Re: Developing for Cultural Differences

CRMWILSON (CRMWILSON_at_aol.com)
Fri, 12 Dec 1997 15:08:15 EST

Good words, Greg. At the risk of involving everyone else in our intratribal
discussion, I note that the recent commentaries from some of the leaders in
our field (with the exception of Kern, Edwards, Mancuso, Wilson, and a few
others) do not place a lot of emphasis on "following the rules" or procedural
obedience. Perhaps it is an "understood" thing. That is, it is so obvious that
policy and procedure must be followed that it goes without mentioning.
However, many of the recent of the recent accident analyses involve the
disregard or abuse of one "standard operating procedure" or another. Some
organizations are deemphasising it in their programs, even to the point of
removing discussions and facilitation in policies and procedures from their
programs and requirements. That seems odd when several recent mishaps in both
the commercial and military are directly related to a crew (or a pilot)
disregarding one or both, policy and procedure. If I remember correctly, the
last figures I saw attributed something like 20% of all mishaps with primary
or contrubuting causes involving noncompliance.

Policy and procedure form a framework in which we all must operate. This is
true in any walk of life. Departure from the framework puts one, one's crew,
and others in a world without rules. That is, once the rule is broken, what is
the new rule? People slip into and out of policy and procedural obedience
frequently, sometimes deliberately (with or without good reason) and sometimes
inadvertantly. This is, I think, the essence of the error management words we
now hear. The lessons to be taught are how to avoid a slip in as much as it is
possible, and what to do when the breach occurs.

Doug Edwards discusses this at some length in his book, Fit to Fly, and in a
posting recently seen in this forum. He comes at the issue from the aspect of
the instructions and attitudes pilots get from their instructors from day one.
If the instructor (and/or others to whom the student looks for guidance and
leadership) are casual, dismissive, or disrespectful of the policy and
procedure, an unhealthy culture is formed. The more so if the business is
"macho" or "macha" by its very nature (such as combat operations). Hope I got
that right, Doug.

So, though the aircraft is culturally neutral, the pilot/crew is/are not. And
it is precisely there that the "cultural thing" enters. Any CRM program that
ignores the culture in which it is to serve is doomed to failure.

Think of the problems encountered with some of the early commercial and
military programs. The developers and management said, " We have a problem. It
is the pilots and their ability to lead (read: manage, coordinate, etc). Here
is a program, use it!!! " Most would say in retrospect that that was not the
best way to develop a program. Some of which were severly damaged by the very
instructors and check airmen assigned to insure compliance.

Later, more successful programs involved pilots (and later still other crew
members) in the development. That was a concession to the culture. So, my
answer to the question of when does culture enter the picture is:

The day we first think of a CRM course to be developed.

Bye for now . . .

Dave Wilson
HTI