1. The social idea is great--isn't there a two-story sports bar across the
street? Perhaps they have a reservable room.
2. This is more to the OSU staff--when are the registration materials coming
out? With all this talk on the net, I can't wait. (bag's already packed).
Several of the Air Force clients (advance weapon instructor school) I work
with want to come also, and they are asking me for registration and hotel
applications.
3. RE: boundries of CRM--Dr. Stan Trollip has an excellent challenge in his
workshop: look for "human factor stuff" during the lunch break. I've used
that technique myself to challenge CRM trainees to increase their fluency in
teamwork awareness. When a uniformed worker at a quick-food joint refused to
help me because he "hasn't clocked in yet", 3 minutes before the appointed
time, is this a CRM thing? How about an individual's attitude toward the
organization's mission? Recognizing CRM concepts
outside of the aircraft increases the fluency of the language, and should
improve at least the awareness in the cockpit. I worry about sending a
message that CRM is a behavior we can turn on and turn off as we pass through
an aircraft door.
4. Having studied the reports of Cali and the Ron Brown event, I see very
different dynamics. For those who have asked, the CT43 was a "steam"
instrument cockpit (737-200). In the Cali incident, the crew seemed to be at
a low-arousal state during the approach; allowing the FMS to execute the
approach while the captain discussed the differences between the crew rest
policies of cabin and cockpit crews. When the low altitude alerts triggered,
the crew was quickly overwhelmed.
In the CT43 event, the crew was quite overloaded shortly after take-off.
The rerouting in flight caused a delay (in that organization, on-time
arrivals are a BIG priority), the weather was lousy, the crew's profficiency
in flying unapproved approaches was low, they rushed the approach, and the
radio conversation with the host-country pilot did not help matters.
Additionally, the aircraft was not adequately equipped for the mission,
navaid wise. I do not think a more advanced "glass cockpit" would have made
much of a difference since the crew did not have the MAP in their INS.
5. I have noticed the "metrics" dialogue dried up when I pitched a
challenge for application. I certainly did not intend to shut up a
discussion. I'll be transmitting the result comparison of all three
responses to the challenge tomorrow.
An encouraging note: last night, during a MOST mission, I inserted the
same challenge to a different crew (prop light on short final), and when the
engineer verbalized the light, the pilot instantly applied go-around power,
directed the engineer to trouble-shoot the problem, directed the navigator to
select an alternate airfield, and told the co-pilot to advise the
command-control system they were aborting the assigned mission. What a
difference a decision makes. Yes Virginia, there is a Santa Clause!
See ya tomorrow---Greg Deen, HTI/Raytheon/?