility it was to close the
>door OR inform the bridge if they were not closed was asleep in his cabin),
>the inquiry found rather more to the accident. The ship had a danger-side
>failure system i.e. the bridge could not see the bow doors, had no
>indicator light to say they were closed / open and had to rely on a single
>individual (who as it turns out had been on an amazingly long shift and
>fell asleep) to tell them if the doors were unsafe. The crux of the matter
>is that the courts decided that it was the MANAGEMENT that were culpable
>and as such could stand trial for CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER. This was ground
>breaking stuff in the UK and it was only a legal technicality that kept the
>senior management out of jail for failing to assure a safe operating
>environment. I was told by a reliable source that on news of the courts
>decision to press corporate manslaughter charges, Lord King (BA) stormed
>into the safety department and said MAKE SURE THAT NEVER HAPPENS TO ME!
>Food for thought! (There is a good book all about this is anyone is
>interested).
>
>Right, I am going to shut up now....
>
>
>Graham R. Braithwaite
>Research Associate
>Department of Aviation
>University of New South Wales
>Sydney 2052
>Australia
>
>Tel. + 61 (0) 2 9385 5756 (work)
>Fax. + 61 (0) 2 9385 1072 (work)
>Tel. + 61 (0) 2 9314 5061 (home)
>
>e-mail: groovy_at_alpha.maths.unsw.edu.au
>e-mail: G.R.Braithwaite1_at_lboro.ac.uk
>
>
>
>