ON ROGUISM
He was socially adept. People remarked at how relaxed he was, in company.
This was especially noteworthy as he was also so intense. Relaxed-and-intense!
He was thought to be arrogant. People said he "strutted" rather than walked.
Although of medium height, he was thought to 'walk tall'. He was not liked
by many contemporaries - and they knew he didn¹t care.
He was a display pilot, and relished that status.
He thought he was a star pilot - but by objective criteria, he was not.
(Examples, he routinely "fell out" of stall turn attempts, his slow rolls
showed gross/coarse control input.) His fellow pilots felt there was little
point in saying anything to him. His superiors didn't haul him into line. I
suspect they were in awe of him.
Doug Edwards
1. They are extremely competent if not experts in some aspect of their
profession.
2. They are socially adept, what some psychologist call a "maladaptive
sociopath" but I think true roguism goes beyond that description
3. Rogues make people take sides. There is little or no ambivalence.
4. Rogues are often liars or exaggerate their abilities or accomplishments
as well as belittling others
5. Rogues often feel trapped in a system designed for "lesser mortals."
This is often their rationalization for breaking established rules, which
they feel were created by morons for "normal people" not superior being like
themselves
6. Rogues are driven, but often by different types of motivation.
7. Rogues, once identified seem to be "teflon-coated" or "have nine lives"
They can ride out the tough times intact and appear to be masters at
"working the system."
Major Tony T. Kern
Psychodinamically they constitute hysteroparanoide characteropathies, they
freeze their cockpits, are prone to fly for others (like to have
spectators), to show their flying skills (that most of the cases are very
very good), they don't like copilots, in our country they use to say
"copilots are nothing more than the consequence of the captain's mood" or
worst than that "copilots are no more than flesh in transit". They are
"risk-seekers", counterphobic subjects, (it depends on the optic you use).
Hugo Oscar Leimann Patt
Neil Johnston at Aer Lingus used a mnemonic to describe rogue (maladaptive)
behaviour in general - PROD:
- Project
- Rationalise
- Opt Out
- Deny
Rick Heybroek
1. In most, but not all cases, the ability to project themselves and their
accomplishments positively to superiors was noted. However, the old saw,
"you can't fool all of the people all of the time" was also true. Peers and
subordinates were not fooled, but some still became "groupies" -- attesting
to the mystique and charisma which tends to surround a rogue.
2. Regarding positions of power and influence, with minor exceptions,
rogues seem to be in upper mid level positions. Examples include Bud
Holland as Chief of Standards and Evaluation, Marcus Arnheither (Navy
Destroyer captain), and Nick Leeson (Barings Bank wrecker).
3. As to "when" the rogue behavior began to appear, I haven't bee able to
get to that level of depth (yet). Most stories I get are "after the fact"
and will require considerable time to dig at the roots. There are always
opinions of course, like "Bud went bad when he didn't get a squadron
command." but I don't put much stock in Monday morning quarterbacking. I
need to do the research and see if there is evidence out there to help
answer this one.
4. I haven't looked at the "life stressor" or "failing aviator" criteria
yet either, but from what I recall of most of these men, they were otherwise
well adjusted and successful. Once again, more research is needed.
Major Tony T. Kern
Their projected competence is exaggerated. They are not as good as they get
other people to believe they are.
The projection of mastery of/in all situations is part of what intimidates
others - superiors and co-pilots alike. The other part is a quick temper -
and disproportionate emotional response to advice.
The greatest amount of rogue behaviour, in my observation, is learned in
developing as a pilot (doctor, lawyer).
Entry to flying/the professions is competitive. Advancement brings rewards.
Hubris follows. If something is learned-in, it can be learned-out. Even
inherited traits can be 'learned-over'.
Doug Edwards:
the problem solving issue with rogue pilots: recruitment and/or training.
In both cases you must have a theoretical framework to orient yourself to
make decisions.
Safety is not jeopardized by the 95% of pilots who buy CRM, but by the rogue
5% (and others), CRM reluctant or refractory.
But why are they reluctant or refractory?, is it enough with acrostics and
self check lists?, how many seminars and loft sessions are needed to change
their dangerous behavior? CRM is the best context to self examine and
insight, but have these individuals enought insight capacity? Has peer
pressure demonstrate efficiency to deal with them?
When you are in front of a characteropathic individual, you are dealing with
a person unable to make any insight. They believe that they are the "best
pilots they ever saw" (remember The Right Stuff and the Chuck Yeager
Syndrome?, also Maverik's Top Gun Syndrome)...
Hugo Oscar Leimann Patt
I think that the rogue individuals fall in this category so the true problem
must lie in recruitment and / or training. As we are involved in ab initio
training of pilots at UNSW it is interesting to see just who our students
model themselves on.
...our problem could be that we may be rogue recruiters?!
Graham Braithwaite
If the so called rogue is not more accident prone that the non-rogues then
we just have to write him/her off as a pain in the butt. If the
characteristics of the rogue do make then more likely to have an accident,
then obviously we should try to do something about them.
So the question I end with is, can the so called rogue really be identified
with an acceptably low rate of false positives? Is there anything other
than observational/anecdotal data to support this position?
Keith Hendy
I think I was beginning to understand how rogues fooled the bosses, but I
was perplexed as to how rogues were able to get so many "groupies" around
them, ones who could see them for what they were -- undisciplined.
One element that I found anew was a universal tendency of these men to
feel somehow unnecessarily "bound" or "restricted" by the system. Typical
rogues were able to sell this "victim mentality" to peers and subordinates,
creating a clandestine cult of "victims of the system" who were now released
from personal responsibility for following what they felt were
inappropriately restrictive rules. This tracks with societal trends in
general, which makes it doubly dangerous and something worth taking note of.
This may be the most devastating finding so far. The social influence
of the rogue extending out to infect others who are primed to accept this
argument because of shifting tends in society at large. But there seems to
be a natural organizational response. We can and should talk about the
rationale for the rules and regulations under which we operate. I think
that this is appropriate content for CRM. Even if we don't decide to add
this into our existing courseware, which is already pretty crammed, we MUST
guard against the tendency to join in the "policy-bashing" discussions that
often take place in seminars of senior aviators. Just like an instructor
who apologizes for the textbook on the first day of
class, if we as facilitators downplay the importance of this or that
regulation, policy, or procedure, we have set the table for the rogue to feast.
Major Tony T. Kern
>From my observation, these are part of the profile:
--superhumanly stubborn, especially when resisting new ideas;
--averse to physical exercise;
--uncommonly affected by heights (near cliff edges and windows in tall
buildings).
Doug Edwards:
I would suggest that attitude and personality are more likely to, knowingly
or unknowingly, have and effect through the influence they exert on others
in the organization. Consider Reason's (1991) hypothesized list of
"violation producing conditions" (that is precursors to individuals
violating rules):
1) lack of organizational safety culture;
2) conflict between management and staff;
3) poor morale;
4) poor supervision and checking;
5) group norms condoning violations;
6) misperceptions of hazards;
7) perceived lack of management care and concern;
8) little elan or pride in work;
9) macho culture which encourages risk taking;
10) beliefs that bad outcomes won't happen;
11) low self esteem;
12) learned helplessness;
13) perceived licence to bend rules;
14) ambiguous or apparently meaningless rules, and;
15) age and sex (young men).
How many of these conditions are likely to be precipitated or exacerbated by
the presence of the character type identified by Major Kern, particularly if
these individuals are in senior or training positions?
Thus, it is through their effect on safety culture which "rogues" (if they
do exist) will do most harm.
Joel Morley
Two items I can state fairly clearly at this point. First, "accident
proneness" is at the small end of the impact scale as it relates to the
potential damage a rogue can do. A far more weighty concern is impact of
rogues on the long term compliance on other members of the organization and
organizational credibility across the board, especially as it relates
to training.
Secondly, rogues in aviation put at risk far more than an individual
aircraft or passengers. When the moment of truth comes in the form of a
rogue accident, the organization as a whole is hit in the solar plexus
because it can usually be proven that the individual operated out of bounds
under the noses of supervison -- sometimes with their knowledge and tacit
approval -- for a prolonged period of time. This means heads roll at
senior levels, again more of an organizational than a purely safety issue
(unless you consider job security as safety). The bottom line is that while
rogues may or may not be more prone to accidents and incidents, when they do
occur, the damage quotient is typically far greater.
Major Tony T. Kern
The danger in attempting to categorise behaviour into personality types is
effective cultural ostracism. If "rogues" exert a cultural influence they
are also subject to it. The quality of the organizational safety culture is
not in it's ability to find and eliminate undesirables, it is in the
interplay between "desirables" and "undesirables" and the permeability of
the boundary between them. A characteristic of safe organizational culture
is "a distributed attitude of care and concern" for the outcome of
safety-related decisions. Anyone can exhibit rogue characteristics.
Effective CRM must discourage those behaviours wherever they are in the
company, including management. Simply turning a poor performer into the
enemy is counterproductive.
Rick Heybroek
We should feel comfortable in identifying them now.
My question is : what do we do about them? Should their treatment and
control be part of a "supervisor CRM" training program?
What should the supervisor of a flying unit do when he is informed that he
has a "rogue" in his airplanes?
Greg Deen
I feel we are on a witch hunt here and do not yet feel '...comfortable with
identifying them...' as Greg says.
Out of any screening system there are 4 results
„ correct rejection
„ missed detection (false negative)
„ incorrect detection (false positive)
„ correct acceptance
Think of all the pilot selection methods that have been used (at one stage
you had to be able to ride a horse). Most schemes lie in the dust now
because they did not have predictive power or they had high false
positive/negative rates (particularly in the personality area). The latest
round of selection tools have gone through rigorous testing to check all
possible outcomes. Even then it is a moot point about whether they are
really working or not. To really do this exercise you must score you
subjects on the measurement instrument and make the selection of
rogue/non-rogue before you know the outcome of the profile. Then when you
know the outcome you can calculate all possible outcome rates. Once you
have done this I may be less sceptical.
Keith Hendy
With the investment one has in a line pilot, one does not merely wish to cut
them loose. If possible, turn the resource into an asset..and even better if
one can convince a rogue to change..sort of like saving the local drunk...
becomes not only an asset but shows others it can be done. <G>
So, in summary, advise them their behavior has to change...
John Wiley
First, true rogues manipulate information for personal aggrandizement and gain.
Secondly, rogues (by my early definition) are most definitely NOT team
players, unless the team goals align themselves coincidentally with their own.
Major Tony T. Kern
I wondered if an organization can take on the "Rogue" characteristics. Seems
like the Wing in Europe involved in the CT-43 crash at Dubrovnik may fit
into the mold. My memory tells me there are some special operations units
that might fall into that classification as well. Is there such a thing as a
rogue organization or unit?
"We can and should talk about the rationale for the rules and regulations
under which we operate. I think that this is appropriate content for CRM."
After situational awareness, failing to follow the rules, and poor decision
making are the leading elements of the 60-80% Human Error to which we so
often refer. The first elements of our program are Policy and Regulation
followed by Command Authority. The first draws the students into discussion
of the reasons and sources of the policies and regulations with which they
have to deal. There is also a very interesting segment on "the unwise
command" that draws/allows them to discuss how to deal with that subject. In
Command Authority we deal with legal authority of the aircraft commander and
the responsibilities of a crew member. Here is where assertiveness, inquiry,
and advocacy are introduced.
If we limit all CRM training to skill based learning only, those critical
subjects fall out of the curriculum. I think they are essential in the
awareness or introductory part of a CRM training program. Probably there
should be a reinforcement at some recurring interval. We use an annual cycle.
The organization has a right, and I think a responsibility, to establish
standards of performance. We do not have a problem with that concept when
talking about technical skills or knowledge, but behavior is another thing.
Reporting for a flight drunk or hung over to the point of being unable to
safely conduct their aircrew duties would be grounds for dismissal in most
flying organizations. There is something to be said for the reformed person
here, but the very term "reformed person" means their objectionable or
unsatisfactory behavior has changed.
Why then do some of us seem to stumble over the inability of some crew
members to get the CRM picture? Given reasonable opportunity to correct
their behavior, the only solution should be show those who can't change the
door and wish them good luck.
In fairness to employees and to the organization, there must be clear
guidance as to expected behavior and ample time and training for the
employee to attain it. However, at some point, the door opens and they are
out if they can not comply.
Greg Deen asked, What should a supervisor do if he discovers a rogue in his
airplanes? 1) Get him out of the cockpit. 2) Give him a chance to correct
his behavior. 3) If he doesn't, do not let him back in the aircraft.
Dave Wilson
Yes, you can show people the door. If you don't want to spend a lot of time
in litigation you will need to document the problem which means something
bad has already happened. CRM place in this rogue business is to alter the
acceptance level of the peer group. To that end a list of rogue
characteristics or profile can be incorporated in classes. Rogues are quite
clever at picking their audiences for the extreme behavior and changing
their stripes when being checked.
Peer pressure does have a role, but it has to be backed by an organization
willing to impose discipline.
Gerry Joering
These personalities can be screened for during psychological assessment.
Kerry Douglas
It seems to me that Roguism can be bred into individuals via the
organizational culture. The Air Force, unlike the airlines, has a great
number of very young troops (most of which may eventually be airline pilots).
The commander and operations officer significantly influence those
youngsters... That attitude seems very difficult to change. Indeed, I
think that many leave the service sooner than expected because they cannot
transition to a more disciplined unit.
differ from the airline operation?
Jeffrey R. Hill
If we are talking about changing behaviours, ought we not to be placing a
significant focus on new/ ab initio pilots and their instructors to ensure
the necessary behaviours and habits are taught and developed correctly in
the first place? Hopefully then we will not end up spending so much time
and energy teaching "old dogs new tricks."
Wendy Santilhano
I have flown fighters for 22 years, and have trained airline pilots of all
nationalities for another 11 years. From what I have observed pilots come
in several categories: Good hands, no brains; bad hands, good brains, but
slow; good hands, good brains, quick. Airliners or fighters, we are looking
to get the third variety...good hands, good brains, quick.
These descriptions of course outline what one could call boundaries with the
majority of pilots running in between the boundaries. The rogue pilots are
usually the first category, good hands, no brains....there are definite
advantage to these types in the combat arena as the brainy pilots will tend
to get their butt blown off thinking about their next move. This variety of
pilot is very impressed with senior leadership...monkey see, monkey do. I
would think that these guys might go a little nuts in the airline cockpit
life...not enough challenge to keep their mind working toward productive
outcomes.
However, good pilots are good no matter what they are doing and the airline
life is challenging for a good pilot, just in other ways. These ways
include things like interpersonal skills, crew coordination, different form
of discipline, and more management of the overall effort than the pilot in
the military was normally exposed to during normal operations.
All said and done, there is still a need for all types of pilots and
you just can't throw anyone out the door...just a little firm guidance will
normally suffice.
Reid Fairburn
No followership technique was enough to restrain his (police commander)
brainless "operational" decisions.
I humbly don't believe this a sort of witch hunt, as some colleagues have
posted here in the forum.
We have a big problem out there, but I'm sure there are a lot of Lt Col
Hollands out there, perhaps very useful in wartimes (nevertheless in a
little war we had in 1982 -Malvinas/Falklands Island- this hypothesis was
not confirmed at all), but not in a commercial cockpit please.
This caracteropaths put at risk not just a single flight operation, but are
a kind of cancer in the intimate tissue of the organization.
CRM "boomerangs", rogue pilots, will continue to challenge our imagination.
Knowing the bad prognosis of personality disorders, I would like to get ride
of them.
Hugo Oscar Leimann Patt
I disagree that there is a big problem out there. In my experience the so
called "rogue pilot" that is being discussed in this forum, a discussion
that I am viewing with some alarm, is the very small minority.
To those who have initiated this still small scale feeding frenzy, I urge
caution; - Witch Hunts do get started this way. We all have seen examples
of egregious behavior in the cockpit at one time or another; they are
memorable because they are so rare. Who among you would be comfortable
enough to say that you would be able to perfectly fit the objective
standards that were arbitrarily designed by some alphabet group deciding
what the perfect pilot should be?
Some of the characteristics of a "Rogue Pilot" that I have seen bandied
about recently are characteristics that are needed for certain missions at
certain times. If these people where eliminated by some very fallible
objective written test before they even started flying then
they would not have been in the seat when they were needed.
I believe, very few of your so called "Rogue Pilots" are suicidal. Better
that we use effective training methods to weed out the incompetent people,
like the police commander that you reference, and provide guidance for the
pilots among us, some of whom some may consider "rogues" to effectively and
safely employ their skills.
Lonney McCann
I have seen first hand what Jeff Hill is saying about the organizational
culture breeding rogue attitudes and behavior. We work in the wildland fire
industry, and we're seeing a lot of that "attitude damage" occurring at the
indoctrination and basic course levels - inflicted by instructors, many who
are rogues themselves.
I sat through a basic fire behavior course last spring and was appalled to
see the instructor impart such attitudinal gems as: "Don't trust anyone you
don't personally know", "Don't trust your fellow crew members." and "Don't
trust your crew leader."
Lark McDonald
I did 7yrs in the Air Force, did 3.5yrs flying general aviation in Learjets
and Citations and then the airlines in 1978.. small observation. People do
what is required of them but the tone comes from the top down. I had a very
good ops officer in the KC-135 who went after excellence and showed others
it was not only desirable, it was obtainable. Leadership.. pure and simple.
Now, what many want to do is pay lip service to the program, give half
hearted support and bust the chops of anyone who threatens the possible
pending promotion.... whether airline or military or GA..there is always
something that is in vogue and those who see themselves as "shakers and
movers" will be out front dancing...the key is to find out who is applying
it..<G>
Culture is on going and self reproducing....it takes time to change....but
it can be done. But, first, the guys at the top have to do more than
dance... they have to show they are willing to change also.
Discipline is not a realm solely belonging to the military. On a CAT IIIb
approach or even worse, a non-precision approach at night, you better have
good crew discipline or prepare for a smoking hole....
Reid, you have broken the code.. the good pilot is able to adapt to the
changing requirements. Airline ops is not about TOT or putting the pipper on
the target but about making sure the pax in 13D thinks it was a great
flight.... but in the end, the real test is fulfilling the "mission
requirement". It is the mission requirements that change and some guys don't
or can't make the change..
True, there are some guys out there who no amount of followship will work
with..but as one old guy once told me, "Do what you can to stick to
procedures....be nice and be tactful...but remember one thing...never let
the SOB kill you....
I know one or two guys who told a "wild and crazy guy", "Do that once more
and you are without a F/O". They were asked if they knew what they were
doing and they replied, "Do you know you're no where near procedure?"
One was able to get his point across and finished the trip. One other got on
the ground, called the chief pilot and said, "Get another pilot... and pull
the tapes..I ain't flying with this SOB again."
Don't be tactful to the point of getting dead.....
John Wiley
There is a spectrum of value against which opinion can be assessed. To be
sure, one end of the spectrum can be classified 'worthless'.
However, at the other end, adjectives such as 'learned' and 'expert' are
usually applied to the noun in question.
Another mate, the lawyer, would be out of a job but for the commercial value
of his opinions. He sells them, and gets a good price. Indeed, those
countries with a common law (or 'caselaw') tradition would have no system of
jurisprudence (read as 'Check on Government') at all but for opinion. Senior
professionals routinely are called upon to express opinion on the conduct of
their fellow-professionals.
People who have accumulated considerable experience and status within a
profession, are generally accepted by society as being capable judges of
such things as how well (or poorly) a fellow-professional prepared for his
or her conduct of professional tasks. In other words, a professional (pilot,
doctor, lawyer) can achieve a position from which their opinion is of
tremendous weight and merit - even in such difficult matters as assessing
safety factors in fellow humans.
Having attained 'expert' status, it will be greatly valued, not put at risk,
such as by advancing opinion loosely, thoughtlessly, or without solid grounds.
Scientific (&/or other) Studies.
Keith, there may not be a lot around, but there are some. The Swedish
academic studies that led to the design and implementation of the Defense
Mechanism Test (DMT) are pretty dated by now, but their scientific rigor
looked good to me, back when I organized to (as Air
Force Director of Training) trial the DMT Down Under.
The DMT trial was a sub-element of a study that looked at, with the usual
academic discipline, and over a two-year period, twenty years' experience
with pilot selection, training, and subsequent pilot-career progress. It was
quality work, even though (mostly) subjective.
(By the way, the principal conclusion of the Swedish studies was that high
denial - or ego-protection - was strongly correlated with poor performance
under stress. That's what we want to know about pilots - how well will they
will handle stress??? Some of us who were involved in the Australian trial
of the DMT remain convinced of the merits of its - or some equivalent -
method of testing to answer that question.)
There are other studies such as reported in Robert Dixon's book, on The
Psychology of Military Incompetence. It, admittedly, uses the case study
method - but it perfectly describes the phenomenon wherein an individual
superimposes his/her preferred version of reality over the grim truth. This
is denial - at very high levels - and it is exactly what pilots do when they
refuse to admit the approach or presence of danger. (The Cali 757 CVR
transcript is worthy of review from this perspective.)
Acceptance of Risk.
People who have died on Mt Everest climbed into a hazard zone - and they
processed their evaluation of the ambient risk factor in ways that are
familiar to accident investigators in any field. But - and it is important
to note this - they did accept the risk voluntarily.
Passengers in aircraft do not. And the pilot in command may not accept risk
vicariously - on behalf of the passengers. Thus the 'duty of care' imposed
on the professional pilot is manifestly greater. Or, at least, it should be,
especially in terms of professional preparedness.
Of course, it is not just about pilots. A rogue businessman who trades on in
the face of overwhelming evidence of bankruptcy similarly averts his gaze
from - denies - the evidence of danger. His irresponsibility may cause havoc
and hurt - but no fatalities (at least, not directly).
Implanting/Nurturing Roguism.
To add support to part of Tony's evolving thesis (and acknowledging that
Hugo has said much the same thing, only more elegantly), in this country,
the regulating agency (CASA, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority) is not
regarded, by the aviation community, with respect and affection -- and that
is fertile ground for seeds of roguism to be sown and thereafter nurtured.
A clue to this syndrome may be found in US literature - the 'doctrine of
civic disobedience' (was it Thoreau?).
The argument is this: When the rule of law becomes so despised by the
citizens (be it through corruption, venality, lack of representation,
whatever) then refusal to co-operate with authority is promoted from being
offence against the law to proper and urgent duty. The Emperor enfeebled by
madness, we must all go to the barricades in revolt. Our Emperor, CASA, is
routinely and frequently 'bagged' by instructors in flying schools. That
teaches students that disrespect for CASA's mandate (and rules) is OK. In a
highly macho environment, that easily translates into rejection of
regulatory dictates becoming an heroic
and just cause - the duty of disobedience! Some of these embryo aviators go
on to careers in an airline. And they carry with them the rogue pathogen,
without a shadow of doubt.
For your profile list: Rogues are averse to reading accident reports.
Doug Edwards
The End (for the moment)