The LOFT tool
CRMDEEN (CRMDEEN_at_aol.com)
Wed, 7 Jan 1998 11:40:11 EST
Good Morning, CRMers, and Happy New Year to all,
Thought I'd throw my two cents-worth into the LOFT event discussion.
When I started our military version of this training (MOST) back in the
mid-80's, there was very little experience and guidance in the designs of the
training. I learned some fascinating lessons from the start, to include how
ignorant I was. Here's some of the things experience has taught me:
1. Crewmembers are carbon-based systems. These "humans" all have a
certain UN-predictability about them. They will make their OWN decisions to
delimmas, regardless of what the facilitator wants, expects, scripts, plans
for, and sometimes even, regardless of what organizational policy would
dictate. This makes "automated triggers" either useless and frustrating. The
ISD process, as good as it is, must remain subjective in its objectives.
2. Only the beginning of the script will be "standard." Once a crew
gets airborne, and the mission begins to unfold, anything can, and will,
happen. There are three malfunctions that occur in simulators: the ones the
instructors insert on purpose (because they want the crew to experience it),
the ones the crew will create in their minds (because they are bored and in a
simulator), and the ones the computer/simulator will inject itself. The
challenge to the facilitator is respect that once a malfunction is identified
by the crew, it is REAL, no matter what the source. If a crew does NOT see a
malfunction, that is real also. I once did verbal battle with ISD script-
writers who wished to "legislate" crew reactions. They would write into our
profile to introduce a minor aircraft malfunction, and then write the expected
behavior. The reality is that some crews would not see the malfunction at
all, some would react according to the script (few, actually) and some would
see the malfunction, but not care. Creation of environmental reality is the
facilitator's artform.
3. Simulators: Niel is absolutely correct in saying "the designers of
simulators have a LONG, LONG, LONG way to go in trainer design." I have never
met a simulator I like. The fault, I submit, is in the objectives of the
design of the simulator. Are we designing simulators to turn on red lights so
the crews can recall procedural reactions, or are we designing simulators to
have crews work TEAMWORK challenges? What HUMAN senses do the simulators
really input to? Crewmembers will react to ALL of their human senses.
4. The most UN-real "effect" in the simulators is that which we are so
earnestly trying to avoid---death. If a crew in a simulator fails to properly
solve their delimmas, the computer comes to an abrupt halt, and gives some
silly sign to the crew such as "Fatal Error". I have witnessed crews do
stupid stuff, and in some instances even re-enacted history. When they
"crash" the crew will sit there a moment, shrug their shoulders, and say
something intelligent like "oops". The ignorant instructors usually preset
the "reset" button at that time, and life goes on. WRONG ANSWER, I say. If
the "aircraft" crashes, the mission is over, no matter how much training time
is left on the clock. The crews get pretty frustrated with me, having spent
several hours of flight planning time, and then when they flew into a rock, or
lost control of the airplane, they see me walking out of the simulator.
Experience has taught me that even "simulated" death is a valuable teacher, as
is peer-evaluations.
5. The key success factor of MOST/LOFT training is ATTITUDE. Is the
training really taken seriously? The students, instructors, training
department, and management MUST take the training seriously. Even to the
point of jeaprody objectives. If a crew fails to follow policy or does
"stupid" stuff, and that BEHAVIOR results in a "simulated" mishap, they should
experience the pain of the mistake and learn from it. To do this properly
requires a commitment to a most formidable training objective: CRM. To know
whether the training of CRM in the classrooms is really getting to the
airplane, even the simulated airplane, we must have a method to measure the
training. (oh no, metrics again) One thing I was asked a long time ago: what
are we trying to do in the LOFT/MOST sessions? I think it's called "behavior
modification," and that ain't easy!
FINAL thought: LOFT is a tool, not an objective. CRM is the training,
but what's the objective? To write LOFT scripts with specific learning
objectives must start with the CRM objectives. To assess the training, there
must be behavior objectives, and the assessment tool must reflect the
objectives. To publish a universal, and possibly international, "event set",
is a wonderful idea, but are you assuming the training objectives, as well as
mission objectives, are universal? (oh no, culture again)
One of the training objectives our ISD folks wrote is: "the pilot will
react to other malfunctions." Most of the pilots succeed at this; it's
probably a universal objective.
Greg Deen
Raytheon (formerly HTI, formerly CAE, formerly. . .)