However, by using a third party to manage the system there is the risk of
the individual units not taking the program seriously. If the members of
the unit perceive the third party as an "outside" organization there is
little chance that the input to the system will be steady and worthwhile.
Only a system that is vigorously supported by the chain of command will
provide the desired results. I'm not proposing a system be forced on the
flying squadrons, but good solid leadership would be essential.
At 04:57 PM 8/12/97 -0600, you wrote:
> 1. I agree that some type of trusted 3rd party must manage a military
ASRS
> type system.
>
> 2. Incentive? I think it pretty much HAS to lean on "altruism for a
better
> system" because much of what military pilots do is dangerous, and such a
> system could save lives and expensive aircraft. Perhaps there is a
> successful means of marketing this program. A military ASRS system could
> catalog these lessons and close calls in a database that would allow
various
> types of trend analysis which would be useful to both the safety community
> and the operational guys. What if the trusted 3rd party responsible for
> collecting the incident reports were to publish a periodical that
summarizes
> the incident reports, cleansed of identity? I imagine such a periodical
> would get much ready room attention. In the tactical fighter business,
> crews are routinely experiencing close calls and lessons learned, most of
> which are etched in the brains of those in the flight but never get passed
> on outside the unit. In the single seat communities, the pilots may
never
> tell anyone. This is a tremendous loss of "tribal knowledge." Imagine
how
> useful Navy pilots would find the discovery of a trend through such an
ASRS
> system of failure to recognise the radar altimeter warning on a night
> approaches to the ship. If the trend had not been recognised by the
system,
> many of the pilots may have thought that they were the only ones that
> experienced this particular failure. With the trend identified and proper
> action taken, lives and aircraft could be saved.
>
> The vast majority of class A mishaps (fatality or total loss of
aircraft) in
> the F-18 community are due to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and
> mid-air collisions. A wealth of information is probably available in
> lessons learned and close calls in daily flight operations. Right now,
the
> lessons only get out after a mishap or a hazard report gets filed.
>
> 3. Make the military ASRS system EASY TO USE. Writing an Approach/Combat
> Edge article or submitting a proper hazard report is more work than most
> will trouble themselves with. 2-3 hand written sentences, however,
don't
> take much time. I think aircrew members would take the time to jot down
> their experiences if it was easy and they knew it might help save lives
and
> aircraft.
>
> 4. Make the system DOD wide, not just service specific.
>
> Conclusion: In my opinion, a confidential, easy to use, and well marketed
> military ASRS system would be well received by the military aviation
> community and would provide useful information which may be put to good
> accident prevention use.
>
> Vince Mooney
>
>
>______________________________ Reply Separator
_________________________________
>Subject: ASRS
>Author: crm-devel_at_db.erau.edu at INTERNET
>Date: 7/28/97 12:28 PM
>
>
>Hello Folks,
>
>We are all familiar with the tremendous success of the Aviation Safety
>Reporting System and the benefits that managers and training developers c=
>an
>derive from confidential incident reporting systems.
>
>When we look at creating such a system for the military there are two
>fundamental questions that, until adequately answered, virtually guarante=
>e
>that an ASRS or ASRS-like system for the military will not work.
>
>1. What guarantee does the aicrew member have that the information
>provided will not be used against him or his unit? There is a confidenti=
>al
>incident reporting system in place today within the Air Mobility Command =
>of
>the U.S. Air Force called "airmail". The pilot sends the completed forms=
>
>to a military point of contact. It has not experienced the participation=
>
>that one would hope for. I am fairly convinced that to be successful, th=
>e
>reports have to be sent to an independent and TRUSTED 3rd party. =
>
>
>2. When the mission is over and the aircrew member has the choice of goi=
>ng
>home or filling out an incident report, what is the incentive for the
>aircrew to fill out the report? Altruism for a better system has proven
>not to be adequate incentive. The "Why should I take the time" or "What=
>'s
>in it for me" part of the equation is much different in the military than=
>
>in commercial aviation.
>
>I hope the group can help generate some possibilities or share some
>experiences that would allow the architects of military safety and CRM/OR=
>M
>systems to craft a realistic proposal for confidential incident reporting=
>=2E =
>
>The current systems for incident reporting are passive systems
>(organization waits for aircrews to report). =
>
>
>Assuming the trust issue in item #1 above could be addressed by using an
>independent/trusted 3rd party, I wonder if the "hassle threshold" could b=
>e
>lowered by a trusted third party actively acquiring the incident reports.=
> =
>
>The military very successfully used the "Critical Incident Technique" to
>acquire over a thousand reports from pilots who flew in Desert Storm. Dr=
>=2E
>Rick Siem has been exploring the usefulness of CIT in his work at Brooks
>AFB. I wonder if the key to a successful incident reporting system for t=
>he
>military is a combination of ASRS-like trust and active acquisition of
>reports using a CIT methodology?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Vince Mancuso, Ph.D.
>
>
>
Rod Pierce
OSU Aviation Research Team