Obviously, there are still some chains of events and circumstances which can
lead qualified and experienced flight crew into the dreaded CFIT envelope. CFIT
has been rightly placed high in a "cancer of aviation" category.
One design perspective on an accident such as Cali is to take a look at
appropriate automation from the point of view of "what may assist recovery",
once a CFIT environment is recognised by a pilot. Although prevention is
obviously better than cure, one level of automation which contributes to flight
safety in such circumstances is, in my opinion, fly-by-wire envelope protection.
>From available data, CFIT may have been avoided if the aircraft had been a type
fitted with fly by wire envelope protection, which requires only a single action
to recover from CFIT - SIDESTICK FULLY BACK!
Data derived from the FSF and actual tests of envelope protected aircraft shows
an average reduction of recovery (bucket) distance of 1000 ft, and a saving of 4
seconds of time to recover to the start altitude, compared with the averaged
data from non-protected aircraft.
TOGA application and speedbrake retraction is automatic with current models of
envelope-protected airliners, and the ONLY skill required is available to any
person (pilot or leyman) with basic motor skills, at a time where arousal levels
may be relatively low ofter a long flight. There are very few airline pilots
with the skill derived from regular practice, who can fly an aircraft around the
edge of the envelope as well as computer-assisted envelope protection allows.
Such technology has been in airline service for over 8 years and is largely
misunderstood by those unfamiliar with it as some kind of "usurper" of pilot
control.
Perhaps manufacturers and designers could look again at the relative merits of
computer-assisted envelope protections for commercial airliners, and the aircrew
body be less cynical about such safety enhancing systems. Not all automation is
"bad"!
THIS IS NOT TO DOWNGRADE IN ANY WAY THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING ANY OTHER
LESSONS, IN AREAS OF DESIGN, HUMAN FACTORS, ATC INFRASTRUCTURE, AND PROCEDURES,
WHICH MAY BE USEFULLY LEARNT FROM THIS TRAGIC ACCIDENT.
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