I guess I have a couple of questions about the incident you relate
that are relevant to the acceptance of CRM by your crew members.
1. How did the pilot flying know that there was not some other factor
that prompted the call for a go around besides visual contact with the
runway? The fact that the copilot has low experience doesn't mean
that he/she does not see a problem that requires action in a situation
that may not permit discussion or explanation.
I assume your SOP places the go around decision making in the hands of
the non-flying pilot in such a case. As flying pilot, I would be very
hesitant to reverse that decision without knowing more about the
entire situation. Part of effective CRM is to react conservatively to
situations where all factors may not be known. Another is trusting
the properly qualified person you are flying with, regardless of
experience.
2. Does your SOP permit a landing to be accomplished once the
non-flying pilot has called for and the flying pilot has initiated a
go around? I have a bunch of time in civilian Lear 35s, and that
sounds very marginal to me. Application of power creates significant
pitch trim changes and jockeying the power at low altitude and
airspeed could challenge even the best crew.
I've not been to Sarajevo, but I would think that if the crew is not
ready and able to execute the missed approach they shouldn't be there
either.
In short, it sounds to me like your copilot did just fine. If I had
been in his shoes, I would have been shaken too. If you want to
demonstrate the value of good CRM to your junior people, I suggest
that your senior people use it.
Best regards,
Neil Krey
neilkrey_at_mail.airmail.net
http://web2.airmail.net/neilkrey/
---Jeffrey Cuoio <cuoiojeffrey_at_hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Greetings to all the CRMers,
> I've been reading these messages for a few months now and have not
> seen a question like mine, so please let me know if this is the wrong
> forum for this, but: I'm flying c-21's (US Air Force's version of a
> Learjet 35) here in Stuttgart, Germany. With the bad weather and
> two-man crew things can get quite busy. Thus, deviding up duties is
> essential. The division of duties that concerns me here is that our
SOP
> for callouts on a low vis approach is that they are made by the pilot
> not flying (PNF). This caused a significant problem recently as we
had
> a very experienced pilot (IP) flying with a very new copilot. At
> decision height the copilot was unable to acquire visual cues for
> continued approach and called go around as per SOP. The experience
> pilot started to push up the power for a go-around and immediately
> acquired the runway. The pilot checked the glideslope indicator and
was
> still in a safe position to land (less than one dot high) and told
the
> PNF that he was "visual, full-stop". The landing was uneventful,
but it
> was obvious the copilot (PNF) was shaken by the experience. The IP
and
> the copilot debriefed and then the IP came to me to relate the
story.
> My question to you all is this: how do we convince the copilot
that
> his input is very important and at the same time make a consession
that
> the IP's experience put him in a situation to better recognize the
> lighting and evaluate a safe position to land? Asking the IP's
around
> here, the majority (actually all that were asked) said they would
have
> been comfortable continuing because the aircraft was still in a safe
> position for landing and because a go-around at Sarajevo airport can
be
> quite tricky. My main concern is the copilot's belief in CRM and his
> position in it. I appreciate your time and inputs.
>
> Jeff Cuoio
> cuoiojeffrey_at_hotmail.com
>
> P.S. I would also like have a contact or two with any major US
civilian
> carrier for questions outside this forum. Thanks.
>
>
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