> The main area I was looking for advice is my response to the copilot.
All three of us talked about this situation, but I wanted to be sure I
drove home the idea that the copilot's inputs were both valued and
necessary. Obviously, there is a difference between words and deeds,
and I wanted to know what those more experienced than I would do. Any
suggestions? Thanks again, Jeff Cuoio<
Jeff,
I think the co-pilot probably knows that his inputs are "valued and
necessary". What he needs to know is his role during each phase of the
approach and landing. The PNF is essentially and always a safety observer.
At the point where the IP directed "visual, full-stop", the copilot has to
make an initial safety call. His first question is, "Is the aircraft in a
safe position to continue?." With the ILS essentially centered, he can
assume that the aircraft is still "in the slot" for a safe landing. His
next question is, "Is the aircraft in a safe position to land?" At this
point, he needs seek reinforcement that the PF is able to safely land. If
he takes a quick glance outside and sees adequate runway cues and the PF
making positive corrections to a safe landing, again, continue call-outs.
If all he sees is milky white IMC, call again for the go-around -
forcefully and assertively. The second half of this is that the IP and the
squadron has to back up the copilot's decision.
As I said earlier, the IP has all of the extra brain cells working
at this point. He must take the extra effort to gauge his copilots comfort
level. I remember one flight into St. Louis. I was flying with a
Phoenix-based FO with relatively little weather-radar experience. I had
been previously Chicago-based and had way too much experience with St.
Louis weather. The radar was attenuating in the moderate to heavy rain and
showing mostly red. I could sense his discomfort. I knew he needed
internal and external confirmation that all was well. I keyed the mic and
asked for ride reports on final. All previous aircraft reported a smooth
approach with moderate to heavy rain. I could tell he was relieved by the
"smooth" PIREP. I then turned to him and asked if he was now comfortable
with continuing. He said yes and we continued to an uneventful landing.
On the ground, we had the time to further discuss the approach and our
decision-making.
A necessary part of CRM is the realization that the High
Situationally Aware crewmemember must help the Low Situationally Aware
crewmember regardless of crew position. Back in F-4s we had a running
discussion of how the seat selector should be positioned. The non-pilot
back-seater had could essentially force both seats to eject or eject by
himself. My briefing was to always set the dual-ejection. I told them,
"If I ever scare you enough that you want to eject, take me with you.
We'll sort it out on the ground."
Steve Swauger
B-737 Captain
TheSwaugers_at_Compuserve.com