What about the "operational methods level?" That's an interesting viewpoint.
If I might be so bold, do the aircraft manufacturers design and build
airplanes according to "national", or "organizational" culture? Does the
engine on an aircraft really care if the pilot is a Brit, Aussie or Japanese?
Is the programming of the FMS on the new aircraft "culturally specific?" Do
the adjectives come before or after the nouns?
I suspect the aircraft is generic. The wing will stall at a predicted speed,
no matter what nationality is flying. So I'm going out on a limb here and
surmise the aircraft is NOT culturally sensitive. So if the CRM objective is
"safe and efficient flight operations", where does this "culture" stuff really
show up?
Perhaps we are back to a basic "Standard Operating Procedure" dilemma. Are
SOPs based upon the aircraft or the people? I witnessed an interesting
example of the need for clear and specific SOP in a MOST (LOFT) mission this
week.
Before the mission, we had a CRM refresher class in which we reviewed a
recent, and tragic, mishap. The final part of the mishap was that the pilot
crossed the threshold too high and 26 knots fast. In an academic setting,
everyone sitting in the chairs say "I would have said 'Go Around'." On this
crew, I specifically challenged the rookie copilot if she would do this, and
she promised she would.
During the MOST, when briefing the approach and landing procedures, the pilot
told the copilot to call him "fast or slow", but did not specify an amount.
Later, while attempting to land on a 3500' runway, the pilot was flying too
fast on final. Nearing the midpoint of the runway (still airborne), the
flight engineer yelled "Go around! pilot, you are WAY too fast", and the pilot
complied.
During the debrief, I asked the pilot if he had briefed the crew on "go-around
criteria", and he said he had. I asked the copilot if she heard the briefing
and she did. I asked her if the pilot specified what was too fast or too
slow, and she said no. Then I asked what HER values would be, and she said
"about 3 to 5 knots". I then asked the flight engineer what he meant by the
term "WAY too fast", and he replied the pilot was 30 knots too fast.
Lessons learned?
1. Just four hours before this event, the copilot said she would not let a
pilot land 26 knots too fast, even to the point of taking controls. Saying it
in a classroom is one thing, doing it in the aircraft is another.
2. The pilot did NOT specify "fast or slow" criteria, so the action
stimulation becomes less predictable.
3. The flight engineer held his tongue until the pressure built up and he
exploded into assertiveness.
4. An examiner-qualified navigator sat in the cockpit and watched without
participating himself.
5. The pilot, who has just recently upgraded to PIC, learned that his
briefings need to be clear and specific because "assumed" SOPs don't work.
Trainers NOTE: I, as the facilitator of the MOST, asked the pilot to perform a
lousy approach when given a secretive cue. He normally operated the aircraft
in a very acceptable manner, but, all of a sudden, he became task saturated,
overloaded, and his pilot performances decayed rapidly; and most on the crew
were willing to simply watch and ride.
Vince Mancuso's Skills List is quite appropriate for this event. Items 2, 7,
8, 10, 12, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, and 28 are among the items we debriefed.
What is NOT on Vince's list is "SOPs" or "Policy and Regulations". I think it
is necessary because I once read that it is the LAW that makes us equal, and
cuts through cultural barriers.
Greg Deen
HTI