I guess there's a lot about CRM prescriptions that make more sense when
the overall objective of safer piloting is kept in view. An example from
my past:
In the Macchi, the max rate descent is throttle to idle, speed brake
fully extended, 45 degrees nose down. ('Plummeting' is the appropriate
descriptive word.) It was while in this configuration, calmly noting
that we were soon to pass through 1,000 feet AGL, that I politely
pointed out to my rocket scientist student that the time had come to set
aside the data gathering and would he please exercise judgement. (An
authentic genius, he had, even by then, designed his first aircraft.)
I do not generally hide my sense of appreciation for the contributions
scientists, psychologists, and all sorts of supporting folk, have made
to the aviation community. However, there's a lot in flying that has
evolved intuitively. I don't recall any study of the relationship
between pulling back on the stick and not hitting the ground. When it
comes to safety prescriptions, we can't treat them as you would a new
drug. The aviation equivalent of the placebo would be to let some
crashes happen.
The first predicting (single gyro) gunsight just turned up, one day, in
the wartime squadrons. It came with the newest model Spitfire. Previous
aiming devices had been fixed, the pilot had to work out the lead
deflection aim-off. This one moved, in proportion to rate of turn and
range. (For the younger folk out there, range was manually fed through
the throttle twist grip.) There was no operating manual, nor any
training course. An Australian pilot, 'Bluey' Truscott, very soon after,
made ace. While others were struggling to understand how this
new-fangled device worked, he took to it automatically. So much so he
was of no use in assisting others, explaining how he used it. Truscott
had been a star football player before the war. Australian Football is a
running-kicking-catching game. Truscott was renowned for his skill in
taking catches, judging the flight of the ball into his hands while on
the run.
When I trained as a fighter pilot, skeet shooting was routinely
practised, to hone those very eye-hand co-ordination skills. I was
hopeless at it. However, once I'd worked out air gunnery, I became good
enough on the clay target range to win several championships.
We have talked a bit about controlling attention switching through, or
allocation of attention to, multiples of tasks. Some people do it
easily, it seems. More, we have noted how pressure degrades that
ability. An autonomous cognitive process causes focus in a single issue,
obliterating situational awareness by ceasing the monitoring of all
matters of interest. A threshold has been crossed.
I say that pilots must to be able to keep up the scan, maintain their
attention-allocation control, regardless of ambient stress. How can they
do that if they do not firstly know -- intimately -- how they react to
pressure, that is, where their threshold is -- and then continually
re-visit it and practise being able to impose conscious authority over
attention scan to ensure it is supplying the information -- updating
their situational awareness? That's a skill that surely qualifies as a
safety prescription.
One day, pilots are going to have to be able to prove their 'cognitive
resilience'. The ones who have been doing some work on it will do better
than those who have stayed in the middle of their comfort zones. What
that work is will depend on lots is things, like culture, type of
flying, access to resources, etc.
I hope I don't come across as being prescriptive with 'exercises'. I do
offer examples, but that's all they are. I know what 'works' with my
clientele. You have to work out your own. The principles are clear
enough from what I have written. And it's is the same as any other form
of training -- identify the skills and knowledge needed, diagnose for
existing levels, design the training, check to see how it worked,
re-design, and so on.
Good luck with it.
Cheers
Doug
PS I'll never offer an opinion on something I haven't tried