As a child, I was taught never to pick up a snake. Aaah! What the heck?
Culture can't bite. 'Specially if you grab it by the back of the neck.
A while back, Hidetake Sakuma raised the issue of flight crew behaviour
under the terrible stress of a major emergency. He suggested that
cooperative behaviours need not be attributable to crm alone. He later
in the debate clarified his position, contrasting 'thoughtful (not
necessarily heroic) behaviour' 'not producing any conflict' with
'compelling action to do a right thing'.
That got me thinking about behaviour options and choices, especially
when under pressure. I referred back to the University of Texas'
Helmreich/Merrit work on culture. People from different cultures will
allocate different 'weight' to the same 'pictures'. The example from
that work that got some media play down here was 'trust' in the
automatics, eg, letting the autopilot keep doing the job even when the
crew is in doubt.
The Helmreich/Merritt work described cultural characteristics that might
be perfectly harmless - charming even - in walks of life where safety is
not critical, but which, in a flight crew, will be most undesirable
baggage. Cultural differences are not just of national origin ('macro').
Where I work, you can easily 'sense' the different culture ('micro')
from one training school to another, and between airlines. In air
forces, the microculture within a transport squadron will differ
markedly from that in a fighter unit. (Not taking sides, here, just
observing.)
No point thinking about this stuff if you can't draw useful conclusions,
so I went back and read some CVR transcripts. Sure enough, there are
plenty of instances of behaviour that could be described as defining
'the prevailing flight crew microculture' for those airlines. They
include a preference for being laid back when there is genuine cause for
alarm, acquiescence with inappropriate commercial pressure, and, worst
of all, the complacent belief that it's OK not to follow procedures.
(Boeing study, 65% 150 - out of 232 jet airliner accidents.)
Still not getting anywhere, I'm given some assistance by a post from a
Canadian pilot whose first language is not English, and a response by Dr
Turney. Is there such a thing as a 'culture-free' zone? Well, my earlier
thinking suggests that, if it can be done, if a culture-neutral place
can be obtained, then the cockpit ought to have first priority for this
development. If it can be done, it must be done. Now the crm (and other
training) goal posts are just beginning to take shape.
When you look at so many of the characteristics that constitute a
microculture, they pretty much all are matters of choice. I can choose
to be laid back, or I can prefer to be alert, even against my national
background and personal predilictions. Even under stress, I can choose
between domineering behaviour leading to unresolved conflict or I can
act so as to promote cooperative problem-solving. The abject
professionalism seen too often in CVR tapes can also be defined as a
matter of personal selection from the range of options.
Up to a point, I concede. As Oscar Quintero reminds us that
understanding the mental models at work in managing attention and the
process of focussing lies at the root of coming to grips with human
error and judgement processes. If I do not do injury to your submission,
Oscar, I think you are implying that training choices can be made that
will advance the microculture in aviation away from where it now too
often is towards real professionalism. 'Focussing', in decision-making,
has been seen in so many accidents, where the dominant influence has
been one person's obsessive tracking of the wrong goal. That's
'compelling action' of no use to anyone.
But it's 'Pepehahns''s post that starts to bring the goal posts into
clear focus. The time available to get the team cooperating, sharing
joint objectives, motivated, happy with the methods to be used, a little
hugging to dissipate negative tensions, might not be enough. 'Pull Up
...' 'Turn right!' The responsible decision maker has to act now
regardless of grounds for conflict. 'What do you mean? Birds? I don't
see any ...'
But hang on, birds on short finals is the sort of emergency we train
for, no? In a sense, the potential for conflict takes lower priority to
the vital need for immediate action. We train so that the compelling
action is the right one, and instantly operable by the whole crew, not
just one of them. More important, we have assessed the situation,
decided on proper responses -- in advance -- and thoroughly prepared our
reactions so they can be instant and automatic. Indeed, we have
checklists full of pre-ordained decisions.
My least favourite CVR tapes are those that reveal total lack of basic
preparation. On one tape you hear the letdown plate being referred to,
late in the piece, the pages being turned just now, with the crew about
to descend into an unfamiliar field. The time to become intimately
familiar with that letdown plate was the night before, not just before
descent! Lack of preparation leads to the sort of impromptu
decision-making environment in which the pathogen -- obsessive focus on
the compelling action -- flourishes.
I wish now I hadn't gone back over those transcripts. There's another
appalling quality displayed - imprecise, uninformative, use of language
- meaning-deprived gibberish denying any real opportunity for either
pilot to reveal his thinking and intentions and thus ensuring the other
pilot has no chance to approve or disapprove, or assist and support. In
these microcultures, even routine checklists have degenerated from
precise, sharp, 'challenge and response' words to laid back, casual,
'Joe Cool', waffle.
So there are the goal posts. The aeroplane can and should be rendered a
'culture-free' workplace. There are cultural attributes in flight crew
that work against the interests of safety. They may be deeply
entrenched, but must be neutralised. Regardless, they are largely
matters of preference. That is, they can be over-ridden by personal
choice, though it will be difficult. The training to enable that must
therefore be (a) closely focussed, ie, just what is needed for aviation
professionalism, no more, especially not whole-of-life behaviour
modification, and (b) it must be rigorous, including absolute commitment
to and practise of precise and meaningful language in all flight
management communication along with deep learning of all critical
checklist actions and greater effort in preparation for each and every
flight. It's going to need serious application and self-discipline, but
isn't that what being a professional is about?
Finally, in my view, tough training such as this (it's commonplace
enough in the military) is to be separated from crm exercises. The crm
session is where the crew show how well they have used the other
training to strengthen their participative behaviours.
Cheers
Doug